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Judgment
265 paragraphs · 13,127 wordsAnubha Rawat Choudhary, J
These appeals have been filed against the judgment dated 03rd January, 2019 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Dhanbad in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.17 of 2018 whereby the learned appellate court has allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and has reversed the order dated 24.03.2018 passed by Revenue Officer, Dhanbad in suit bearing case No. 18 of 2011. The Revenue Officer, Dhanbad had dismissed the suit seeking rectification of the finally published record of rights. Both the appeals arise out of the same impugned judgement passed by the appellate court under Section 87 (2) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the CNT Act). The 1st appeal was filed against the order passed by the revenue officer.
On 30.10.2025 the following points have been framed for consideration: -
i. Whether the suit was barred by limitation?
ii. If the suit was barred by limitation, whether the learned Revenue Officer had the power to condone the delay in filing the suit?
iii. Whether the suit was maintainable on account of absence of notice under Section 80 CPC?
iv. Whether the suit before the Revenue Officer could have proceeded in view of pendency of Title Suit No.119 of 2014 challenging the two said deeds no. 24951 dated 1.10.1970 and 25097 dated 6.10.1970 alleging fraud which was filed after institution of the suit before the Revenue Officer but before its disposal on 24.03.2018?
v. What would be the consequence of suit filed by respondent no. 39 (intervenor) at the stage of pendency of the 1st appeal being title suit no. 201 of 2018 challenging the two said deeds no. 24951 dated 1.10.1970 and 25097 dated 6.10.1970 alleging fraud?
vi. Whether the decision in Suit No.544 of 2001 is binding on the parties?
The hearing of the case has been taken up from the records of S.A. No. 94 of 2019 as agreed by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties in both the cases.
S.A. No. 94 of 2019
Submission regarding question of law no. (i) and (ii)
The learned counsel for the appellant-State has referred to the petition filed under Section 87 of the CNT Act which was filed on 15.03.2011 and has submitted that it is an admitted fact that the record of rights was finally published on 15.05.2001. The learned counsel submits that the applicants themselves had filed a petition seeking condonation of delay meaning thereby that there was no dispute that the suit was barred by limitation. So far as explanation for delay is concerned it was only mentioned in paragraph 11 of the plaint that the applicants were staying outside and subsequently, they obtained the khatiyan and then they came to know that the period for seeking rectification of record of rights under Section 87 had already expired and they are filing a separate petition seeking condonation of delay. A reference has been made to paragraph 2 to 4 of the petition seeking condonation of delay.
The learned counsel has submitted that there is no explanation for delay in as much as the applicants did not even disclose as to when and how they got knowledge about the error in record of rights.
He has submitted that the delay in filing the petition seeking rectification was condoned on 10.05.2011 by a cryptic order in as much as it does not disclose as to whether the parties were heard while condoning the delay. The learned counsel has submitted that the suit being admittedly barred by limitation, there was no occasion to condone the delay as the same is not permissible in law. He has referred to the judgment passed by this court in S.A. No. 89 of 2016 [Janak Kumar Singh vs. Amresh Mohal Lala and Others] decided on 26th August, 2025 which has been reported in 2025 (4) JBCJ 216 (H.C.) paragraph 17 and 20 of the reported judgment.
Submissions on question of law no.(iii)
Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2925 [Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Puspha L. Tolani and Others] paragraph 8, 9 and 10 on the point that notice under Section 80 CPC is mandatory and also on the point that there is no provision for condonation of delay so far as suits are concerned. He has then referred to the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeal No. 10047 of 2025 [Odisha State Financial Corporation vs. Vigyan Chemical Industries And Others] decided on 5th August, 2025 and has referred paragraph 25, 25.1 and 26 and has submitted that the requirement of notice under Section 80 CPC and its purpose has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held that the provision is a mandatory provision and if that is not complied, the suit can be dismissed even at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. He has also submitted that non-compliance of the notice under Section 80 CPC is fatal to the suit.
He has also submitted that before the Revenue Officer, while responding to the plaint in the suit, a specific stand was taken by the State that the suit was barred on account of non-furnishing of notice under Section 80 CPC, but neither the Revenue Officer nor the learned 1st appellate court has dealt with the issue and a point for consideration has been framed relating to Section 80 CPC which is fit to be answered in favour of the appellant-State.
Arguments of the respondent No.1
A. With respect to point of law No. (i) & (ii), the Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has submitted that the suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation inasmuch as the plaintiffs applied for rectification of revisional record of rights after they came to know about the error. The learned counsel has referred to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2010 SC 3240 [Daya Singh and another vs. Gurdev Singh through L.Rs] and has referred paragraph 10 to submit that entry in record of right by itself does not give a cause of action to file a suit. He has also relied upon the judgment passed by this Court reported in (2003) 2 JCR 134 [Dwarika Sonar and others vs. Most Bilguli and others] and has referred paragraph 20 of the said judgment to submit that it has been held that the maximum period of limitation for filing the suit for declaration of title, recovery of possession and for challenging the entry made in survey records of right will be 12 years from the date of final publication of record of rights. He has submitted that it was also noticed by the court that it was not the case of the plaintiffs of that case that he was not aware or he had no knowledge about the publication of the record of right in the name of the defendant rather it was specific case of the plaintiff that in the said case the record of right was published in the year 1966 in the name of the defendant and the suit was filed after 18 years i.e. in 1984.
B. The learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submits that date of knowledge is the crucial date to commence the physical running of the time with regard to filing a suit for rectification of record of rights. He submits that the case reported in (2003) 2 JCR 134 (Supra) was arising out of a regular suit filed before the Civil Court and in the present case it is a suit filed before the Revenue Officer under Section 87(1) of CNT Act, but the principles of law with regard to computation of the period of limitation would be the same. The limitation prescribed under Section 87(1) of CNT Act is three months from the date of publication of record of right. However, as the mere publication of record of rights does not give the cause of action to file the suit, therefore, the date of knowledge is the crucial date.
C. He submits that in the main petition which was filed before the Revenue Officer and also in the petition seeking condonation of delay, it was mentioned that after having knowledge, they applied for certified copy of the Khatiyan and thereafter, the suit was filed. He submits that the said statement having been made is enough to suggest that the date of knowledge was of the year 2011. The learned counsel has submitted that the period of limitation was to be commenced from the date of knowledge and therefore, the suit was filed within the period of limitation of three months. This would be the submission, even if it is assumed that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the suit filed before the revenue officers.
D. Learned counsel has also referred to the provisions of Section 230 of the CNT Act and has submitted that the Indian Limitation Act 1980 is applicable to suits filed under the provision of Section 87 of the CNT Act, 1908.
E. With respect to point of law No.(iii), the learned counsel has submit that no specific argument in connection with notice under Section 80 CPC was made before the learned courts inspite of the fact that this point was raised in the written statement filed by the State as well as by the private respondent before the court. Accordingly, there was no occasion for the court to pronounce upon the absence of notice under Section 80 of CPC.
F. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel has also submitted that Section 80 of the CPC is applicable only in a regular suit filed under CPC and the same has no applicability so far as the suit filed before the Revenue Officer under the CNT Act is concerned. He has submitted that the suit before the Revenue Officer is guided by the rules framed under Chota Nagpur Tenancy Rules 1959 and has in particular referred to Rule 33. Learned counsel has referred to Section 265 of the CNT Act which deals with power to make rules to procedure on application of Code of Civil Procedure. He submits that any provisions of CPC would be applicable for the suit under the CNT Act only when a rule to that effect is framed. He submits that no such rule has been framed mandating the pre-requisite of service of notice under Section 80 of CPC. He has referred to Chapter 6 of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Rules, 1959 which deals with the procedure to be followed by Revenue Officer with regard to record of rights and settlement and has referred to Rule 33 thereof which deals with the steps to be taken by the Revenue Officer. He has referred to rule 33(ix) which deals with distribution of copies of records of right to the parties interested. The learned counsel submits that rule 33(ix) has been taken into consideration by the learned 1st appellate court while dealing with the point of limitation.
G. So far as point of law No.(iv), the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has submitted that the sale deed involved in the Title Suit No. 119 of 2014 does not cover the entire suit property.
H. The learned counsel submits that the property involved in the Title Suit No.119 of 2014 covers the property in CS Plot No.2790, 1730 and 2875 recorded in C.S Khatian No.152.
I. Learned counsel has submitted that in the Title Suit No.119 of 2014 the entire property involved in the present case is not in dispute. He has submitted that in the relief portion thereof only one sale deed i.e. sale deed No.24951 dated 5.10.1970 is sought to be declared as forged, sham and illegal and void document. However, the plaint in paragraph 24 also refers to forgery of the document i.e. sale deed No. 24951 dated 05.10.1970 and sale deed No.25097 dated 06.10.1970. The learned counsel has submitted that the revenue officer while deciding the suit has referred to the Title Suit No.119 of 2014 and the learned 1st appellate authority has already observed that if the competent civil court decided that the sale deed, which is the basis of the claim of the plaintiff over the land in question, is forged and fabricated and the private respondents are title holder of the part of the suit land, automatically, the order passed by the revenue authority will not come into force.
J. The learned counsel submits that the case of the parties who have filed the Title Suit stands duly protected by the learned 1st appellate court’s judgement in this case.
K. Learned counsel has submitted that in the other Title Suit which was filed during the pendency of the 1st appellate being Original Suit No. 201 of 2018, the legality and validity of the two sale deeds is also involved in the said case and the judgment in the title suit will take its own course. The Title Suit No. 201 of 2018 has been filed by the respondent No. 39 who is the intervener in the present case whose intervention has been allowed. He submits that the claim of the intervener will stand duly protected by the judgment to be passed by the learned Civil Court in the pending suit.
L. With respect to the point for law No.(vi), the learned counsel has submitted that the respondent No.1 was never party in the said proceedings and therefore, the judgment passed therein is not binding upon the respondent No.1. The learned counsel has submitted that he was not party in the suit No. 544 of 2001 and therefore, it is not binding upon respondent No.1. However, during the course of argument it transpired that suit No.544 of 2001 was relating to a portion of the property involved in this case i.e. Khata No. 401/152 Khesra No. 2509/1730, 2510/1730 and 4081/2875 (part) and the suit involved in the present case was filed after more than 10 years relates to the same record of rights where the land was recorded in the name of State of Bihar.
M. The learned counsel for the respondent no.1 has also referred to the judgement passed by Hon’ble Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1936 Calcutta 456 (Rai Kiran Chandra Roy Bahadur and others Versus Tarak Nath Gangopadhyay and others) and referred to page no.3 of the said judgment and submits that the cause of action to the suit is a serious question to decide as to whether the suit was barred by limitation. During the course of hearing, a reference has also been made to Section 231 of the CNT Act.
N. The learned counsel for the appellant-State, in response, has referred to Rule 66 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Rules, 1959 and has submitted that the proceeding under Section 87 has been directed to be dealt with in all respects as suits between the parties.
O. The learned counsel has referred to Section 114 illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act to submit that official acts are presumed to have been regularly performed and there is no illegality in the publication of the finally published record of rights in the instant case, nor any such allegation has been levelled.
Arguments of the Respondent no.26 in S.A. No. 94 of 2019
The learned counsel for the respondent No.26 has submitted that the said respondent is concerned with Khata No.401/152 and Khesra No.2509 area 1.04 acres, 2510 area 0.77 acres and 4081 area 1.81 acres out of 5.80 acres. She submits that the respondent no.26 was contesting the suit. She has submitted that while deciding the aforesaid points for determination, if it is held that the suit was not barred by limitation and the suit was maintainable, then another point for determination would arise in the present case i.e. “Whether the decision in Suit No.544 of 2001 is binding on the parties?
Arguments of the Respondent nos.14 to 32 in S.A. No.94 of 2019 and appellants in S.A. No.114 of 2019
Mrs. J. Mazumdar, Advocate submits that respondent nos.14 to 32 in S.A. No.94 of 2019 have filed their separate appeal bearing S.A. No.114 of 2019, challenging the same impugned judgement passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Dhanbad. The learned counsel has submitted that respondent nos.14 to 32 of S.A. No.94 of 2019 did not challenge the order passed by the Revenue Officer before the learned Principal District Judge, Dhanbad as they were not aggrieved by the said judgement, but they were the respondents in the said case and now they have filed a separate appeal against the 1st appellate order. She submits that her case was also covered by the earlier order passed in Case No.544 of 2001 and therefore, the same point for determination would arise for their case also as has been suggested with respect to respondent no.26 and their case would be covered by the case of respondent no.26.
Arguments of the respondent no. 39 (Intervener) in S.A. No. 94 of 2019
I. In S.A. No.94 of 2019, intervention application has been allowed and Kumari Ratnakar, wife of Jainiwas Pandey has been added as respondent no.39. The order allowing the intervention is dated 16.08.2023 and the court while allowing the intervention application has observed that “having heard the submission made at bar and after going through the materials in the record, the fact remains undisputed that intervenor has purchased the part of the suit property and will be affected by the ultimate judgement that would be passed in this Second Appeal. The intervenor undertakes to abide by the judgement passed in this appeal.”
II. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 39 (intervener) has submitted that the sale deed No.24951 dated 05.10.1970 and 25097 dated 06.10.1970 have been challenged in Title Suit No. 201 of 2018. The respondent No.39 is only concerned with a portion of the property which is not included in the schedule of the property involved in this case. He has submitted that his concern is in connection with Khesra No. 2866 (part) area 56.14 decimal Khata No.152 and submits that Khesra No. 2866 is not a part of the property which has been enumerated in the order passed by the learned revenue officer. During the court proceeding, the learned counsel has provided a copy of the plaint before this court. The learned counsel therefore, submits that technically speaking the right, title, interest etc of the respondent No.39 is not directly involved when seeing in the light of the description of the property in the schedule of the plaint involved in this case, but both the courts have referred to the aforesaid two sale deeds of 1970 and therefore, respondent No.39 found it proper to intervene in the present proceedings and the intervention has been allowed. He has submitted that the respondent No.39 is concerned with the fact that any judgment passed in this case may not prejudice his right which is pending in Title Suit No.201 of 2018. Accordingly, he submits that his main argument would be with respect to the point of law No. (i), (ii) & (iii). Learned counsel has submitted that they have also filed a cross suit being Original Suit No. 180 of 2020 and has also produced a copy of the cross suit.
