State of Karnataka vs Shiv Alingappa and Another

On I. As. I & II.

Kulkarni, J.-A-1 and A-2 had been acquitted by the II Addl. Munsiff and J.M.F.C. II Court, Gadag, in C.C. No. 64 of 1978. The State challenged the correctness of the acquittal. This Court by the judgment dated Novr. 23, 1982, set aside the acquittal and convicted A-1 and A-2 of the offence under S. 324 read with S. 34 I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 or in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months.

Now A-1 and A-2 have filed these petitions for permission to compound the offence of which they have been convicted and also to record the compromise. The compromise petition has been signed even by the injured persons.

The main question is whether this Court, after disposing of the appeal on 23.11.1982, has still got any jurisdiction to review or revise or alter its own order of conviction and sentence and also to exercise the inherent jurisdiction vested in it under S. 561 A. Cr.P.C. (old Code)-482 Cr.P.C. (new Code).

S. 320 (2) of the Cr.P.C. says thus:

"The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that Table" (underlining italics is ours).

S. 324 of the I.P.C. is one of the offences mentioned in the Table. Therefore the specific use of the words "be fore which any prosecution for such offence is pending", makes it clear that this Court when the case is disposed of by it, cannot be said to have the case pending before it. Once the case is disposed of, the Court becomes functus officio and it cannot do anything more. Even the learned Author B.B. Mitra on Code of Criminal Procedure, Vol. No. 2, 15th Edn., page 408. has stated in unequivocal terms that under S. 320 (2), there must be a prosecution pending and the permission of the court must be given. The learned State Public Prosecutor Shri M.V. Devaraj referred to State of Orissa v. Ram Chandar Agarwala, AIR 1979 SC 87. The Supreme Court has stated clearly in the said decision as:

"Once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction."

It has further stated as:

"Ss. 369 and 424 do not restrict the prohibition under Sec. 369 to the trial Court alone. The purpose of S. 424 is to prescribe mode of delivering the judgment, the language, and the contents of the judgment, while Section 369 is general in its application and prohibits all courts from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it has signed it.

Nor does S. 430 deal with the prohibition imposed under S. 369 prohibiting the Court from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it has signed it."

It has further held as:

"The provisions of S. 561-A cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code."

S. 561-A of the old Cr.P.C. is the new S. 482 of the amended Cr.P.C. When the law specifically prohibits altering, reviewing or bringing about any amendment to its judgment once it is pronounced, S. 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be pressed into service at all. The learned counsel Shri B.S. Raikote referred me to an unreported decision of this Court in Crl. Petn. No. 368 of 1976, rendered by the Single Judge on 11.8.1976. It was a case where the accused had preferred a revision against his conviction and that revision was dismissed. Some time thereafter, a petition was filed under S. 482 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to exercise its inherent powers and extend him the benefit of S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The learned single Judge acceded to that request and gave the benefit of S. 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the decision rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court can no longer be considered to be good law.

In the result, I.A. Nos. I and II are dismissed.