State Of Chhattisgarh vs Shekh Saleem

This appeal has been preferred by the State/Appellant being aggrieved with the judgment of acquittal dated 26.03.2009, passed by the Court of Special Judge (Atrocity), Bilaspur (C.G.) for offence punishable under Sections 294, 506, 323/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 (1)(10) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocity) Act, 1989.

Facts of the case are that on 17.01.2008 at around 2:50 PM, when Tukaram Nagdone (PW-1) went to his plot bearing Khasra No. 254/2, 3 & 4 situated at Vyapar Vihar, Bilaspur (C.G.) for Bhoomi Poojan along with his wife Usha Nagdone, son Harish Nagdone, daughter-in-law Rashmi Nagdone and two other persons. The Pooja was being conducted by Motilal Pandey (PW-5), at that time the Respondents came their broke the Pooja, uprooted Pandal, abused the complainant and his family members and assaulted Harish Nagdone due to that he sustained injuring on his head and right hand. The matter was reported by Tukaram Nagdone vide Ex.P-1. Harish Nagdone was examined by Dr. Kiran Nahrel (PW-7). After completion of investigation, charge-sheet has been filed.

The Trial Court framed the charges against the Respondents and after recording of evidence, vide impugned judgment dated 26.03.2009, the Trial Court acquitted the Respondents/accused from the charges as mentioned in paragraph one of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

Learned Counsel appearing for the State submits that the Court below failed to appreciate that the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts. Therefore, findings recorded by the Court below is perverse. Hence, the order of acquittal may be set-aside.

Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents supported the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the Court below.

I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and perused the record available with utmost circumspection.

Both the complainants Tukaram Nadone (PW-1) and his son Harish Nagdone (PW-2) in their Court statements deposed that at the time of incident when they were performing Pooja on their plot, suddenly, all the Respondents came their, abused and assaulted them through hands and fists. There are two eye-witnesses in the matter one is Smt. Kamla Bhimte (PW-6) and the another is Motilal Pandey (PW-5). Smt. Kamla Bhimte (PW-6) in her Court statement only deposed that there was a dispute taken place between both the parties. She had not stated anything with regard to any assault and abuse by the Respondents. Motilal Pandey (PW-5) who was conducted Pooja, not supported the case of prosecution and turned hostile.

On minute scrutiny of statements of the evidence, it makes clear that with regard to possession of the plot, a dispute was taken place between both the parties. It is also clear that on previous occasions also, so many times, disputes were taken place between both the parties. It is also admitted by the witnesses that during the recent incident, Respondent No.1 Shekh Saleem also sustained injuries.

Considering the entire evidence available on record, the Trial Court arrived on the conclusion that a fight taken place between both parties and both the parties sustained injuries during the fight but, it is not clear that who was the aggressor party. Therefore, on this ground, the Trial Court acquitted the Respondents only on the basis of benefit of doubt.

The Supreme Court in the case of Anjanappa Vs. State of Karnataka, 2014 Cri.L.J. 368 has held that order of acquittal will have to be disturbed if it is perverse. Para 9 of the report states as under:-

“9. It is well settled that an order of acquittal is not to be set aside lightly. If the view taken by the trial court is a reasonably possible view, it is not to be disturbed. If two views are possible and if the view taken by the trial Court is a reasonably possible view, then the appellate court should not disturb it just because it feels that another view of the matter is possible. However, an order of acquittal will have to be disturbed if it is perverse. We have examined the trial Court's order of acquittal in light of above principles. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was justified in setting it aside as it is perverse.”

In Budh Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. (2006) 9 SCC 731 the Supreme Court also held that in a matter of appeal against acquittal, the High Court does not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, although the view of the Appellate Court is a more probable one.

Looking to the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution and findings recorded by the Court below, I do not find any compelling and substantial reason to interfere with the judgment of acquittal.

Accordingly, the appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.