III.The learned counsel has referred to Section 4 of CPC and has submitted that in absence of any specific provision to the contrary in CPC, nothing in the CPC is deemed to limit or otherwise effect any special or local law enforce or any special jurisdiction of power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under the law for time for enforce. The learned counsel has submitted that in absence of any contrary provisions in the CNT Act, the provisions of CPC would apply in the suit.
IV.Learned counsel then relied upon Section 5 of the CPC to submit that “Where any Revenue Courts are governed by the provisions of C.P.C, in those matters of procedure upon which any special enactment applicable to them is silent, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portions of those provisions which are not expressly made applicable by this Code shall not apply to those Courts, or shall only apply to them with such modifications as the State Government may prescribe. He submits that in absence of any notification by the state government, the CPC ipso facto would apply to the revenue courts.
V. Learned counsel then referred to Section 9 of the CPC to submit that the court is to try all the suits unless it is expressly or impliedly barred. The learned counsel then referred to Section 87 (2) of the CNT Act and has submitted that in appropriate case the revenue court may refer the matter to the civil court for adjudication. Meaning thereby, that the jurisdiction of the court is not expressly or impliedly barred under Section 87 of the CNT Act. Learned counsel submits that once the revenue court refers the matter to the civil court for adjudication then under such circumstances there can be no question of exclusion of Section 80 of the CPC which is a mandatory provision. The learned counsel submits that there is no exclusion provided under Section 80 CPC that it will not apply to a proceeding which has been referred to the court for adjudication by the revenue court.
VI.Learned counsel submits that the provision of CPC when read with the provision of the CNT Act, there is no question of exclusion of Section 80 of CPC with respect to suit filed under Section 87 of the CNT Act.
VII. Learned counsel submits that the judgment which have been cited by the learned counsel for the appellant with respect to the applicability and the object of Section 80 of CPC is to avoid unnecessary litigation against the State and considering the object of Section 80 CPC, there is no scope for exclusion of Section 80 CPC so far as suits under Section 87 of the CNT Act are concerned. He submits that Section 80 CPC is a mandatory provision, in absence of which the suit itself was not maintainable.
VIII. Learned counsel has also submitted that specific plea having been raised by the State and also the private party in connection with absence of notice under Section 80 CPC, it can be said that the absence of notice under Section 80 CPC was fatal to the suit itself. It suffered from inherent defect.
IX. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 [S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) By LRS vs. Jagannath (Dead) By LRS and others] paragraph No.5 to submit that finality of litigation cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants.
X. Learned counsel has referred Section 84 of the CNT Act and has submitted that there is a presumption as to the final publication and correctness of the record of right and therefore, the plaintiffs in the present case cannot deny the knowledge of publication. Learned counsel submits that the period of limitation commences under Section 87 of CNT Act from the date of publication and not from the date of knowledge.
S.A. No. 114 of 2019
Learned counsel for the appellants in S.A No. 114 of 2019 has adopted the same argument, but has submitted that the relief of the appellants in S.A. No. 114 of 2019 is confined only to Khesra No. 2509/1730 area 104 decimal, Khesra No. 2510/1730 area 77 decimal and Khesra No. 4081/2875 area 1.81 acre out of 5.80 acres. She has submitted that this property was involved in the earlier suit being Suit No. 544 of 2001 wherein a judgment was passed directing the State to rectify the record-of-rights and the said judgment has attained finality. The learned counsel has submitted that the respondent no. 1 has included this property also while challenging the same record-of- rights published in the year 2001 and the revenue suit has been filed after expiry of more than 10 years from the date of publication of the record-of-rights.
Learned counsel further submits that in spite of the fact that Revenue Suit No. 544 of 2001 was brought on record, but till date, the same has not been challenged by the respondent no. 1, although they are also claiming the same property. The learned counsel has submitted that this property is also involved in the two sale-deeds of the year 1970 in connection with which two title suits are pending alleging fraud and forgery. The learned counsel has submitted that the learned 1st appellate court has already observed that the judgment in the title suit will govern the parties and the judgment in the revenue suit will give way to the final judgment to be decided in the two civil suits.
Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 in S.A. No. 114 of 2019 has submitted that they are not interested in this appeal.
Findings of this court.
The records reveal that Krishna Singh s/o Late Parmeshwari Singh, Sri Kameshwar Singh s/o Late Sudarshan Singh had filed the suit under Section 87(1) of Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act 1908 and Veena Devi w/o: Late Raju Choudhary become co-plaintiff in the case.
The suit was filed before the Revenue Officer, Dhanbad against numerous persons including the State was represented through Circle Officer Govindpur, Dhanbad.
The suit was filed for rectification of record of rights in connection with thana No. 86, Govindpur Circle, District-Dhanbad falling in Khata No. 401/152. The details of the property have been mentioned in schedule of the plaint which is quoted as under:-
Schedule
Mouza- Bada Pichari, Thana No. 86, Anchal- Govindpur, District- Dhanbad
Khata No.
Khesra No.
Darj Rakwa
Mang
Rakwa
401/152
2513/1730
42 Decimals
ALL
2607/2790
20 Decimals
2630/2790
23 Decimals
2606/2790
13 Decimals
2608/2790
10 Decimals
2632/2790
35 Decimals
2531/1730
9 Decimals
2591/2790
15 Decimals
2674/1730
31 Decimals
2509/1730
104 Decimals
2510/1730
77 Decimals
2635/2790
23 Decimals
2430/1730
124 Decimals
2462/1730
009 Decimals
2633/2790
21 Decimals
2634/2790
29 Decimals
2532/1730
12 Decimals
2513/1730
42 Decimals
2592/2790
20 Decimals
2433/1730
2.57 Decimals
2448/1730
4.26 Decimals
2432/1730
6.91 Decimals
2636/2790
15 Decimals
2628/2790
30 Decimals
2629/2790
12 Decimals
2643/2790
15 Decimals
2514/1730
22 Decimals
2515/1730
005 Decimals
2456/1730
30 Decimals
2508/1730
193 Decimals
2679/2790
046 Decimals
2627/2790
33 Decimals
2630/2790
23 Decimals
2696/2790
1410 Decimals
2431/1730
700 Acre
A prayer was made to delete the name of the defendants from the record of rights and entry be made in favour of the plaintiffs.
Pursuant to addition of Plaintiff no.3 in the suit, some more properties in relation to Khata No. 401/ 152 were included and they were as follows: -
Khata Number
Khesra Number
Darj Rakwa
401/152
2792/2875
11 decimals
2734/2875
35 decimals
4081/2875
380 decimals
The suit was filed on 15th March, 2011.
Case of plaintiffs.
a. The specific case of the plaintiffs was that Jharia Raj Estate settled the suit land to Tilku Choudhary by Kaccha Hukumnama on 14.01.1927; subsequently his son Raju Choudhary sold and transferred the same to the plaintiffs through sale deed No. 24951 dated 05.10.1970 and the plaintiffs paid rent to the State Government. The R.S khatiyan was finally published on 15.05.2001 in the name of the defendants which was to be corrected. It was stated in the plaint that the distribution of purchase in connection with the disputed property was done on 15.05.2001 which was the cause of action to file petition under Section 87 of the CNT Act seeking rectification of entry made in the record of rights.
b. It was the case of the plaintiffs that they were in peaceful possession of the property and were paying rent to the State. It was their further case that the plaintiffs remained outside and subsequently, they obtained the recent Khatiyan and then they came to know that the period for filing the suit under Section 87 of CNT Act has expired and therefore, they were filing the suit under Section 87 of the CNT Act with a petition for condonation of delay.
c. The petition seeking condonation of delay in filing the suit was also filed.
