State of H.P. vs Prithi Chand

Sanjay Karol, J.—For an offence which is alleged to have been committed on 17.7.1993 accused was put to trial. In terms of judgment dated 5.9.1995 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, in Sessions Case No. 1-G/95 titled as State of H.P. v. Prithi Chand, accused stands acquitted of the charged offence.

It is the case of the prosecution that Smt. Suita Devi d/o Sh. Kali Ram (PW-1) was married to accused Prithi Chand. The accused was having relations with "some other" lady which was objected to by Smt. Sunita Devi. For this reason the accused used to beat her up. He would strip her naked and then beat her. Once he threw the meal prepared by her and threatened to hit her head with the cot. He also made a dowry demand of a cooker. She complained about his misbehaviour to her father who in turn reported the matter to Pradhan Gurnam Singh (PW-7). The Pradhan asked PW-1 not to send Smt. Sunita Devi to her matrimonial house but however on the asking of Sh. Rikhi Ram (PW-4), she was sent to her matrimonial house on the assurance that the accused would mend himself. However, the accused continued to mentally and physically torture Smt. Sunita Devi which prompted her to commit suicide by taking poison. The police was informed of the incident and the statement (Ext.PW-1/A) of Sh. Kali Ram (PW-1) was recorded by the police. On the basis of the said statement F.I.R. dated 17.7.1993 (Ext.PW-10/A) u/s 304B IPC was registered with Police Station, Dehra. During investigation the clothes of the deceased were taken into possession vide recovery memos (Ext.PW-3/B & Ext.PW-3/C). The site was photographed and one plastic container (Ext.PC) found near the body of the deceased was taken into possession vide memo (Ext.PW-3/D). The post mortem of the dead body was carried out by Dr. R. K. Sharma (PW-8) who gave his report (Ext.PW-8/A). The plastic container and the part of body of the deceased was sent to the Chemical Examiner and his report was also taken on record. With the completion of the investigation the challan was presented in the Court for trial.

The accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under Sections 498A IPC as also 304B IPC to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. With the recording of the statements of the prosecution witnesses statement of the accused u/s 313 Cr.P.C. was also recorded. The defence taken is that of denial and false implication.

The Court below acquitted the accused of the charged offence, hence the present appeal.

Heard learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the record.

It is a settled position of law that there should be reasonable nexus between cruelty and the suicide. It has to be substantiated, established and proved on record. Cruelty by itself would not amount to having committed an offence punishable u/s 498A IPC. A reasonable nexus has to be established between cruelty and the suicide in order to make good the offence of cruelty under the penal laws. Cruelty has to be of such a gravity as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. Suicide alone would not establish that it was occasioned on account of cruelty which was of sufficient gravity so as to lead a reasonable person placed in similar circumstances to commit suicide. Mere assumption or demand of dowry by itself in given circumstances may not amount to cruelty. The harassment has to be with a definite object i.e. to meet any unlawful demand. Every act of cruelty is not punishable. There must be evidence to show that soon before the death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of natural or accidental death so as to prove that the death had occurred otherwise than in normal circumstances. The expression "soon before" the occurrence is very relevant, where Sections 113B and 304B IPC are pressed in to service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case the statutory presumption would arise. The expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If the incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.

In Girdhar Shankar Tawade Vs. State of Maharashtra, , the Apex Court has held that the basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid ''cruelty'' which stands defined by attributing "a specific statutory meaning attached thereto. In order to ascribe a meaning to the word ''cruelty'' as is expressed by the Legislatures Whereas explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz, (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the Legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrace the attributes of ''cruelty'' in terms of Section 498A".

Section 498A is attributed only in the event of proof of cruelty by the husband or the relatives of the husband of the woman Admittedly, the finding of the trial court as regards the death negated suicide with a positive finding of accidental death. If suicide is left out, then in that event question of applicability of explanation (a) would not arise - neither the second limb to cause injury and danger to life or limb or health would be attracted in any event the willful act or conduct ought to be the proximate cause in order to bring home the charge u/s 498A and not de-hors the same To have an event sometime back cannot be termed to be a factum taken note of in the matter of a charge u/s 498A.

