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Judgment
79 paragraphs · 1,715 wordsSanjeev Kumar, J
1 This Criminal Acquittal Appeal by the State is directed against the judgment dated 12.07.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Udhampur
[‘trial Court’] in file No. File No. 35/Session titled ‘State of J&K Versus Abdul Rehman Challoo and another (FIR No. 368/2003 under
Sections 489-B/489-C/120-B RPC).
2 With a view to appreciate the grounds of challenge urged by learned counsel for the appellant, it is apt to briefly take note of the prosecution case as
was put up before the trial Court:
On 14.12.2003, a source report was received in the Police Station, Udhampur that the respondents were having association with anti national elements
and were helping their activities by managing fake currency from Delhi, to be used in Kashmir Valley to destabilize the country. The police was
further informed that the respondents had brought the consignment of counterfeit currency notes from Delhi in a Fiat Car No.JKOlB-2880 and were
staying in Udhampur. On the basis of the aforesaid information, a case FIR No. 368/2003 was registered in P/S Udhampur and the investigation set in
motion.
A naka was laid at new Bus Stand, Udhampur on Jammu-Srinagar National Highway at about 7 pm and a Fiat Car bearing registration No. JKOlB-
2880 which was going from Udhampur towards Traffic Check Post, Udhampur was intercepted. Respondent No.2 was driving it, while respondent
No.1 was sitting on the front seat. On search, a bag was found in possession of respondent No. 1 which contained a suit and a shawl etc. The suit
was further searched and 11 currency notes of 500 denomination were recovered from the said suit. The currency notes were found to be counterfeit
and were, accordingly, seized. The respondents were taken in custody. The seized currency notes were sent to FSL for examination. The FSL expert
confirmed that the seized currency notes were counterfeit and, accordingly, investigation was carried further. After collecting the relevant evidence,
the Investigating Officer concluded that the respondents were, prima facie, guilty of commission of offences alleged and, accordingly, submitted the
final report/challan before the trial Court.
3 The trial Court in the light of evidence collected by the Investigating Officer and presented with the final report framed the charges under section
489-C/34 RPC against the respondents. The prosecution with a view to bring home the charge against the respondents produced and examined PWs
Joginder Kumar, Parvez Sazad, Rajesh Kumar, Daya Nand, Hukam Chand, Rakesh Hangloo, Sunil Kumar, Mohan Lal Thakur and Abdul Qayoom.
4 On the conclusion of prosecution evidence, incriminating material emerging therefrom was put to the respondents and their statements under Section
342 CrPC were recorded in which they simply denied their involvement in the commission of offences attributed to them. However, the respondents
chose not to lead any evidence in defence.
5 The trial Court considered the evidence on record and after hearing the Public Prosecutor for the State and learned counsel representing the
respondents, concluded that, though the prosecution had apparently established that 11 currency notes of 500 denomination were recovered from the
vehicle in question in which the respondents were travelling, yet it was not established by the prosecution by any evidence that at the time of recovery
of the seizure currency notes, the respondents knew that the currency in their possession was forged or they had reason to believe it to be so, nor was
it proved that the respondents intended to use it as genuine or it might have been used as genuine. Having found that the necessary ingredients of
Section 489-C of CrPC had not been proved, the trial Court dismissed the challan and acquitted the respondents of the offences which they were
charged with. It is this judgment of acquittal which is assailed by the State on the ground that the trial court has not correctly appreciated the evidence,
oral as well as circumstantial and has erroneously held that the offence was not proved by sufficient evidence by the prosecution. The impugned
judgment is also assailed on the ground that that the trial Court adopted a very hyper technical approach and acquitted the respondents despite the fact
that the prosecution had led sufficient evidence to establish the recovery of counterfeit currency notes from the possession of the respondents and also
that they had nexus with the anti-national elements and were helping their activities by managing fake currency from Delhi, to be used in Kashmri
Valley for militant activities.
6 Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record, I am of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court was the only
plausible view that could have been taken in the face of evidence led by the prosecution.