A written statement was filed on behalf of the State of Jharkhand raising many technical pleas including that the suit is barred by limitation, there was no cause of action, the suit was barred under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code as mandatory notice under Section 80 CPC was not given. On merits it was, interalia, stated that the suit under C.S. khata No. 152, plot Nos. 1730, 2790 was recorded in the name of State Government and the nature of the land was Gairabad which is valuable government property. It was also asserted that the suit is recorded as Gairabad khata in CS Khatiyan and none of the document relied by the plaintiff were genuine and the plaintiff derived no title on the basis of those false documents. The statements in the plaint were stated to be false and were denied. It was also the case of the State that the plaintiff had neither title nor possession with respect to the suit property and the State claimed ownership and possession by virtue of Section 4 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act after abolition of Zamindari.
The defendant Nos. 8, 9 and 10 also contested the suit stating that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation and it was admitted by the plaintiff that the New Parcha was distributed amongst the concerned persons on 15.05.2001 and according to Section 87 of Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act the suit should be filed within three months, but the suit was filed after delay of almost 10 years and suit was fit to be dismissed on this score alone.
It was also alleged that the plaintiffs’ documents were forged and fabricated. All the statements in the plaint were denied. It was specifically asserted that it was false to say that Late Parmeshwari Singh and Late Sudarshan Singh has purchased the suit lands in the name of their minor son from Khewatdar Raju Choudhary s/o Late Tilku Choudhary. It was asserted that Tilku Choudhary was neither Khewatdar with respect to suit property nor he had ever possessed the same at any moment with respect to entire Mouza No.86. Therefore, the question of inheriting the disputed land by his son Raju Choudhary did not arise. They did not have any right, title and interest and therefore, the purported sale deed No. 24951 dated 05.10.1970 was a forged and fabricated document which was never executed by Raju Choudhary in favour of the father of the plaintiffs as alleged in the plaint. Consequently, the mutation on the basis of the same is wholly illegal and inoperative and therefore, the plaintiffs cannot claim right, title and interest over the said property. It was also denied that Jharia Raj issued permanent patta in the name of Tilku Chouhdary making him Khewatdar of the land. It was also asserted that the plaintiffs were taking advantage of the fire which took place in the registry office sometimes in the year 1970, so that no copy of document may be made available and no volume may be made available, if the registry office is summoned by any court.
It was denied that mutation had taken place and correction slip was issued in a proper way. It was asserted that the question of mutation/issuance of correction slip does not arise as the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit property. It was further asserted that the revisional parcha was started sometime in the year 1986 but during the span of 1985 to 2011 the plaintiffs remained totally silent and the plaintiffs have also not shown any reasons for such long silence.
It was also asserted that out of the land in the schedule of the plaint some land in the form of forest land over which no person can claim right, title and interest. It was asserted that in fact Late Kena Ram Paul was the Khewatdar of Khata No. 152 within which the suit land is situated being Khewat No.4 and the defendants had been paying rent regularly to the State of Bihar now State of Jharkhand since the rent assessment was done in their favour. It was asserted that the defendants were the legal heirs of Khewatdar Late Kena Ram Paul.
Additional written statement was also filed on behalf of the defendants and the defendants asserted that they had enquired into the matter in the office of Sub-Registrar, Dhanbad and obtained a certified copy of index 1 of 1970, volume 122 in which it was specifically mentioned that the deed No. 24951 page 286-288 contained in index-1 1970 and the vendor was one Arjun Nath Sharma and purchaser was Chiniwas Sharma of Khamarbindi within P.S Chas and the land in connection with sale deed was situated in Mouza-Chas and therefore, it was asserted that the sale deed No.24951 dated 05.10.1970 which was relied upon by the plaintiffs was forged and fabricated on the face of the records and it was asserted that plaintiffs be prosecuted under I.P.C for manufacturing forged and fabricated document. It was also asserted that recently a complaint was made before the Deputy Commissioner against the illegal zamabandi created by the plaintiffs in which an enquiry was set up.
It was asserted that the plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit had filed execution case being Execution Case No. 07 of 2013-14 before the LRDC Dhanbad for execution of the order dated 25.10.2011 passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 10/11-12 by Circle Officer Govindpur and order dated 12.01.2013 passed in LR Case No. 14 /12-13 by LRDC, Dhanbad for issuance of rent receipt in connection with property in Mouza-Barapichhari Khata Nos. 152, 124 and 266. It was asserted that the LRDC, Dhanbad without any jurisdiction passed order on 11.01.2014 in Execution Case No.07/2013-14 and ordered for issuance of rent receipts with respect to Zamabandi No.161 and 266 and an enquiry was set up. It was asserted that both the orders dated 25.10.2011 passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 10/11-12 by Circle Officer Govindpur and order dated 12.01.2013 passed in LR Case No. 14 /12-13 by LRDC, Dhanbad were set aside and an enquiry was set up by Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad by order dated 14.10.2014. The Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad has further quashed the order dated 11.01.2014 passed in Execution Case No. 07/2013-14 by LRDC, Dhanbad and it was asserted that the suit be dismissed.
The substituted defendants also adopted the written statement filed by the original defendants and asserted that the land under present suit was already sold and transferred in Mokrari right to Khewatdar Kena Ram Paul prior to preparation of C.S. Khatiyan by Ex-landlord of Jharia Raj Estate and therefore, in the C.S. operation kewat was prepared under Khewat No.4, C.S. Khata No.152 of Mouza Badapichhari including the suit lands in the name of Kena Ram Paul and he was exercising all rights and acts of tenure holder. It was asserted that the superior landlord of Jharia Raj Estate had no right, title, interest to settle the land under Khewat No.4 of Mouza Barapichhari as he had already sold these lands to Kena Ram Pual in Mokrari rights and Jharia Raj Estate had no right to settle the land to any person.
The defendant No.1 had also opposed the prayer by filing a written statement.
The learned revenue court dismissed the suit and the learned 1st appellate court set aside the judgement of the learned trial court by holding that the suit was not barred by limitation as it was filed within the period prescribed from the date of knowledge and also directed the revenue authorities to rectify the record of rights and observing that this would be subject to decisions in the pending suit before the civil court.
Questions of Law no. (i) and (ii)
The questions of law nos. (i) and (ii) are taken up together.
(i) Whether the suit was barred by limitation?
(ii) If the suit was barred by limitation, whether the learned Revenue Officer had power to condone the delay in filing the suit?
It is not in dispute that a suit under Section 87 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 was filed on 15.03.2011 and admittedly the record of rights which were under challenge in the suit were finally published on 15.05.2001 and as per the case of the plaintiffs the parchas were also distributed on15.05.2001 and their specific case was that the cause of action arose on 15.05.2001.
