State Of H.P. vs Suresh Kumar And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 29.08.2012, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 08.06.2007 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Trial Court) were set aside. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant, Tara Chand (PW1), was present in his home on 11th May 2004 at about 11:30 PM. His pet dog was barking. The informant woke up and saw that the accused, Mahesh and Suresh, were standing outside his home, who were abusing and threatening him. The informant asked them to go away. They opened the door by kicking it and entered the house. They gave beatings to the informant, Tara Chand (PW1), and his wife, Bhujla Devi (PW2). Mahesh inflicted a stone injury on the mouth of Bhujla Devi. The accused left after the incident. The informant and his wife narrated the incident to Up-Pradhan Gorkhu Ram (PW4), who advised them to report the matter to the Panchayat Pradhan. They went to the house of Pradhan Dhani Ram, but he was not present at home. They reported the matter to the Police, who recorded an entry (Ex.PW1/A) in the daily diary. FIR (Ex. PW7A) was registered in the police station. HC Bhag Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex. PW9/A). He seized a broken torch (Ex. P1, dupatta (Ex. P2) and broken pieces of stones and slate (Ex. P3). These were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with three impressions of seal B. Seal impression (Ex. PW9/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ex. PW1/A). Sanjay Kumar (PW5) took the photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P4) whose negatives are Ex. P5 to Ex. P8. Dr KAS Dadhwal (PW10) examined informant Tara Chand and Bhujla Devi and found that they had sustained multiple injuries which could have been caused within 24 hours of the examination. He issued the MLCs (Ex.PW6A and Ex.PW6/B). Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

Prosecution examined 10 witnesses to prove its case. Tara Chand (PW1) and Bhujla Devi (PW2) are the victims. Munshi Ram (PW3) and Ajju Ram (PW6) are the eyewitnesses. Gorkhu Ram (PW4) was the up-pradhan to whom the incident was narrated. Sanjay Kumar (PW5) clicked the photographs. Inspector Gian Chand (PW7) signed the FIR. Constable Prahlad (PW8) proved the entry in the daily diary. HC Bhag Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. Dr KAS Dadhwal (PW10) examined the injured.

The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. They stated that the witnesses had deposed falsely against them. They had a dispute with the informant regarding the land, and they were falsely implicated. They claimed that they were innocent. They did not produce any evidence in their defence.

Learned Trial Court held that the statements of the injured/victims corroborate each other. They were corroborated by the testimonies of the eyewitnesses and medical evidence. The delay in lodging the FIR was properly explained. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as follows:

Conviction

Sentence

Section 452 read with Section 34 of the IPC

One-year rigorous imprisonment, fine of ₹500 each and in default of payment of fine, further imprisonment for 15 days

Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC

One-month simple imprisonment, fine of ₹100 each and in default of payment of fine, further imprisonment for 7 days.

Section 506(1) read with Section 34 of IPC

One-month simple imprisonment, fine of ₹300 each and in default of payment of fine, further imprisonment for 7 days.

All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court held that the presence of independent witnesses on the spot was highly doubtful. Their names were not mentioned in the FIR, and their conduct did not support their version. The learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused, hence the appeal was allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was wrongly held that the presence of eyewitnesses on the spot was doubtful. There was nothing to doubt their presence, and the learned Trial Court had rightly relied upon their testimonies. Learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside a well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Mr Ajay Chandel, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant-State, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in acquitting the accused. Testimonies of injured/victims were duly corroborated by the medical evidence, and even if the presence of eyewitnesses on the spot is doubtful, there is nothing to doubt the testimonies of the injured. Learned Appellate Court ignored the statements of the injured/victims and acquitted the accused because the statements of the eyewitnesses were not found to be credible. The learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view that could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

Mr Ajay. Chandel, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the presence of the eyewitnesses on the spot was highly doubtful, which made the prosecution’s case suspect. Learned Appellate Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced before the Court, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court while deciding the appeal against the acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438:

“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a mis- reading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:

We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudarv. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471.

The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

As per the prosecution’s case, the incident had occurred on 11th May 2004 at 11:30 PM. Munshi Ram (PW3) admitted in his cross-examination that the marriage of Gorkhu’s son was solemnised on 11th May 2004, and he had accompanied the barat to the village Kunala. He admitted that Barat had returned on the next morning. Ajju Ram (PW6) stated that he had also accompanied the barat. Gorkhu Ram (PW4) admitted that the marriage of his son was solemnised on 11th May 2004, in which the accused Suresh and Maheshi had participated. HC Bhag Chand (PW9) admitted in the cross- examination that the marriage of Gorkhu Ram’s son was being solemnised on the date of the incident in which the accused had participated. These admissions show that the accused and the witnesses had gone to another village; hence, the accused could not have caused any hurt to the informant, Tara Chand and his wife Bhujla Devi, and the witnesses could not have witnessed any such incident in the village.

The informant, Tara Chand and his wife Bhujla Devi stated that the accused had damaged the door by kicking it. The investigating officer nowhere mentioned that he had found the door to be damaged. The photographs of the damaged door were not taken, and this part of the prosecution’s case has not been established.

Ajju Ram (PW6) stated in his cross-examination that the police had not recorded his statement. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715, that when a witness denies having made a statement to the police, it shows how unreliable his memory is. This denial will also affect his testimony.

The learned Trial Court was swayed by the consistencies in the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses and failed to appreciate the significance of the statements of the witnesses that the accused had gone to attend the marriage of Gorkhu’s son, which made the incident improbable. Learned Appellate Court had rightly considered this admission. Hence, the learned Appellate Court had taken a reasonable view, and it is impermissible to interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Appellate Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal.

No other point was urged.

Consequently, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Records be sent back to the learned Courts below forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.