High CourtsSingle Bench

State of Himachal Pradesh vs Jai Singh

High Court Of Himachal Pradesh · Decided on 18 December 2014 · Citation: (2014) 12 SHI CK 0102

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sanjay Karol, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 313, 378, 417, 418, 423 · Forest Act, 1927 — Section 33
CASE NUMBER
Cr. Appeal No. 119 of 2006
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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 1,303 words

Sanjay Karol, J.—Assailing the judgment dated 08.11.2005, passed by Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P., in Case No. 121-3 of 2003, titled as State of H.P. Versus Jai Singh, State has filed the present appeal under the provisions of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

2.

Accused was put to face trial in connection with the complaint filed by the Department of Forests, Government of Himachal Pradesh. Allegedly, from the declared reserved forest, belonging to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, accused, on 17.09.2000, illicitly felled one tree of Deodar. Incident was witnessed by the Forest Guard, Madan Lal (PW.1), who was then accompanied by Laxmi Dutt (PW.2) and Chuni Lal (PW.4). Madan Lal prepared damage report (Ex.PA). He also associated Radha Krishan (PW.3), an independent witness, to whom the logs, so extracted by the accused, were entrusted on Supurdari, vide memo (Ex.PC). The offence being compoundable, damage report was prepared and accused was asked to pay the monetary compensation as damages. Since he failed to do so, prosecution lodged a complaint against him. In crux this is the case of the prosecution.

3.

Notice of accusation was put to the accused for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial.

4.

In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also recorded, in which he took up the defence of false implication. No evidence in defence was led.

5.

Trial Court, after appreciating the testimony of prosecution witnesses acquitted the accused. Hence the present appeal.

6.

Having heard Mr. H.K.S. Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. Jagdish Vats, Advocate, on behalf of the accused and having minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution, I am of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. The judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice.

7.

It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence.

8.

In Prandas Vs. The State, , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under:

"(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under S. 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 417, Criminal P.c. in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - AIR 1934 227 (Privy Council), in these words:

"Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized in the administration of justice." "

9.

From the conjoint reading of testimonies of spot witnesses Madan Lal (PW.1), Laxmi Dutt (PW.2) and Chuni Lal (PW.4), it is evidently clear that there is material contradiction rendering the genesis of the prosecution story to be doubtful. According to Madan Lal (PW.1), accompanied by Laxmi Dutt and Chuni Lal, he was on patrol duty in the forest, when he noticed that accused felling the tree, which version stands materially contradicted by Laxmi Dutt (PW.2), according to whom, accused was in the process of preparing the logs. Whereas, according to Chuni Lal (PW.4), tree stood felled, which is a third version. PW.1 is categorical that at the time when they caught the accused, the tree was still standing. Thus, contradiction is material and major, rendering the veracity of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses to be doubtful.

10.

That apart, case against the accused has also not been established by way of link evidence, for case property has not been produced. Be that as it may, according to Madan Lal (PW.1), the same was entrusted to Radha Krishan (PW.3) on Supurdari, which version stands categorically/emphatically refuted by the witness. Independent witness has also not supported the prosecution and despite extensive cross-examination, nothing fruitful could be elicited from his testimony. Significantly, none of the officials seized the tools with which the tree was being allegedly felled or converted into timber. Why so? has not been explained. The first thing they ought to and should have been done was seized the tools alongwith the timber. Also it has come on record that timber allegedly entrusted to Radha Krishan (PW.3), on Supardari, was stolen, but no complaint to this effect was ever lodged with the police. Now, all this renders the prosecution case to be doubtful.

11.

I do not find prosecution to have proved its case, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing piece of evidence with regard to illicitly felling two trees of Deodar. Contradictions and embellishments in the statements of police officials are glaring, material and relevant, totally shaking the edifice of the prosecution story.

12.

The trial Court, in my considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice.

13.

The accused person has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Md. Ankoos and Others Vs. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., , since it cannot be said that trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case.

For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged. Record of the trial Court be immediately sent back.