Explanation (b) of Section 498A in no uncertain terms records harassment of the woman and the statute itself thereafter clarifies it to the effect that it is not every such harassment but only in the event of such a harassment being with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand there is total absence of any of the requirements of the statute in terms of Section 498A.

Charges under Sections 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code are independent of each other and acquittal of one does not lead to acquittal on the other.

To have an event sometime back cannot be termed to be a factum taken note of in the matter of a charge u/s 498A The legislative intent is clear enough to indicate in particular reference to explanation (b) that there shall have to be a series of acts in order to be a harassment within the meaning of explanation (b) The letters by itself though may depict a reprehensible conduct, would not however, bring home the charge of Section 498A against the accused Acquittal of a charge u/s 306, as noticed hereinbefore, though not by itself a ground for acquittal u/s 498A, but some cogent evidence is required to bring home the charge of Section 498A as well, without which the charge cannot be said to be maintained.

In Ramesh Kumar (supra) the Apex Court has also held that "Sections 498A and 306 IPC are independent and constitute different offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence u/s 498A and may also, if a course of conduct amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an accused has been held liable to be punished u/s 498A IPC it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by the woman concerned."

In Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the Apex Court has held as under:

The object for which Section 498A IPC was introduced is amply reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons while enacting the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act 46 of 1983. As clearly stated therein the increase in the number of dowry deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of the evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses to examine the work of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In some cases, cruelty of the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by or murder of the helpless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction involving such cruelty. Therefore, it was proposed to amend IPC, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short "CrPC") and the Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of dowry deaths but also cases of cruelty to married women by the husband, in-laws and relatives. The avowed object is to combat the menace of dowry death and cruelty.

One other provision which is relevant to be noted is Section 306 IPC. The basic difference between the two sections i.e. Section 306 and Section 498A is that of intention. Under the latter, cruelty committed by the husband or his relations drag the woman concerned to commit suicide, while under the former provision suicide is abetted and intended.

The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreak personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin''s weapon. If the cry of "wolf is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual "wolf appears. There is no question of the investigating agency and courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that the ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide and generalised a statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of a watchdog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.

Sections 304B and 498A IPC are both distinct and separate offences. Though ''cruelty'' is a common essential ingredient of both the offences, but u/s 304B, it is only a ''dowry death'' that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. In the statute, no such period is mentioned in Section 498A IPC. The husband or his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to ''cruelty'' any time after the marriage. The legal position is absolutely clear that a person charged and acquitted u/s 304B can be convicted u/s 498A IPC. Smt Shanti and Another Vs. State of Haryana, and State of U.P. Vs. Santosh Kumar,

In State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal and another, the Apex Court has held as under:

In a criminal trial the degree of proof is stricter than what is required in a civil proceedings. In a criminal trial however intriguing may be facts and circumstances of the case, the charges made against the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and the requirement of proof cannot lie in the realm of surmises and conjectures. The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not stand altered even after the introduction of Section 498A, I.P.C and Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act. Although, the court''s conscience must be satisfied that the accused is not held guilty when there are reasonable doubts about the complicity of the accused in respect of the offences alleged, it should be borne in mind that there is no absolute standard for proof in a criminal trial and the question whether the charges made against the accused have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts must depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the quality of the evidences adduced in the case and the materials placed on record. The doubt must be of a reasonable man and the standard adopted must be a standard adopted by a reasonable and just man for coming to a conclusion considering the particular subject matter.

The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law.

The Apex Court further cautioned that "the court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty."

In Arun Vyas and Another Vs. Anita Vyas, the Apex Court has held that "the essence of offence in Section 498A is cruelty. It is a continuing offence and on each occasion on which the wife is subjected to cruelty, she would have a new starting point of limitation."

In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Apex Court has held as under:

The role of courts, under the circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities or insignificant lacune in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women.

Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the mental cruelty was established or not Mohd. Hoshan and Another Vs. State of A.P.,

In State of A.P. v. M. Madhusudhan Rao (2008) 15 SCC 582, the Apex Court has held as under:

It is plain that as per Clause (b) of the Explanation, which, according to learned Counsel for the State, is attracted in the instant case, every harassment does not amount to "cruelty" within the meaning of Section 498A I.P.C. The definition stipulates that the harassment has to be with a definite object of coercing the woman or any person related to her to meet an unlawful demand. In other words, for the purpose of Section 498A I.P.C. harassment simpliciter is not "cruelty" and it is only when harassment is committed for the purpose of coercing a woman or any other person related to her to meet an unlawful demand for property etc., that it amounts to "cruelty" punishable u/s 498A I.P.C.

