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Judgment
I.M. Quddusi, J.—Heard. The instant appeal u/s 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (henceforth ''the Act'') has been preferred by the State of Chhattisgarh to call in question the order passed by the 9th Additional District Judge (FTC), Raipur on 25-6-2007 in Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 14/2005 dismissing the reference application preferred by the State/appellant u/s 18 of the Act.
Facts of the case, in short, are that land belonging to respondent No. 1 was acquired in Land Acquisition Case No. 06/A-82/Year 2002-2003, Village Khamtarai, Tehsil and District Raipur and the award u/s 11 of the Act was passed on 26-7-2004/27-8-2004. The acquisition was made for construction of railway over-bridge on Raipur-Bilaspur Road at Village Khamtarai. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award in favour of respondent No. 1 for Rs. 27,36,873/-. After deducting the amount already deposited by the State, respondent No. 1 was found to be entitled to balance amount of Rs. 23,43,424/-.
The District Court framed 4 issues for determination and while answering issue No. 3 it has found that though the State of Chhattisgarh is a "person interested" and can prefer a reference application u/s 18 of the Act yet the application having been preferred by a person who was not authorized in writing and no letter of authorization having preferred, the reference is not maintainable.
Shri Sourabh Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 has raised a preliminary objection that the State of Chhattisgarh is not a "person interested" and, therefore, the reference application itself was not maintainable.
Shri Vinay Harit, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/appellant has strongly resisted the argument and has submitted that the reference application was maintainable in law and the leaned District Court should have allowed the application.
Before proceeding to consider the merits of the matter, this Court would first take-up the issue regarding maintainability of the reference application on behalf of the State/appellant. The expression "person interested" has been defined u/s 3(b) of the Act. The said definition is inclusive definition although not an exhaustive one. Primarily it includes "all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land".
While considering the meaning and sweep of the words "person interested" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. S.U.T.N.I Sangam and Others, has held in Paragraphs 55, 57 and 59 thus:--
The expression "person interested" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act may be given a restricted meaning. A State is not a person interested. A company or a local authority for whose benefit the lands are acquired, having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Act, is not entitled to file any application for reference.
The Association, therefore, could file a writ application representing its members but, stricto sensu, it could not have filed any application for reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. For the purpose of making such an application, indisputably, the period of limitation provided for therein must be resorted to. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a statute of limitation should receive strict construction.
In a land acquisition matter, the question of a body of the persons being represented by Association does not arise. The statute provides for filing of claim applications as also filing of objections by the land holders and not by and/or on behalf of the Association and that too an independent body corporate.
On an earlier occasion, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sharda Devi Vs. State of Bihar and Another, after relying on The Collector of Bombay Vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri and Others, and Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, has held that Government is not a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act. In view of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, as discussed above and relying on the said judgments, this Court is of the considered view that the reference application u/s 18 of the Act preferred by the State/appellant was not maintainable. Though the District Court has dismissed the application on merits after recording a finding that the reference application was maintainable yet in view of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, this Court does not find any substance in this appeal as the reference application was not maintainable. Consequently, the instant appeal is dismissed.