The plaintiffs admitted that the suit was barred by limitation and had also filed a petition seeking condonation of delay. The only explanation with regard to delay in filing the suit in the main plaint in paragraph 11 was that the plaintiffs were staying outside and subsequently, they obtained the khatiyan and then they came to know that the period for seeking rectification of record of rights under Section 87 had already expired and that they were filing a separate petition seeking condonation of delay. In the petition seeking condonation of delay the explanation which has been furnished is in paragraph 2 , 3 and 4 as follows: -
“(2) the plaintiff are not aware of the publication of revisional khatiyan of mouza Bara Pichari
(3) That, the plaintiffs obtained the certified copy of revision Khatiyan in the year, 2011,
(4) That, after obtaining the certified copy of revisional the present application for correction of khatiyan.”
Apparently, neither in the plant nor in the petition seeking condonation of delay, any disclosure was made as to when and how the plaintiffs got knowledge about the alleged errors in the record of rights. The suit was filed after expiry of almost 10 years from the final publication of the record of rights.
Section 87 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 is quoted as under: -
Institution of suits before Revenue Officer – (1) In proceedings under this Chapter a suit may be instituted before a Revenue Officer, at any time within three months from the date of the certificate for the final publication of the record-of- rights under subsection (2) of Section 83 of the decision of any dispute regarding any entry which a Revenue Officer has made in, or any omission which he has made from the record [except an entry of a fair rent settled under the provisions of Section 85 before the final publication of the record-of-rights] whether such dispute be,-
(a) between the landlord and tenant, or
(b) between landlords of the same or of neighbouring estate,
or
(c) between tenant and tenant, or
(d) as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, or
(e) as to whether land held rent-free is properly so held, or
[(ee) as to any question relating to the title in land or to any interest in land as between the parties to the suit; or]
(f) as to any other matter; and the Revenue Officer shall hear and decide the dispute:
Provided that the Revenue Officer may, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf under Section 264, transfer any particular case or class of cases to a competent Civil Court for trial:
Provided also that in any suit under this Section, the Revenue Officer shall not try any issue which has been, or is already, directly and substantially in issue between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, in proceedings for the settlement of rent under this Chapter, where such issue has been tried and decided, or is already being tried, by a Revenue Officer under Section 86 in proceedings instituted after the final publication of the record-of-rights.
(2) An appeal shall lie, in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed Officer from decisions under sub-section (1) and a second appeal to the High Court shall lie from any decision on appeal of such Officer as if such decision were an appellate- decree passed by the Judicial Commissioner under Chapter XVI.
The present suit was instituted under Section 87 of the CNT Act before the Revenue Officer, which clearly provides that a suit has to be instituted before the Revenue Officer within a period of three months from the date of the certificate for the final publication of the record-of-rights. It also provides that the Revenue Officer may, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf under Section 264, transfer any particular case or class of cases to a competent Civil Court for trial. It further provides that in any suit under Section 87, the Revenue Officer shall not try any issue which has been, or is already, directly and substantially in issue between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, in proceedings for the settlement of rent under the Chapter, where such issue has been tried and decided, or is already being tried, by a Revenue Officer under Section 86 in proceedings instituted after the final publication of the record-of-rights.
In the judgment passed by this Court in S.A. No. 89 of 2016 decided on 26.08.2025, a specific substantial question of law was framed as under: -
“i. Whether Section-5 of Limitation Act has any application with respect to a suit or original proceeding and if the answer is in negative the Revenue Officer, Dhanbad had any jurisdiction to entertain the CNT Case No.15/2006 which was admittedly barred by the law of Limitation and the subsequent order including order dated 18/01/2006 is illegal ab initio void and without jurisdiction?”
In the said case also, the suit was filed after expiry of 10 years and delay was condoned by referring to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The said substantial question of law was considered in paragraph 14 to 20 by taking into consideration Section 5(2) of CPC which defines Revenue Court; Section 2(1) of Limitation Act, 1963 provides that suit does not include an appeal or an application; Sections 3, 5 and 29 of the Limitation Act and also Sections 87, 230, 230A and 231 of the CNT Act and Rule 75 of the CNT Rules. It has been ultimately held in paragraph 16 to 20 that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply with respect to the suit under Section 87(1) of the CNT Act, 1908 and the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit which were barred by limitation and it was also held that the order impugned suffered from improper assumption of jurisdiction. Paragraph 16 to 20 of the judgment passed by this Court in S.A. No. 89 of 2016 are quoted as under: -
“16. The provision of Section 87 reveals that suit before the revenue court, interalia, in connection with rectification of record of rights has to be filed within 3 months and there is no specific provision for extension of time or for condonation of delay akin to section 5 of the Limitation Act. As per Section 230 of C.N.T Act, 1908, the provisions of the limitation Act shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act, apply to all suits, appeals and applications under the Act.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for Extension of prescribed period in certain cases and it provides that any appeal or any application, [other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)], may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. It has also been provided under Section 2 (l) of the Limitation Act itself that “suit”does not include an appeal or an application. Thus, suit does not include an appeal or an application and Section 5 does not apply to suits, it only applies to any appeal or an application. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that Section 5 does not apply even to suits filed before the revenue court under Section 87 of the C.N.T Act, 1908. The suit under section 87 of the C.N.T Act, 1908 has to be filed within a period of 3 months as prescribed under section 87(1) itself. The suit filed in this case was admittedly much beyond the prescribed period of limitation and hence the suit filed under section 87 (1) of the C.N.T Act, 1908 was barred by limitation.
So far as the judgment reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470 (supra) relied upon by the respondents is concerned, the judgment was passed in the context of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which does not deal with suits. The said judgment does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case where the point is as to whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to suits filed under Section 87(1) of the CNT Act 1908 which has to be considered in the light of provisions of CNT Act, 1908 read with Limitation Act, 1963.
So far as the judgment reported in 1963 BLJR 35 (supra) relied upon by the respondents is concerned, it has been simply held therein that in view of Section 20 of the CNT Act, 1908 all the provisions of Indian Limitation Act, so far as they are not inconsistent with the CNT Act, 1908, apply to all the suits, appeals and applications under CNT Act, 1908. The said judgment also does not help the respondents in any manner, inasmuch as, there can be no dispute that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to suits be it a suit under CNT Act, 1908 or a suit before the Civil Court under the general law of the land.
Thus, the 1st substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant by holding that Section-5 of Limitation Act does not apply with respect to a suit under section 87 (1) of the C.N.T Act, 1908 and the Revenue Officer, Dhanbad had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit being CNT Case No.15/2006 which was barred by the law of Limitation and consequently, the subsequent order including order dated 18/01/2007 is illegal ab initio void and amounts to improper assumption of jurisdiction.”
The judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 2010 SC 3240 (supra) does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case where suit has been filed before revenue court under the special Act of CNT Act which has its own provisions of limitation and as per section 230 of CNT Act, the Limitation Act would apply so far it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the CNT, Act .
In the said case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court ,the suit before the civil court seeking declaration and injunction after expiry of 18 years from the date of compromise. The case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with Article 58 of the Limitation Act which in turn deals with suits seeking to obtain declarations, other than declarations under Article 56 and 57 of the Limitation Act. It was held that mere existence of a wrong entry in the record of rights does not give rise a cause of action to within the meaning of Article 58 of the Limitation Act.
