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Judgment
8 paragraphs · 725 wordsA.L. Bahri, J. (Oral)
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, recorded acquittal of Kewal Krishan accused in a case under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with regard to sample of milk purchased from him by the Food Inspector on October 3, 1977. The acquittal was recorded primarily on two grounds, firstly that as per report of the Public Analyst the fat contents found Acre 6 per cent and solids not fat 7 per cent and by clubbing the same it met the standard; secondly provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act were not complied with as it was not specified in the notice informing Kewal Krishan that if so desired he could make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the receipt of the report of the Public Analyst, to get the sample examined by the Central Food Laboratory. The present appeal is filed by the State,
The Full Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Teja Singh, 1976 PLR 433, held that the clubbing of the various constituents of the sample was not permissible under the law. Thus on this ground the acquittal of Kewal Krishan could not be ordered as has been argued by the counsel for the State. However, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the order of acquittal can be maintained as provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act were not complied with. Exhibit PF is the notice which was sent to Kewal Krishan by the Local Health Authority, Kurukshetra. It reads as under :
"Please find enclosed herewith the result of your sample No. 77/MRK/93 which is found to be adulterated."
The perusal of the notice aforesaid obviously does not comply with the mandate of Section 13(2) of Act which reads as under :
"13(2). On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under subsection to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local Health Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14 A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory."
The intention of the legislature was to afford an opportunity to the person from whom sample of food is taken which is found by the Public Analyst to be substandard, to get the same analysed from Central Food Laboratory. Under the provisions of the Act the report of the Central Food Laboratory is to be considered as final which supersedes the report of the Public Analyst. This right in the present case was denied to the respondent Kewal Krishan as it was not mentioned in the notice that he could approach the Court within the specified time to get another bottle of sample kept with the Local (Health) Authority to be sent to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. A valuable right was thus taken away from the respondent which has prejudiced his defence in the case. What value is to be attached to the report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory was considered by the Supreme Court in Chetu Mal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1981 Chandigarh Law Reporter 576. In that case the report of the Director, Central Food Laboratory was ignored on the ground that seal of the sample had been tampered. In this way a valuable right of the accused was denied to him for no fault of his and conviction passed upon the report of the Public Analyst was quashed.
Since the mandatory provisions of Section 13(2) of the Act were not complied with in the present, there is no scope for setting aside the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Dismissed.