In Balram Prasad Agrawal Vs. State of Bihar and others, , the Apex Court has held cruelty to mean torture to be so unbearable in the common course of human conduct that a young lady having commitments to life could take a drastic steps to end her life leaving behind her infant children in the lurch and at the mercy of the accused husband who was found to be in contemplation of remarrying.

In Arvind Singh Vs. State of Bihar, the Apex Court has held as under:

The word ''cruelty'' in common English acceptation denotes a state of conduct which is painful and distressing to another. The legislative intent in Section 498A is clear enough to indicate that in the event of there being a state of conduct by the husband to the wife or by any relative of the husband which can be attributed to be painful or distressing. The same would be within the meaning of the section. Torture is a question of fact. There must be a proper effort to prove it.

Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The accused must by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct create such circumstances that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh,

The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from individual to individual, also depending upon the social and economic status to which such person belongs. "Cruelty" for the purposes of constituting the offence under the aforesaid section need not be physical. Even mental torture or abnormal behaviour may amount to cruelty and harassment in a given case. Gananath Pattnaik Vs. State of Orissa,

In U. Suvetha Vs. State by Insp. of Police and Another, the Apex Court has held that "living with another woman may be an act of cruelty on the part of the husband for the purpose of judicial separation or dissolution of marriage but the same, in our opinion, would not attract the wrath of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."

In Bhaskar Lal Sharma and Another Vs. Monica, the Apex Court has held as under:

Ex facie no case has been made out u/s 498A of the IPC so far as the appellants are concerned. The allegations relating to the place where the marriage took place has nothing to do with an offence u/s 498A of the IPC. Allegations that appellant No. 2 kicked the respondent with her leg and told her that her mother to be a liar may make out some other offence but not the one punishable u/s 498A. Similarly her allegations that the appellant No. 2 poisoned the ears of her son against the respondent; she gave two used lady suits of her daughter to the complainant and has been given perpetual sermons to the complainant could not be said to be offences punishable u/s 498A. Even threatening that her son may be divorced for the second time could not bring out the offence u/s 498A of the IPC.

In order to prove its case the prosecution has examined 13 witnesses. Sh. Kali Ram (PW-1) is the father of the deceased; Smt. Ram Devi (PW-2) is the mother of the deceased; Sh. Gurcharan Singh (PW-3) is the witness to the inquest report (Ext.PW-3/A) and also recovery of one bottle of medicine (Ext.PW-3/B); Sh. Rikhi Ram (PW-4) is the brother of the deceased; Smt. Maya Devi (PW-5) hails from the village of accused; Sh. Amin Chand (PW-6) is the brother of PW-1; Sh. Gurnam Singh (PW-7) is the Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Bassi; Dr. R. K. Sharma (PW-8) carried out the post mortem; Sh. Mohit Kumar (PW-9) took the photographs at site; Sh. Balwant Singh (PW-10) recorded FIR (Ext.PW-10/A); HC Parmod Singh (PW-11) and Constable Madan Lal (PW-12) have deposed with regard to the receipt and handing over of the case property in the Police Station and Addl. SHO Krishan Chand (PW-13) carried out the investigation.

PW-10, PW-11, PW-12 & PW-13 are the police officials. In order to prove the charged offence statements of PW-1 to PW-7 are also relevant. Noticeably except for PW-5 & PW-7 all are family members of the deceased.

From the statement of PW-8, it is evident that the deceased died due to "organo phosphorus poisoning". Post mortem report (Ext.PW-8/A) based on the report of the Chemical Examiner(Ext.PW-8/B) and the opinion of the Doctor (Ext.PW-8/C) also evidences the said fact.

