State of Karnataka vs Munivenkatappa

The respondent before me was put up for trial before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore, under S. 304-A IPC. The learned Magistrate, after following the procedure laid down in S. 239 Cr.P.C., came to the conclusion that the charge against the accused was groundless and accordingly, discharged him.

It is contended on behalf of the State that the learned Magistrate was wrong in dealing with the case under S. 239 Cr.P.C. and the order of discharge is manifestly contrary to the facts.

So far as the 1st contention is concerned, S. 259 confers power on the Magistrate to convert a summons case relating to offence punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months into a warrant case, if he considers it necessary to do so in the interest of justice and proceed to hear the case as a warrant case. In this case, the learned Magistrate has stated in his order that in the interest of justice it was necessary to try the case as a warrant case. I do not find anything wrong in this view of the Magistrate.

Turning to the merits of the case, there is very little that can be said in favour of the State, and it is necessary to mention the material facts. The accused who was a driver took in his lorry one Reva, cleaner and another person to bring sand from Ramanagram to Bangalore on 19-6-1976. After loading the lorry the accused proceeded to come to Bangalore. At that time, Reva was sitting in the lorry by the side of the door leaning on it along with one Hanumanthappa. Hanumanthappa was sitting by the right side of Reva. When the vehicle was being driven by the accused near Gali Anjaneya temple, the door of the lorry opened, consequently Reva fell down from the lorry. The left side hind wheel of the lorry ran over Reva resulting in his death.

S. 239 Cr.P.C. reads:

"If, upon considering the police report and documents sent with it under S. 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing".

This section corresponds to sub-section (2) of old section 251(A). The change is that if a Magistrate discharges the accused at the initial stage on finding the charge to be groundless, he has to record his reasons for doing so. The Magistrate is empowered to discharge the accused after recording reasons if after (i) considering the police report and documents mentioned in S. 173; (ii) examining the accused, if necessary, and (iii) hearing the arguments of both sides, he thinks the charge against him to be groundless, i.e., either there is no legal evidence or that the facts do not make out any offence at all. This section expressly authorises usage of statements of witnesses examined by the police for considering the question of discharge or framing a charge.

Looking into the facts of the case, it is clear that there was no ground for presuming the accused to be guilty of an offence under S. 304-A IPC. The learned Magistrate, in my opinion, has rightly come to this conclusion on the material on record and he did not exceed his jurisdiction in discharging the accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Magistrate, at the stage of framing the charge, has not to apply his judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the-accused. The responsibility of framing a charge or otherwise is of the Magistrate and he has to judicially consider the question of doing so. At the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to find out whether there is a ground for presuming the commission of an offence by the accused. The plain language of the section itself authorises the Magistrate to examine the material placed before him.

In this case, the charge levelled against the accused was that he rashly or negligently drove the lorry, as a result of which, Reva was thrown out of the lorry and died.

I have examined the material on which a charge was levelled against the accused. From that material, it is not possible to hold that the accused drove the vehicle recklessly or indifferently. The death of Reva, in this case was due to his own negligence or accident beyond the control, at any rate, of the accused. If, on the existing material, there is no ground tor presuming the accused in be guilty, then there can hardly be any point in framing a charge and then going through the formality of a trial and then acquitting the accused. Such a course would result in unnecessary harassment to the accused without serving the cause ofjustice. The order of the Magistrate did not suffer from any legal infirmity.

In the result, this revision petition fails and is dismissed.