State of Haryana and others vs Dharam Singh

M.S. Liberhan, J.

The appellants have come up in Letter Patent Appeal whereby they have impugned the judgement, dated February, 16, 1989, of the learned Single Judge, whereby the respondent were granted the benefit of the provisions of section 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.

The facts lie in a narrow compass. The land in question was acquired vide Notification dated September 24, 1973. The Land Acquisition Collector vide his award, assessed the compensation which was enhanced by the Additional District Judge, Sonepat, vide his award, dated March 19, 1980, which was further enhanced in Regular First Appeal No. 958 of 1980. The learned Single Judge determined the rate of the acquired land at Rs. 4.46 per square yard which has not been challenged in this appeal.

The only challenge of the appellants is with respect to the grant of statutory benefits to the respondent in the amended provisions of sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act.

It was urged that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRs. etc, and Prithpal Singh and others v. Union of India and Ram Mehar Rajkumar and others v. Union of India and others and Delhi Cattle Breeding Farms Pvt. etc. v. Union of India, AIR 1989 S.C. 1933, the benefit of the enhanced solatium was provided by section 30(2) of the Amendment Act. There is no gainsaying that the Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, observed as under :

"There can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by section 30(2) of Amendment Act in respect of an award made by the Collector between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium is extended by section 30(2) to the case of an award made by the Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before 30 April, 1982. The dispute is about the meaning of the words "or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award" used in section 30(2). Are they limited, to appeal against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, or do they include also, appeals disposed of between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30 April, 1982. It is significant to note that the Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against ''any such award.'' The words ''any such award'' are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such awards decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. It cannot be said that the words ''any such award'' only mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of forum contemplated in the parent Act those appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court." It was further observed as follow :

"If Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced solatium should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have said so in clear language. On the contrary, the terms in which section 30(2) is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit. The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospective with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provision concerned. Similarly it was never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date.

It is true that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings initiated before the Court by way of reference under section 18 but the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself."

The following observations of the apex Court in the aforementioned precedent may also be noted with advantage :

"The Parliament intends that the benefit of section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two date or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word ''or'' used in section 30(2) is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under section 30(2) is sought to be extended. Word ''or'' cannot be understood as meaning that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court."

In view of the pronouncement of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that no benefit of the amended provision of section 23(2) can be granted to the respondent. However, he shall be entitled to the solatium at the rate of 15 per cent as was available before the amendment of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

So far as the applicability of the provisions of section 23(1A) is concerned, it would be obvious from a reading of sections 23(1A) and 28 of the Amendment Act that they were made applicable by the Parliament only to the proceeding which was pending before the Land Acquisition Collector on the date of coming into force of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, i.e. September 24, 1984. The statutory provisions run as under :

"30. Transitional provisions : (1) The provisions of subsection (1A) of the section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to :

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition) (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People, in which no award has been made by the Collector before that date;

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) the provisions of subsection (2) of section 23 and section 23 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of section 15 and section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal Act after the 30 day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People and before the commencement of this Act)."

A bare look at the above provisions would unmistakably indicate that the benefit of provisions of section 23(1A) and section 28 cannot be extended to the respondent as the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector had come to end much before the stipulated date, i.e. 30th April, 1982. Similar is the position with respect to the provisions of section 28. It has been observed in State of Punjab v. Krishan Lal, 1987(1) PLR page 688 as under :

"the provision of subsection (1A) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act applies only to cases falling within two cutoff dates namely, April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984, and in which the Collector made his award after April 30, 1982. It certainly does not apply to a case, like the one before us, in which the award of the Collector had been made prior to April 30, 1982. The wordings of subsection (1) and (2) of section 30 of the Amending Act clearly negative any implication that the Legislature intended to give any retrospective operation, beyond that specified therein, to section 23(1A) of the Act. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that neither section 23(1A), by itself, nor it being read alongwith section 30 of the Amending Act, enables the applicant to claim the benefit thereunder. The applicant''s claim for 12 percent per annum enhancement on the amount of compensation from the date of notification under section 4 of the Act till the date of the award of the Collector under section 23 (1A) of the Act is rejected.

That newly inserted subsection (1A) of section 23 has been given retrospective operation only in following two classes of cases :

(1) the case in which the proceedings were pending on April 30, 1982 and in which no award had been made by the Collector before that date, and

(2) the case in which the proceedings for acquisition of land were commenced after April 30, 1982, whether or not the award had been made by the Collector before September 24, 1984."

Thus, in view of these statutory provisions, and the law laid down by Hon''ble the Supreme Court and Full Bench supra. The benefit of sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 cannot be extended to the respondent. To that extent, the order, dated February 16, 1989 of the learned Single Judge, is modified and the benefit granted to the respondent is set aside. However, it is made clear that the respondent shall be entitled to solatium at the rate of 15 percent with 6 percent interest per annum on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking over possession till the date of payment.

In view of the above observations, the judgment date February 16, 1989 is modified to the extent, indicated above.

The Letters Patent Appeal stand disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.