This court finds that Article 58 of the Limitation has no applicability to the present case. This case involves CNT Act which is a special Act where the entry in record of rights which is finally published itself gives rise to the cause of action and triggers the period of limitation for filing a suit which has to be filed within a period of three months from the date of certificate issued in connection with final publication of record of rights. In view of the fact that the parties had filed a suit before the Revenue Officer under Section 87(1) of the CNT Act, 1908, the parties are governed by the period of filing the suit as per limitation provided under the Special Act. Under Section 230 of the CNT Act, the provision of Limitation Act, 1908 has been made applicable to a proceeding under suits, appeals and applications so far as they are not inconsistent with the CNT Act. Meaning thereby, the special provision made under CNT Act with regard to limitation would govern the parties and they will not be governed by the General Law of Limitation Act.
So far as the judgment passed in the case of Dwarika Sunar (supra) is concerned, this Court has taken note of an earlier Full Bench judgment passed by Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Paritosh Maity v. Ghasiram Maity reported in 1986 SCC OnLine Pat 243 where the question posed was as follows: -
“Whether a civil suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession, challenging, inter alia, the entries in the revenue records would still be maintainable after the insertion of Cl. (ee) in S. 87(1), Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, by the Chotanagpur Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1920 (Bihar and Orissa Act VI of 1920), is the significant common question in these two connected Second Appeals, referred to the Full Bench for an authoritative decision”
The Hon’ble Full Bench in the case of Paritosh Maity (supra) considered the true legal effect of a harmonious reading of Section 87 and 258 of the CNT Act in paragraph 16 and ultimately answered the reference in paragraph 21 of the judgment. Paragraph 16 and 21 of the judgment passed in the case of Paritosh Maity (supra) are quoted as under: -
“16. The true legal effect of a harmonious reading of Ss. 87 and 258 may, therefore, be noticed. Chapter XII provides for the record of rights and S. 83 therein deals with the preliminary publication, the amendment and the final publication of the record of rights, whilst S. 84 creates certain rebuttable presumptions in favour of the correctness of the entries in the record of rights. However, S. 87 provides a remedy by way of a suit before the Revenue Officer for resolving any dispute with regard to such an entry in the record of rights or an omission therefrom. In essence, such a suit is thus directed as a challenge to the entry or omission in such a record, but S. 87 further provides that this can be raised even where such a dispute be with regard to matters specified in Cls. (a) to (f) of S. 87. In a way, therefore, S. 87 provides a special and additional remedy pertaining to entries in the revenue records as soon as they are finally published and certified. That is why the Legislature has chosen to provide a narrow limitation of three months from the date of the certificate of the final publication of the record of rights for bringing such a suit. To my mind, this remedy is not in any way in derogation of the civil rights of the parties, but indeed is a special and additional remedy which may be availed of within a limited period of three months, if a party feels aggrieved by any of the entries in the record of rights. However, if such a remedy is availed of by the parties then the statute now provides an appeal and even a second appeal to the High Court itself in the very forum of sub-s. (2), S. 87 which inevitably would achieve finality. Thus, if actual resort has been made to a suit under S. 87 then for an identical lis S. 258 would bar a further resort to the Civil Courts except on the grounds of fraud or want of jurisdiction. Obviously enough, to bring in even this limited bar, the lis would have to be identical. However, as already noticed and it bears repetition that if no resort has been earlier made to a suit under S. 87 by the parties, the very precondition for the application of S. 258 would be absent and it cannot come into play in such a situation.
“21. To finally conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative both on principle and precedent. It is held that a civil suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and, inter alia, challenging the entries in the revenue record would still be maintainable even after the insertion of clause (ee) in S. 87(1), Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908.”
This Court finds that the judgement of Dwarika Sunar (supra) was arising out of a suit filed in Civil Court wherein it has been held that maximum period to file suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession and for challenging the entry made in record of rights will be 12 years from the date of final publication of record of rights. This court is of the considered view that the judgment passed in the case of Dwarika Sunar (supra) does not help the respondents in any manner in view of the aforesaid discussions. In the present case this Court is concerned with the limitation in filing suit before the Revenue Officer seeking rectification of record of rights under Section 87 of the CNT Act.
As per the provisions of CNT Act and CNT Rules of 1959 framed thereunder, after disposal of the objections with regard to draft publication of the record of rights, the final record of rights is to be published and distributed in terms of rule 56 and 58, the copies of record of rights are to be distributed to the landlord and/or to the concerned tenants in whose favour the record of rights are finally published. Schedule VII is the form prescribed under Rule 56 dealing with the notice for final publication of the record of rights.
This Court finds that it was never the case of the plaintiffs that the procedure of publication and distribution of the record of rights was not followed. Rather, their specific case was that they remained out of station and had no knowledge of the final publication of the record of rights which was published on 15.01.2001 and also distribution of copies of record of rights which had also taken place on 15.01.2001 itself.
It was the specific case of the plaintiffs themselves that the record of rights, which were under challenge in the suit filed under Section 87 of the CNT Act before the revenue officer, were finally published on 15.05.2001 and the parchas were also distributed on 15.05.2001 and that the cause of action to file the suit also arose on 15.05.2001.
This Court finds that the learned Revenue Officer while considering the suit filed under Section 87 has mechanically condoned the delay in filing the suit without appreciating that the Revenue Officer has not been empowered under law to condone delay in filing the suit and that Section 5 of the limitation Act does not apply to suits. The learned 1st appellate court has also erred in law by recording that the limitation would be counted from the date of knowledge although Section 87(1) of the CNT Act provides for the cause of action to file the suit being the date of the certificate for final publication of record of rights under sub-section 2 of Section 83. The learned 1st appellate court has wrongly recorded that there was nothing on record to show that the procedure for distribution of record of rights to the persons interested was followed and has thereby failed to consider that it was the specific case of the plaintiffs themselves that the record of rights challenge in the suit was finally published on 15.05.2001 and as per the case of the plaintiffs themselves, the parchas were also distributed on 15.05.2001 and their specific case was that the cause of action arose on 15.05.2001 and it was never the case of the plaintiffs that the required procedure for publication and distribution of record of rights as per the CNT Act and the rules framed thereunder were not followed. The case of the plaintiffs was that they were out of station and when finally published record of rights came to their knowledge, the suit was filed challenging the finally published on 15.05.2001 and as per the case of the plaintiffs themselves, the parchas were also distributed on 15.05.2001 and they admittedly filed the suit after 10 years from the cause of action.
Section 87(1) of the CNT Act, clearly provides that a suit has to be instituted within three months from the date of certificate to the final publication of record of rights. Thus, as per the CNT Act, the cause of action to file the suit arises from the date of certificate of final publication of the record of rights and not from the date of knowledge. Therefore, there is no doubt that the suit was barred by limitation and the revenue court did not have the power to condone delay in filing the suit under section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the period of limitation would be counted from the date of the knowledge of final publication of record of rights is devoid of any merits in view of clear provision of Section 87(1) of the CNT Act, which provides for the cause of action to file the suit being the date of the certificate for final publication of record of rights under sub- section 2 of Section 83.
