State of Kerala and Others vs M. Muraleedharan, Health Inspector and Others

P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J.—The issue involved in this appeal is whether the service rendered by the Respondents under Rule 9(a)(i) of Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules could be reckoned for the purpose of granting increment.

The appeal has been preferred at the instance of the State being aggrieved of the judgment passed by the learned single Judge whereby the controlling officer was directed to verify the service particulars of the Petitioners and take appropriate action to grant the benefit of provisional service rendered by them prior to 01.10.1994 for the purpose of increment.

The learned Sr. Government Pleader appearing for the Appellant submits that the Petitioners in the writ petition were regularized after 01.10.1994 and it is no more in dispute. The fact remains that they were originally appointed under Rule 9(a)(i) initially for a period of 180 days, which however happened to be extended from time to time and they were continuing in service when they were regularised as mentioned above.

Referring to the ''Decision No. 2'' under Rule 33 of Part I Kerala Service Rules, the learned Government Pleader submits that the said decision was deleted from the statute book w.e.f. 01.10.1994 and this being the position, the prayer of the Petitioners to have the service rendered by them prior to 01.10.1994 to be reckoned for the purpose of increment was not liable to be entertained.

It is brought to the notice of this Court that similar writ petitions being preferred before this Court were being allowed and the appeals, if any, were being dismissed, when subjected to challenge. However, a different view was taken by another Division Bench; which necessitated reference by another Bench leading to the decision rendered by the Full Bench as reported in State of Kerala Vs. Ponnamma, whereby it was held categorically, that if regularisation was effected after 01.10.1994, the persons concerned would not be entitled to have the provisional service counted for the purpose of increment. In the above circumstance, we find that the law has been declared by the Full Bench, which on application to the given set of facts and circumstances, covers the case of the writ Petitioners as well.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioners sought to distinguish the above verdict stating that, in the decision considered by the Full Bench, the service was only for a period of ''six months''; whereas in the case of the writ Petitioners they had served the Department for nearly five years. This contention does not hold any water at all. This is obviously for reason that the initial appointment as contemplated under Rule 9(a)(i) is only for a period of 180 days, which however happened to be extended and the Petitioners who were the beneficiaries, without having the seats vacated for others, are not entitled to have any undue benefits in any manner. Since law has been declared by the Full Bench, the legal position stands concluded. The writ petition is devoid of any merit. None of the grounds raised in support thereof does serve its purpose.

In the said circumstance, we set aside the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and allow the Appeal. No cost.