State of Karnataka vs S.B. Lokesh and Others

M.F. Saldanha, J.—We have done an in depth scrutiny of the record of this case and we have also very carefully assessed every one of the submissions canvassed by the learned Additional SPP in support of the appeal. Before issuing notice to the Respondents - accused, we have out of a sense of responsibility, reviewed the record and the Judgment of the trial Court, in order to arrive at a necessary conclusion, namely, that the notice ought to be issued because the order of acquittal is vulnerable. We need to say to the credit of the learned trial Judge that evaluation of the evidence before him has been done very judiciously and very correctly and that the result recorded, namely, that the evidence does not make out the offences punishable u/s 498-A or 304-B Indian Penal Code or even under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, will have to be upheld.

So far as the delay is concerned, for the reasons set out, we allow IA-I and condone the delay. On merits, we have bestowed our special consideration to the fact that as rightly pointed out by the learned Additional SPP, this is a case of death of a young woman within two years of the marriage and there is an underlying allegation that she has consumed poison and ended her life because of the severe torture from the accused who were insisting that she should get additional dowry of Rs. 20,000/-. Had this allegation been established, undoubtedly, both the offences would have been made out. On the first question, with regard to the harassment, we take cognizance of the fact that the law requires that the accused should have been guilty of cruelty in the legal sense, namely, torture of the gravity that would normally seriously affect the mental well being of the victim-wife and drive her to suicide. Unfortunately, as often happens, the allegation itself has come at a belated stage, which raises a serious doubt, but more importantly, it has not at all been substantiated at the trial. The Investigating Officer seems to have tried his very best to do a genuine and in-depth investigation and it is for this reason that he has seized the letter received from the deceased Leela some time before her death as also her personal note book. The Investigating Officer was honest enough to tell the Court that this material was not produced because it did not contain anything incriminating. It is a very strong circumstance against the prosecution case because any form of serious harassment or torture would certainly have been reflected in the letter written by the deceased to her parents and more importantly, in her personal diary noting. We find that there is virtually no sustainable evidence to make out a case of matrimonial cruelty and contrarily, that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing that it was the accused independently or collectively, who were responsible for driving the deceased to suicide. The defence has sought to point out certain other reasons why the deceased would have been severely depressed and could have committed suicide, but unfortunately, the present record does not throw any light with regard to the possible cause. We are required to judiciously assess as to whether the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge to the effect that there is no material on record to sustain the allegations of cruelty, abetment of suicide, or provoking of suicide, required to be confirmed or not and after a careful independent review of the record and the legal position, our finding is in the affirmative.

The alternate submission canvassed by the learned Counsel was that there are references to certain jewelry having been given by the parents of the deceased and a sum of Rs. 40,000/- was paid by them at the time of marriage. It is submitted that the offence under Sections 3, 4 and 6 have been made out. Unfortunately, here again the parents of the deceased themselves admitted that whatever jewelry were given to their daughter was given voluntarily out of natural love and affection and that the amount of Rs. 40,000/- was their contribution to the marriage expenses and that there was no dowry demand, or for that matter, no demand from the other side. With these admissions on record, it would be impossible to make out any offence under the D.P. Act and consequently, there is absolutely no ground on which notice to the accused would be justified.

After both reassessment and reevaluation of the appeal on merits, we confirm the order of acquittal and dismiss the appeal on Merit.