Otherwise also, this Court finds that there has been enormous delay of almost 10 years in filing the suit and there is neither any foundational date with regard to date of knowledge of alleged error in the entries in record of rights nor there is any cogent explanation for such a delay.
Thus, the 1st question of law is answered by holding that the suit was barred by limitation.
The 2nd question of law is answered by holding that the Revenue Officer has no power to condone the delay in filing the suit under section 5 of the Limitation Act . These two questions of law are decided against the plaintiffs and consequently the suit itself is held to be barred by limitation and was not maintainable.
Question of Law no. (iii)
(iii) Whether the suit was maintainable on account of absence of notice under Section 80 CPC?
So far as 3rd question of law is concerned, this Court finds that the suit has been filed under Section 87 of the CNT Act before the Revenue Officer seeking rectification of the finally published record of rights. Further, proviso to Section 87 (1) reveals that subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf under Section 264, the revenue officer may transfer any particular case or class of cases to a competent Civil Court for trial. Section 87(2) also provides that an appeal shall lie, in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed Officer from decisions under Section 87 (1) and it also provides that a Second Appeal shall lie to the High Court from any decision of the appellate authority as if such decision of the appellate authority were a decree passed by the Judicial Commissioner under Chapter XVI.
Sections 4, 5 and 12 of CPC are quoted as under: -
“4. Savings.—(1) In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the proposition contained in sub-section (1), nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any remedy which a landholder or landlord may have under any law for the time being in force for the recovery of rent of agricultural land from the produce of such land.
Application of the Code to Revenue Courts.—(1) Where any Revenue Courts are governed by the provisions of this Code in those matters of procedure upon which any special enactment applicable to them is silent, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portions of those provisions which are not expressly made applicable by this Code shall not apply to those Courts, or shall only apply to them with such modifications as the State Government may prescribe.
(2) “Revenue Court” in sub-section (1) means a Court having jurisdiction under any local law to entertain suits or other proceedings relating to the rent, revenue or profits of land used for agricultural purposes, but does not include a Civil Court having original jurisdiction under this Code to try such suits or proceedings as being suits or proceedings of a civil nature.
Bar to further suit.—Where a plaintiff is precluded by rules from instituting a further suit in respect of any particular cause of action, he shall not be entitled to institute a suit in respect of such cause of action in any Court to which this Code applies.”
The CPC acknowledges that Revenue Courts constituted by local law who also have jurisdiction to entertain suits. Section 5 of the CPC also provides the circumstances, the extent and the manner in which CPC would apply in revenue courts. It provides that where Revenue Courts are governed by the provisions of the CPC in those matters of procedure upon which any special enactment applicable to them is silent, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any portions of those provisions which are not expressly made applicable by C.P.C. not to apply to those Courts or to apply to them with such modifications as the State Government may prescribe.
Further, Section 265 of the CNT Act, deals with Power of the state government to Make Rules as to Procedure, on Application of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 265 of the CNT Act, is quoted as under:-
Power To Make Rules as to Procedure, on Application of the Code of Civil Procedure:
(1) The State Government may make rule for regulating the procedure of the Deputy Commissioner in matters under this Act for which a procedure is not provided hereby, and may, by any such rule, direct that any provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [5 of 1908] shall apply, with or without modification, to all or any classes of cases before the Deputy Commissioner.
(2) When any provision of the said Code is applied by such rules, the rules may further declare that any provision of this Act which is superseded by, or inconsistent with, any provision so applied shall be deemed to be repealed.
(3) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), and subject to those rules when made and to the other provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall, as far as may be, and in so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, apply to all suits, appeals and proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner under this Act and all appeals from decisions passed in such-suits or proceedings.
Chapter XVI of the CNT Act deals with judicial procedure in matters cognizable by the Deputy Commissioner. Rule 67 of the rules
of 1959, interalia, provide that the revenue officer in suits under section 87 shall adopt the procedure laid down in Chapter XVI of the CNT, Act for the trial of the suit so far as it may be applicable.
Section 265 of the CNT Act clearly provides that until rules are made under 265 (1) and subject to those rules when made and subject to the other provisions of CNT Act, the provisions of the CPC shall, as far as may be, and in so far as they are not inconsistent with CNT Act, apply to all suits.
Thus, by virtue of Section 265 of the CNT Act, the CPC is applicable to the Suits under Section 87 of CNT Act before the revenue officer, but application of CPC is subject to other provisions of the CNT Act and the rules framed thereunder with regards to procedure and applicability of CPC.
As per Section 5 (1) of CPC, where any Revenue Court under special enactment is governed by the provisions of CPC and in such matters of procedure where the special enactment is silent, it is for the state government to declare by notification in the Official Gazette that such provisions of CPC which are not expressly made applicable, shall not apply to the concerned Revenue Courts, or shall only apply to them with such modifications as the State Government may prescribe. 61. No such notification of the state government issued under Section 5 of the CPC has been brought to the notice of this Court excluding the applicability of Section 80 of the CPC to the suits filed in the revenue courts. Further, no such provision of CNT Act has been brought to the notice of this Court to say that provisions of Section 80 CPC would be contrary to any provision of the CNT Act and the rules framed thereunder.
Section 80 of CPC clearly provides that save as otherwise provided in Sub-Section 2, no suits shall be instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the concerned government. Further Section 80 of CPC does not make any distinction between a suit filed before the Revenue Court or a suit filed before a Civil Court. It is also important to note that as per Section 87 of the CNT Act, the Revenue Officer before whom the suit is instituted in the Revenue Court may even refer the suit for decision by a Civil Court. There is no such provision under the CPC or under the CNT Act to exclude the applicability of Section 80 of the CPC to the suit filed before the Revenue Court.
In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the provision of Section 80 of CPC is equally applicable to the Revenue Court dealing with the suit filed under Section 87 of the CNT Act, 1908.
The 3rd question of law is accordingly answered against the plaintiffs and in favour of the State.
Paragraph 25 and 25.1 of the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 10047 of 2025 [Odisha State Financial Corporation vs. Vigyan Chemical Industries and others] decided on 05.08.2025 are quoted as under:-
“25. As seen from the above judgments, a defect in jurisdiction vitiates the decree and renders it unenforceable. The Civil Procedure Code, though considered to be procedural law, encompasses within it, certain provisions that take away or circumscribe the right to sue, which are deemed to be substantive.
One such provision is Section 80 CPC which read as follows:………………
25.1. A plain reading of the above provision makes it explicit that no suit can be instituted against the State, an instrumentality of the State, or a public officer acting in his official capacity, without issuance of a notice under Section 80 CPC. It is not to be forgotten that when a notice is to be given, it must also be given on the appropriate party. The object of this section is to ensure that public funds and judicial time are not wasted on unwarranted litigation. The requirement of notice provides the Government an opportunity to examine the claim, reconsider its position, and potentially resolve the dispute out of Court, thereby avoiding unnecessary proceedings. There is an express bar on a civil court from entertaining a suit against the government or its instrumentalities, without compliance with the said provision. Section 80 (2) further provides that notice under Section 80(1) may be dispensed with, but only with the leave of the court. This Court has consistently held that the requirement of notice under Section 80 is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. Failure to do so renders the suit liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The absence of such notice is treated as a formal defect, and the Court is duty bound to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, if it discloses non- compliance with Section 80 CPC.”
