State of H.P. vs Negi Ram

V.K. Ahuja, J.—This is an appeal filed by the State of H.P. u/s 378 Cr.P.C. against the judgment of the court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rohru, District Shimla, dated 8.12.2003, vide which the respondent was acquitted of the notice of accusation put to him under Sections 279, 304A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 18.10.2002, a telephonic message was received by the police from PW-2 Sagar Dass that one person has been crushed by a vehicle at Khorsughat, who had died. The police went to the spot and recorded the statement of one Leela Devi u/s 154 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of which the case was registered and after investigation, the challan was filed before the learned trial Court for the offences, as detailed above, and the respondent was tried by the learned trial court, leading to his acquittal.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case.

On appraisal of the statement of PW-2 Sagar Dass, it is clear that he received a message from one Leela Devi on 18.10.2002 and when he reached at the spot, Blasu had already died, whose dead body was lying by the road side. He informed the police, which came there and recorded the statement of the complainant PW-1 Leela Devi. He has clearly stated that the accident has not taken place in his presence though he had been informed by Smt.Leela Devi only. Therefore, his statement is not very material.

PW-1 Leela Devi, whose statement was recorded u/s 154 of the Cr.P.C., has stated that her father-in-law Blasu was standing on the road side and one vehicle came from Rohru side, which was of blue colour, and struck against her father-in-law. She came down and the accused ran away from the place and she found that her father-in-law had suffered injuries and blood was oozing out of the injuries. She further stated that the police came to the spot and recorded her statement Ext. PW-1/A. She further stated that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the driver. She further stated that after some time, the accused came to the spot and told his name as Negi. She nowhere stated that she had seen the accident taking place or the vehicle driven by the respondent and hitting her father-in-law. She has also nowhere stated that the accused came after sometime and confessed his guilt, as was the prosecution case, but she simply stated that the accused himself came and told his name as Negi. She never disclosed the fact that the vehicle was being driven by the respondent at the relevant time, which had caused the accident due to rash or negligent driving of the driver. She neither disclosed the vehicle number nor identified the accused, who was the person driving the vehicle at the relevant time, which, allegedly, struck with the deceased. The mere fact that an accident has taken place and one person has died is no proof of rash or negligent driving of the driver until and unless the identity of the driver is established and it is proved on record that the accident had taken place due to rash or negligent driving of the driver of the vehicle about which there is no evidence on record.

PW-5 Ghanshyam has been examined by the prosecution to prove that the accused had confessed his guilt before him and Smt. Leela Devi PW-1. However, he, though is the son of the deceased, has clearly stated that the accused never admitted his guilt before him and as such he was declared as hostile since he had not supported the prosecution case.

The prosecution has also examined PW-7 Pabbar Singh, the owner of the vehicle, who stated that he had sent the vehicle alongwith his driver i.e. the respondent and learnt subsequently that an accident had taken place and that his vehicle had been impounded. His statement does not establish that the accident in question had taken place with the vehicle which was being driven by the respondent and the deceased had died as a result of the said accident.

In view of the above discussion, I hold that the findings of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court cannot be said to be perverse calling for an interference by this Court. Therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. The bail bonds furnished by the respondent shall stand discharged.