Police witnesses PW-10 & PW-13 have contradicted with regard to the mode of communication received with reference to the alleged incident. According to PW-13 he received the information through a telephonic message, whereas according to PW-10 who was posted as I.O. in Police Station, Dehra, no telephonic message about the occurrence of the incident had been received by him. That apart PW-13 admits that he had not recorded the statement of the person who gave information to the police on phone. He also admits not to have recorded the extract of the telephone message in the zimni, though it was mentioned in the roznamcha. He admits to have received the information about the accused having maltreated deceased Sunita Devi which were narrated to a "lady" and yet admits to have recorded the statement of only PW-2. Statement of the lady to whom Sunita Devi had narrated the alleged incident of ill-treatment is not on record. Further this witness has not come out with the truth. His statement to our mind is contradictory, unreliable and does not inspire confidence. He denies that the dead body of the deceased was handed over to her in-laws. He feigns ignorance as to the place and by whom the body was cremated. This statement of his stands contradicted by Sh. Kali Ram (PW-1), according to whom the police handed over the dead body to the accused who also carried out the cremation. This witness further admits that there are number of houses of people belonging to different castes near the house of the accused, yet he did not examine the neighbours as a witness with some credibility.

We are conscious of the fact that the faulty investigation would not render the prosecution case to be false but nonetheless it makes it doubtful. Nonetheless we proceed to examine the statements of the material witnesses.

The alleged incident took place on 17.7.1993. According to PW-1 the deceased and the accused were married 8 to 10 years prior to the occurrence of the incident. However, according to PW-2 the parties were married 5 years prior to the incident. However she subsequently contradicts herself by stating that the deceased had delivered the first child after 3 years of the marriage and the second child 3 years after the birth of the first child. According to the version of PW-4 the parties in question were married 7 to 8 years prior to the date of recording of her statement i.e. 26.7.1995. He admits that two children were born out of the wedlock. His statement, therefore, does not inspire confidence. Apart from the statement of the said witness, there is no other material on record to prove the exact date of marriage of the deceased. Thus, from the statements of the witnesses it can be safely held that the death of the deceased did not take place within 7 years of the marriage. The charge u/s 304B is thus clearly unsustainable.

Now with regard to the allegations of beatings, maltreatment, cruelty and demand of dowry, we are of the view that the statements of the witnesses are extremely vague, unspecific with relation to the incident and time. Having minutely examined their statements, we are of the view that the witnesses have contradicted themselves and have either made several improvements from their earlier statements recorded by the police or have retracted there from.

PW-1 admits not to have stated to the police that the accused had threatened deceased Sunita Devi that he would hit her head with the ''Charpai''. He further admits not to have told the police the fact that one year prior to the date of incident the accused had demanded a sum of Rs. 30,000/-. He further admits not to have told the police that the accused had come to leave the deceased at her parental house with a request to send her back after 3 days. PW-2 was confronted with her earlier statement (Ext.PD) wherein the fact that she had informed the police that the deceased had remained for 3 months at the parental house was not so recorded. When confronted with her earlier statement (Ext.DC), PW-5 admits not to have told the police that he had got the marriage of her sister arranged with the accused. Similarly, PW-6 when confronted with his earlier statement (Ext.DD) admits that the police did not record his statement that the accused had ill-treated the deceased.

The contradictions become significant when considered in totality. Having noticed the contradictions we now proceed to examine their statements on the main charge. According to the prosecution witnesses the accused had illicit relations with "another lady" which was the cause of the maltreatment meted out by the accused to the deceased. Now PW-1 admits that he does not know the name of the lady with whom the accused was having illicit relationship. PW-2 has mentioned the other lady to be the daughter of the uncle of the accused but however does not give her particulars, who is that uncle is not named. PW-4, PW-5 & PW-6 do not mention anything about the illicit relationship. Even the Pradhan PW-7 does not mention this to be the reason of maltreatment meted out by the accused to the deceased. Hence, the statements of the witnesses to this effect cannot be relied upon to conclusively prove the said fact.

With regard to the demand of dowry all that PW-1 has stated is that the accused had demanded a Cooker. It is only in his cross-examination he discloses that the accused had demanded Rs. 30,000/- and that too one year prior to the date of occurrence of the incident. In whose presence such demand was made and whether the same was met or not is not evident from the record. Statement of PW-2 is only to the effect that the accused demanded more dowry. The witness did not bring this fact of dowry demand to any body. PW-2 admits to have told the Pradhan only about the beatings given by the accused to the deceased. It has not come on record from his statement that these beatings were as a result of non-fulfillment of the dowry demand. Statement of PW-4 with respect to the demand of dowry is also vague. Allegations pertaining to the demand of dowry and maltreatment as a result thereof also do not appear to be convincing. Thus there is no clear, cogent and convincing material to substantiate and prove the alleged demand of dowry.

