State Of H.P. vs Saran Singh

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.04.2011, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. 1, Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of Indian Penal Code (in short “IPC”) and Sections 181 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act (in short “MV Act”) (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the Police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 181 of the MV Act. It was asserted that the informant, Saroj Bala (PW-2), was returning to her home on 01.06.2002 at about 9:00 A.M., when a tractor going towards Sulyali fell into the fields. The informant shouted for help. Paras Ram (PW-3), Desh Raj (PW-8), Rattan Singh (PW-5) and Sarwan (PW-6) reached the spot. They saw that Kaku Ram @ Hariya and Surinder Singh were crushed under the tractor. They were extricated. Kaku Ram succumbed to his injuries. Surinder Singh was taken to the hospital. Surinder Singh was driving the tractor, and the accident occurred due to his negligence. An intimation was given to the police. The police recorded an entry (Ext. PW14/A) in the daily diary. Inspector Bharat Bhushan (PW-14) went to the spot for verification. He recorded the statement of Saroj Bala (Ext. PW2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext. PW12/A) was registered. Inspector Bharat Bhushan investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW14/B). Vijay Kumar took the photographs (Ext. PW13/A to Ex. PW13/E), whose negatives are (Ext. PW13/F to Ext PW13/J). Inspector Bharat Bhushan seized the tractor bearing registration No. HP38-7796, vide seizure memo (Ext W14/C). Sarwan Singh produced the documents of the vehicle, which were seized vide memo (Ext. PW1/A). Inspector Bharat Bhushan filed an application (Ext. PW14/D) f r conducting the postmortem examination of the deceased. Dr P.K. Ahluwalia (PW-9) conducted the postmo em examination of Haria Ram @ Kaku Ram and found that the cause of death was haemorrhage and injury to the brain, leading to shock. He issued the report (Ext. PW9/A). Ravinder Singh (PW-7) mechanically examined the tractor. He did not find any defect in it, which could have led to t e accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW7/A). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to accused Surinder Singh for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC and Section 181 of MV Act and notice of accusation was put to accused Saran Singh for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 196 of the MV Act, to which accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Rattan Chand (PW1) and Sarwan Kumar (PW-6) witnessed various recoveries. Saroj Bala (PW-2) is the informant. Paras Ram (PW-3), Rattan Singh (PW-5) (sic), Desh Raj (PW-8), and Desh Raj (PW-10) did not support the prosecution’s case. Ravinder Singh (PW-7) mechanically examined the vehicle. Dr P.K. Ahluwalia (PW-9) cond cted the postmortem examination of the deceased. Sulekha (PW-11) proved that the accused Surinder Singh was driving the vehicle. SI Karam Chand (PW12) signed the FIR. Vijay Kumar (PW-13) took the photographs. Inspector B arat Bhushan (PW-14) investigated the matter.

Accused Saran Singh admitted that his brother Kaku had died in the accident. He stated that he was not aware of who was driving the vehicle. The witnesses deposed against him, as they were official witnesses. He was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence. Accused Surinder Singh, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. The witnesses deposed falsely against him. He claimed that he was innocent, but did not produce any evidence to prove his defence.

Learned Trial Court held that Saroj Bala (PW-2), Paras Ram (PW-3), Rattan Singh (PW-5), Desh Raj (PW-8) and Desh Raj (PW-10) did not support the prosecution’s case that the accused Surinder Singh was driving the tractor. Statement of Sulekha Devi was doubtful in view of her admission in her cross-examination that the accident had not occurred in her presence. Sulekha Devi (PW-11) and Inspector Bharat Bhushan (PW-14) admitted that the accused Saran Singh was at Bharmour at the time of the accident. Therefore, it was not proved that he had allowed Surinder Singh to drive the vehicle wit out a valid insurance certificate. Consequently, the accused were acquitted.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material placed before it. The benefit of doubt was extended to the accused based on minor contradictions, omissions and admissions. Sulekha Devi (PW-11) specifically stated that the accused Surinder Singh was driving the tractor, and the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused Surinder Singh was driving the tractor are incorrect. Kaku Ram and Surinder Singh were injured in the accident; therefore, any of them could have been a driver. The accused did not explain who was driving the tractor and merely denied the prosecution’s case. He did not produce the driving licence, and driving a tractor without a valid driving licence amounts to negligence. Therefore, it was p ayed hat the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

Accused Surinder died during the pendency of the appeal, and the proceedings abated qua him.

I ave heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the accused Saran Singh.

Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution’s evidence proved that the accused Surinder Singh was driving the tractor without valid insurance. The accused, Saran Singh, was the owner of the tractor, who had permitted Surinder Singh to drive the uninsured vehicle. Hence, the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused; hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

Mr Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere wi h he reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he p ayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present appeal has been filed against a jud ment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:

“23. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal It was observed thus:

“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position cove ing the field after considering various earlier j dgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this C urt culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court o review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a do ble presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of inn cence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

… 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cann t verturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acq ittal only if it comes to a finding that the only concl sion which can be recorded on the basis f the evidence on record was that the guilt f the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity.

41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Section 196 of the MV Act reads that a person driving an uninsured vehicle or all wing another to drive an uninsured vehicle shall be punished. It is an admitted case of the prosecution that the accused Saran was not driving the tractor at the time of the accident. Therefore, the prosecution was required to pr ve that he had caused or allowed another person to drive an uninsured vehicle.

No prosecution witness stated that the accused Saran ad permitted Surinder to drive the uninsured vehicle. Sulekha Devi (PW-11) stated in her cross-examination that the tractor was owned by Saran Singh, who used to drive it. Surinder Singh was employed as a labourer. Desh Raj was a mason. Surinder Singh was working on the day of the accident. Surinder and Desh Raj ran to the spot after hearing the noise. She volunteered to say that Surinder had fallen and sustained injuries. She had never seen Surinder driving the tractor. Accused Saran Singh had gone to Bharmour with sheep and goats. The tractor remained parked in the absence of Saran Singh.

The statement of this witness does not establish that the accused Saran Singh had permitted Surinder to drive the vehicle. She specifically stated that she had never seen Surinder driving the vehicle, and Surinder was employed as a labourer. Thus, her statement does n t pr ve that the accused Saran Singh had authorised Surinder to drive the tractor; rather, her statement suggests that the tractor was taken by Surinder himself, and he was not permitted by any person to drive the tractor.

Inspector Bharat Bhushan (PW-14) stated that, as per his investigation, Saran Singh was at Bharmour on the date of t e accident. The result of the investigation is not a legally admissible piece of evidence, and his testimony is useless for determining the liability of the accused, Saran Singh.

The informant, Saroj Bala, stated that she was not aware who was driving the tractor. Surinder never remained a driver of tractor and was a labourer. Paras Ram (PW-3) stated that he had seen Haria @ Kaku driving the tractor. Rattan Singh (PW-5) stated in his cross-examination that he was not aware who was driving the tractor. Desh Raj (PW-8) stated in his cross-examination that he had not seen any person driving the tractor. Surinder was working as a labourer, and he was not a driver. Desh Raj (PW-10) stated in his cross-examination that Surinder was working as a labourer on the date of the accident.

Thus, no witness has stated that the accused Saran Singh had authorised Surinder to drive the tractor, and the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 196 of the MV Act were not satisfied. This was a reasonable view, which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court and no interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal.

No other point was urged.

In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it s dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent No. 2 is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent No. 2 on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Record of learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith along with a copy of the judgment.