High CourtsDivision Bench(1997) 03 J&K CK 0012

State of J&K through Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Social Welfare vs Basanti Dhar

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 4 March 1997 · Citation: (1997) KashLJ 544 : (1998) 1 SCT 117

HON’BLE JUDGES
M.Rama Krishna, J and R.C.Gandhi, J
CASE NUMBER
232/96

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Judgment

51 paragraphs · 1,155 words
1.

The respondent 1 to 69, were writ petitioners in Writ petition No. 1260/93, presented before this Court. In common the case of the writ

petitioners was that they had been working as Angan Wari Workers in the state of J&K, to be with accepting an honorarium. It is stated that later

on this amount of honorarium came to be consolidated by an order made by the Government of J&K. A copy of this order of the Government

consolidating the amount of honorarium into salary, has not been produced in the appeal. They moved a writ petition seeking writ of Mandamus

invoking the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir, forthe reasons

set out in the grounds of writ petition. The writ petitioners made a common prayer seeking interim relief in regard to arrears of the socalled salary

pending consideration of the writ petition.

2.

The learned Single Judge at the time of issuing notice made an order on 27.6.1996 as follows:

Till the matter is finally decided, the petitioners cannot be made to starve since it is pointed out by Shri P.N. Goja, learned counsel for them that

the petitioners are without salary for the post six years. This is rather surprising that these employees have been made to suffer in such a manner.

How are they and their families surviving without salary?

Therefore, it is directed that thepetitioners be paid their salary from June 1996 regularly by respondent 2 through respondent 4 during the first

week of each month. Past arrears of salary be paid within two months.

It is this order that is called into question in this appeal by the State/appellants, on more than one ground.

3.

Mr. Shukla, learned Govt. Advocate, urged that the order under appeal made by the learned Single Judge is as if he has allowed the writ

petition. Indeed Mr. Shukla was right to say that looking at the main prayer of the writ petition presented by these 69 persons the common prayer

made therein is that the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue writ ofMandamus to respondentState to pay them the honorarium and arrears.

4.

Mr. Shukla, learned Govt. Advocate further submits that a detailed counter affidavit was filed in the writ court, wherein a specific stand has been

taken by the State that all these 69 writ petitioners had been working as Angan Wari Workers, accepting only small amount of money as

honorarium and that they continue to draw so. Therefore, they are not government servants and are not holding any civil post, no appointment

order has been issued undertaking to pay any salary for these persons by the Government. Therefore, the question of paying salary to these people

will not arise and that this aspect of the matter has to be gone into by the writ court. 5. Let us see the law Jaid down by the Supreme Court in

Assistant Collector of Central Excise Chandan nagar, West Bengal, Vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and others, reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court,

330, wherein the Bench of Three Judges of the Supreme Court laid down the following Rule:

The Supreme Court also deprecated the practice of granting interim order which practically give the principal relief sought in the petition for no

better reason than that a prima facie case has been made out, without being concerned about the balance of convenience, the public interest and a

host of other relevant considerations."" The Supreme Court observed that the collection of public revenue has been seriously jeopardised and

budgets of Governments and Local Authorities affirmatively prejudiced to the point of precariousness consequent upon interim orders made by

courts. But that does not mean that interim orders may never be made against public authorities. There are, of course, cases which demand that

interim orders should be made in the interests of justice. Where gross violations of the law and injustice are perpetrated or are about to be

perpetrated, it is the bounden duty of the court to interven and give appropriate interim relief. In case where denial of interim relief may lead to

public mischief, grave irreparable private injury or shake a citizen's faith in the impartiality of public administration, a court may well be justified in

granting interim relief against public authority. But since the law presumes that public authorities function properly and bona fide with due regard to

the public interest, court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative burdensome

inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that the parties have come to the court alleging prejudice,

inqoncenience or harm and that a prima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence, discretion

and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of prima facie case. There is the question of

irreparable injury. There is the question of public interest. There are many such factors worthy of consideration.

This law has been laid down a decade ago, but again it has been reiterated in number of cases disposed of by the Supreme Court. It is

unnecessary for us to refer to all those decided cases.

6.

Be that as it may, it is clear that before going into the merits of the case, providing opportunity to the respondents to State their case or to

complete their pleadings, the learned Single Judge has passed the directions in the order under appeal. We are of the view that the directions of this

calibre issued to the State Government to pay salary to the writpetitioners, do not appeal to the mind of the Court, as to whether, at that stage, the

Court was competent to pass that order and direct the state to pay. In that view of the matter, we are satisfied that a case is made out by the

appellants to set aside the State to pay. In that view of the matter, we are satistied that a case is made out by the appellant 10 set aside the order

under appeal.

Mr. Goja. learned Counsel for the respondents 1 to 69 however, submits that tnough to begin with these respondents 1 to 69 had been appointed

as workers of Angan Wan on the honrarium, nonetheless there was an order made by the Government consolidating their honrarium into salary. It

is open to Mr. Goja to make out a case before the writ court, which can decide the matter finally, and therefore, we do not want to express any

opinion which may prejudice the writ court. 8 With these observations the order made by the learned Single Judge dt. 27.6.1996 is set aside and

the appeal is disposed of. The writ petition is directed to be disposed of within a period often days.