7 After carefully going through the evidence of prosecution witnesses, one would tend to agree with the learned counsel for the State that the
prosecution had proved that the counterfeit currency notes i.e 11 notes of 500 denomination were recovered from the conscious possession of the
respondents. The expert evidence of PW Raksh Hangloo also confirmed that the seized currency notes were counterfeit. But, as rightly observed by
the trial Court, that is not end of the matter. Section 489-C RPC which the respondents have been charged with, reads thus:
“489C. Possession of forged or counterfeit currency-notes or bank-notes-Whoever has in his possession any forged or counterfeit currency-note or
bank-note, knowing or having reason to believe the same to be forged or counterfeit and intending to use the same as genuine or that it may be used
as genuine, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with bothâ€
8 From a plain reading of the Section reproduced, it is abundantly clear that with a view to bring home the charge of possession of forged or
counterfeit notes in terms of Section 489-C RPC, the prosecution is required to prove the following ingredients beyond reasonable doubt:
(i) that the suspected currency notes or bank notes were found and recovered from the possession of the accused;
(ii) that the suspected currency notes were found to be and were forged or counterfeit;
(iii) that the accused knew or it had reasons to believe that the currency notes possessed by him were forged or counterfeit; and
(iv) that the accused, who were found in possession of counterfeit currency intended to use it as genuine or that it may be used as genuine.
9 Unless the aforesaid ingredients are proved, the accused cannot be held guilty of commission of offence under Section 489 C RPC. In the instant
case, the prosecution has, to a greater extent, proved the first two ingredients, but has failed to prove that at the time of their possession, the
respondents knew that the currency seized from them was forged or they had a reason to believe it to be forged. There is not even an iota of evidence
to show that the respondents had intended to use it as genuine or that it may be used as genuine.
10 The trial Court after appreciating the material in the light of provisions of Section 489 C RPC and placing strong reliance upon the judgments of
Supreme Court in the cases of Umashanker vs. State of ChattisgarH, AIR 2001 SC. 3074 and M. Mammutti vs. State of Karnataka AIR 1979 SC.
1705, rightly concluded that the prosecution had miserably failed to bring home the guilt of the respondents convincingly.
11 For the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded to take a view in the matter different from the one taken by the trial Court. It is an appeal against
the judgment of acquittal and the power of the Appellate Court to interfere with the judgment of acquittal are circumscribed. Even if the appellate
Court, on analysing the evidence on record, is of the opinion that two views are possible, yet the appellate Court would prefer the view which goes to
the benefit of the accused. In this regard, reference can be made to a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sambhaji Hindurao
Deshmukh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“The principles relating to interference by the High Court in appeals against acquittal are well settled. While the High Court can review the entire
evidence and reach its own conclusions, it will not interfere with the acquittal by the trial court unless there are strong reasons based on evidence
which can dislodge the findings arrived by the trial court, which were the basis for the acquittal. The High Court has to give due importance to the
conclusions of the trial court, if they had been arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. The High Court will interfere in appeals against
acquittals, only where the trial court makes wrong assumptions of material facts or fails to appreciate the evidence properly. If two views are
reasonably possible from the evidence on record, one favouring the accused and one against the accused, the High Court is not expected to reverse
the acquittal merely because it would have taken the view against the accused had it tried the case. The very fact that two views are possible makes
it clear that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and consequently the accused is entitled to benefit of
doubt (vide G. B. Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, 1978 (4) SCC 371: Babu v. State of U.P,-1988 (2) SCC 21: Awadhesh v. State of M.P, 1988 (2)
SCC 557: Thanedar Singh v. State of M.P, 2002 (1) SCC 487: and State of Rajasthan vs. Rajaram, 2003 (8) SCC 180. Keeping the said principles in
view, we will examine the evidence to find out whether the findings of the trial court were not based on evidence and whether there was justification
for the High Court to interfere with the decision of the trial courtâ€.
12 In view of the circumscribed scope of interference with the judgment of acquittal, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment. I,
accordingly, dismiss this appeal and uphold the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court.
Trial Court record, if summoned/received, be sent down along with copy of this judgement.