Admittedly, in the present case, no notice was issued under Section 80 of CPC. In such circumstances, it is held that the suit was barred on account of absence of notice under Section 80 of CPC.
Question of law no. (iv) and (v)-
(iv)Whether the suit before the Revenue Officer could have proceeded in view of pendency of Title Suit No.119 of 2014 challenging the two said deeds no. 24951 dated 1.10.1970 and 25097 dated 6.10.1970 alleging fraud which was filed after institution of the suit before the Revenue Officer but before its disposal on 24.03.2018?
(v) What would be the consequence of suit filed by respondent no. 39 (intervenor) at the stage of pendency of the 1st appeal being title suit no. 201 of 2018 challenging the two said deeds no. 24951 dated 1.10.1970 and 25097 dated 6.10.1970 alleging fraud?
It is not in dispute that three suits are pending: Title Suit No.201 of 2018, Original Suit No.180 of 2020 and Title Suit No.119 of 2014, which are inter alia relatable to challenge the aforesaid two sale deed nos.24951 dated 05.10.1970 and 25097 dated 06.10.1970. The said two sale deeds of the year 1970 have been referred to in the trial/appellate court’s judgement impugned in the present proceedings and pendency of the suits before civil has also been mentioned in the judgements impugned and the learned appellate court has observed that the parties would be ultimately governed by the decision in the suits pending before the civil court.
Admittedly, the revenue suit involved in this case was instituted in the year 2011, and all the aforesaid title suits were filed after the institution of the present revenue suit. Aforesaid Title Suit No.119 of 2014 was filed during the pendency of the suit and the Title Suit No.201 of 2018 was filed when the matter was pending at the 1st appellate stage and Original Suit No.180 of 2020 was filed during the pendency of the present appeal.
This Court while answering the question of law no. (i) to (iii) has held as aforesaid that the revenue suit filed under Section 87 seeking rectification of record of rights itself was not maintainable being barred by limitation having been filed after about 10 years from the date of its final publication as per law and also not maintainable for want of notice under Section 80 C.P.C.
This Court is of the considered view that once a suit under Section 87 was filed before the Revenue Officer in terms of the statute seeking rectification of record of rights, the Revenue Officer was not under any compulsion not to proceed with the suit merely because a title suit is filed before the civil court during the pendency of the suit. However, at the same time, the Revenue Officer under Section 87 of the CNT Act itself has the discretion to refer the suit filed before the Revenue Officer to the civil court for decision and further if the conditions under second proviso to section 87(1) is satisfied, the revenue officer is obliged not to try the suit irrespective of whether the suit before the civil court is instituted prior to or after the filing of the suit before the revenue court. This Court is further of the view that in cases where there are serious allegations of fraud, forgery or impersonation with respect to the sale deeds which forms basis of title and claiming rectification of record of rights and the sale deeds are subject matter of challenge in the civil court on such ground , an exercise of sound discretion in terms of the proviso to Section 87(1) of the CNT, Act calls for exercise of power by the revenue court to refer the dispute to civil court for decision of the suit.
This Court is further of the considered view that the learned 1st appellate court in the present case has taken care of the fact that the sale deeds of the year 1970, pursuant to which title is being claimed by the concerned party, have been challenged in Civil Court to be forged and fabricated. The 1st appellate court has observed that if the competent civil court decides that the sale deeds are forged and fabricated, then automatically the order passed by the revenue authority will not come in force and with this observation the appeal was allowed in favour of the plaintiffs by setting aside the judgement of dismissal by the revenue court in case No. 18 of 2011 directing the revenue authority to incorporate the name of the plaintiffs in the record of rights with respect to the suit land.
The learned 1st appellate court has also taken note of the fact that the challenge to the sale deeds cannot be decided by the revenue authority and also has taken note of the fact that there were serious disputes in connection with mutation and opening of jamabandi while setting aside the order impugned passed by the Revenue officer in the Title Suit being Case No.18 of 2011. The learned 1st appellate court has also observed that the State Government could initiate proceedings seeking cancellation of jamabandi and cancellation of mutation order passed in favour of the plaintiff after giving full opportunity to the plaintiff and further observed that if the question of title is involved the State Government can file a suit against the plaintiff and other plaintiffs as well as private respondents also.
This Court finds that the suit itself has been held to be barred by limitation and bad for non-issuance of notice under Section 80 CPC in view of the answer to the question of law nos.(i) to (iii). Since this Court has decided that the suit itself is not maintainable, any observations made by the courts in both the judgements involved in these proceedings shall have no bearing on the aforesaid suits pending before the civil court and it is sufficient to observed that the pending civil suits shall be decided in accordance with the law.
The question of law nos.(iv) and (v) are accordingly answered in the aforesaid terms.
Question of law no. (vi):-
Whether the decision in Suit No.544 of 2001 is binding on the parties?
So far as the decision passed earlier in Revenue Suit No.544 of 2001 is concerned, the impact of the same will also be considered as per law, if such occasion arises in the pending suits. The suit itself having been held to be not maintainable while answering the question of law No. (i) to (iii) and consequently the suit stands dismissed for want of notice under Section 80 CPC and also barred by limitation and consequently, the suit itself is dismissed. In such circumstances, objection raised by the defendants in the suit referring earlier Revenue Suit no.544 of 2001 with respect to some portions of the suit property, has no bearing in the matter. It is sufficient to observe that it will certainly be open to the civil courts dealing with the four pending suits to decide the said suits as per law and if the order passed in Revenue Suit no.544 of 2001 is relied upon by any of the parties, the same be considered in accordance with law. The question of law no. (vi) is accordingly answered in the aforesaid terms.
These appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms by holding that-
a. The suit under Section 87(1) of CNT Act seeking rectification of the records of rights was barred by limitation [answer to question of law no (i)];
b. The revenue court has no power to condone delay in filing the suit under section 5 of the Limitation Act [answer to question of law no (ii)] ;
c. Section 80 of CPC is applicable to the suits before the revenue authority under Section 87 of CNT Act and the suit was barred for absence of notice under Section 80 CPC [answer to question of law no (iii)];
d. The revenue officer while deciding suit under Section 87 CPC has the discretion to refer the dispute to civil court for decision and where there are serious allegations of fraud, forgery or impersonation with respect to the sale deeds which forms basis of title and claiming rectification of record of rights, an exercise of sound discretion in terms of the proviso to Section 87(1) of the CNT, Act calls for exercise of power by the revenue court to refer the dispute to civil court for decision of the suit and the suit having been held not maintainable while answering the question no (i) to (iii), the pending three suits before the civil court be decided as per law and without being influenced by any observation made by trial court and appellate court in this case [answer to question of law no (iv) and (v)]
e. The order passed in Revenue Suit no.544 of 2001 be also considered in the pending suits as per law if relied upon by any of the parties to the said suits. [answer to question of law no (vi)].
The suit before the revenue court itself was not maintainable being barred by limitation and ALSO in the absence of notice under section 80 CPC and accordingly the suit is dismissed.
These 2nd appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed.
Let a copy of this order be communicated to the concerned court through “Fax/e-mail”.