State of H.P. vs Mussa

Bhawani Singh, J.—The State of Himachal Pradesh has, in this appeal, assailed the judgment of Chief Judicial Magistrate Chamba, in Criminal case No. 288-I/83-271-III/83 whereby Respondent Shri Mussa has been acquitted of the charge u/s 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

The case against the accused can be divided into two parts. The first part relates to the factor of adulteration of Desk Ghee by the accused. The detailed facts right from the taking of the sample to its being found adulterated are contained in the judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate which I do not think it necessary to repeat. The second part of the case relates to the grant of sanction u/s 20 of the Act.

The arguments by the counsel for the parties have been confined to this part of the case. Therefore, there is no necessity to discuss the other part of the case.

Shri Lokeshwar Singh Panta, learned Deputy Advocate. General for the State of Himachal Pradesh, with his usual Vehemence submitted that the provisions of Section 20 of the Act do not mandatory require thorough application of mind by the authority before authorizing the sanction. He further submits that there is difference between the sanction to be accorded under this Act and the one envisaged under the provisions of the Corruption Act. Reading of provisions authorizing prosecution under these provisions, he submits, has a definite object as already asserted. To reinforce this argument, my attention has been drawn to the The Corporation of Calcutta Vs. Md. Omer Ali and Another, the judgment, when perused, does not apply in the present case because the issue, in the present, case is not only as to the form of consent but also as to the, material and the scope of the inquiry to be made by the sanctioning authority before the same is given. Further reference on facts has been made to State of U.P. v. Mehboob 1982 (2) F.A.C. 17. With respect, I do not agree with the observations of the learned judge in this case for the simple reason that the learned Judge has not, in fact, seen the facts in the true tenor and spirit of Section 20 of the Act with which the same was enacted by the legislature.

Section 20, in my opinion, is mandatory in nature. It envisages clearly that no prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence u/s 14 or u/s 14A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government.

The duty to sanction or not sanction prosecution under this Act is a very important function of the authority. It may sanction prosecution in a case and may not sanction in another case but in both cases it has to take a decision. A decision can be taken, obviously, when facts of a particular case, documents in support thereof and other factors necessary for and against are placed before such an authority so that it can apply its mind to the whole case before it so as to arrive at a decision within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act. It is not a function to be discharged by the Health Authority in a casual, routine or mechanical manner as serious consequences in favour or against the accused on the one hand in particular and against the general public, which is interested to see that there is no adulteration of eatables of any form and whosoever does so must be punished in accordance with law, in general. (Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for the sanctioning authority |that before granting sanction, it has to apply its mind to the facts and the documents placed before it in order to save its order from being castigated as vague, omnibus and based on (irrelevant considerations and having been done in a routine land mechanical manner. Similar views have been expressed in Sewal Ram v. State 1980 (1) F.A.C. 448, Yogendra Nath v. State of U.P. 1983 (1) F.A.C. 229 and Bhagwan Dass and Anr. v. The State of U.P. 1979 (1) P.F.C. 48, to which my attention was drawn by Shri D.D. Sood, the learned Counsel appearing for the accused, and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhudas Atalmal Baktani 1986(3) F.A.C. 221, A. K. Roy and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. 1986 (3) F.A.C. 66, Gahininath Bhimrao Patekar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. 1987 (1) F.A.C. 95 and State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Shyam Lal,

Looking to the facts of this case and the perusal of Ex. PF (sanction order), it is clear beyond any shadow of doubt that a cyclostyled form has been used. Someone has filled up the blanks and the Chief Medical Officer, Chamba, District Chamba, has only signed the same at the bottom of it. There is no document on the record except a reference to an application No. 382 dated 22-11-1983 which may have been sent by the Food Inspector to the Chief Medical Officer seeking sanction to prosecute the accused. That application is not on the record nor there do any evidence to show as to whether certain documents were sent along with it for the perusal and application of mind by the sanctioning authority. It is further to be noticed that this sanction order was placed before the Court during the trial and not along with the complaint which is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings u/s 20 of the Act.

The crux of what has been discussed above, it is absolutely clear that the sanction order Ex. PF is no sanction within the meaning of Section 20 of the Act and the same has been the result of complete non-application of mind so cannot be considered to be a valid sanction.

In the light of the discussion, above said, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.