It is further the case of the prosecution that the accused gave beatings to the deceased which prompted her to commit suicide. It has not come on record that the accused was otherwise a man of bad character. According to PW-1 about one year prior to the occurrence of the incident, at midnight the accused asked the deceased to wake up and cook food else he would hit her head with the cot. Also the accused threw away the meal prepared by the deceased. The deceased informed her mother that once when the accused had given beatings to her by stripping her naked, PW-2 reported the incident to the Pradhan Gurnam Singh (PW-7) who visited the spot. The Pradhan had asked not to send the deceased with the accused. According to him, the accused had sometimes beaten-up the deceased in his presence. Importantly this witness did not make any written complaint to anybody. The deceased was not ordinarily living or visiting him. He had no reason or occasion to witness the same.

Now PW-2 has given a different version. According to her the beatings were given about 3 months prior to the occurrence of the incident. She admits that immediately prior to the incident the deceased had come to stay with her. The accused had also visited them at that time. It is her version that even then the deceased had complained about the maltreatment. This statement of her does not inspire confidence. Had it been true she would have definitely narrated the incident to her husband (PW-1) or to some body else. PW-1 does not corroborate this part of her version. Further had it been true she would have got this fact specifically recorded in her first statement made to the police. PW-3 is the Chairman of the concerned Block. According to him, in the Panchayat he had also not received any complaint pertaining to the accused. He had also not received any complaint about the character of the accused. All that PW-4 states is that though initially relations between the accused and the deceased were cordial but later on accused started maltreating her on the ground of insufficient dowry. Now importantly this witness admits that the accused had not maltreated the deceased in his presence on account of dowry. He does not mention about any beatings given by the accused to the deceased. He also does not mention who had informed him about the dowry demand or the ill-treatment.

Importantly, PW-1 admits that the deceased was sent to the matrimonial house only on the asking of the respectable members of the village. Who are these respectable members of the village? Why their identity has not been disclosed? They have also not been examined by the police. The version thus does not inspire confidence.

The version of PW-5 to the effect that the accused used to beat the deceased after consuming liquor does not inspire confidence. She is a close relative. She has retracted from her earlier version recorded with the police. She is not an immediate neighbour. In any event her allegations are vague and unspecific. For the very same reason the statement of the other witness cannot be relied upon to prove the guilt of the accused.

We shall further deal with the statement of the Pradhan (PW-7), according to whom PW-1 had made numerous complaints about the conduct of the accused. Strangely he could not tell the cause of such beatings given by the accused to the deceased. According to him Sunita Devi was taken away by the accused in his presence. Now this statement stands contradicted by the statements of the other prosecution witnesses and more importantly PW-1 to PW-4 & PW-6, according to whom she was sent in the absence of PW-7. That apart this witness admits that for about 2-3 months Sunita Devi remained all right in the house of the accused and died thereafter. He admits that he had not drawn any proceedings about the complaint made to him by PW-1 nor had he informed this fact in writing to anyone.

What was the immediate cause of provocation prompting the deceased to have committed suicide is not evident from the record. The beatings allegedly were given one year prior to the occurrence of the incident. For atleast 2 to 3 months prior to the incident no alleged incident of cruelty, physical or mental took place.

Why no neighbour was examined to prove the fact of maltreatment has not been explained. The prosecution has not adduced evidence of the neighbours who may have thrown some light on the treatment meted out by the accused to the deceased. Admittedly, there were large number of houses owned by people from different castes.

The prosecution has failed to prove its case by not leading clear, cogent and convincing material to prove the guilt of the accused. The accused himself performed the last rites of the deceased. In the instant case nothing has been proved on record to even prima facie show that immediately before the deceased took poison some incident amounting to cruelty had taken place.

Importantly the parties were married for more than 8 to 10 years. They had two children and there is no allegation that the children were not being looked after properly which was the cause of discard. The demand of dowry, if any, is of petty nature i.e. cooker.

The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down in Mohammed Ankoos and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Md. Ankoos and Others Vs. The Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the person has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged.