State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others vs Vedvrat Sharma And Others

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Rohit Arya, J

This intra court appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradhesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, by the State, is directed against the order dated 24.06.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.4591/2017.

As per office-note, present appeal is barred by 1548 days.

IA No.10698 of 2023 an application preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is considered.

Before adverting to the averments made therein and submissions advanced, it is expedient to reiterate the law pertaining to condonation of delay.

It is, by now, well-settled that it is not the length of delay but the explanation offered therefor is to be considered to ascertain the bona fides and the sufficient cause led to filing of delayed proceedings. It is also well settled that before the court of law either private party or the organization or the State Government is to be treated at par in the context of consideration of condonation of delay. Institution of the nature is not to be given special treatment. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of University of Delhi Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2020) 13 SCC 745 has reinforced the dictum of law in this regard. Further in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources department) Represented by Executive Engineer Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460, while referring to the decision in the case of Post Master General Vs. Living Media (India) Limited (2012) 3 SCC 563 it has been held thus:

“59. Likewise, merely because the government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 [“Postmaster General”], as follows:

“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”

The decision in Postmaster General (supra) has been followed in the following subsequent judgments of this Court:

i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592 at paragraphs 8-8.2;

ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422 at paragraphs 2-3;

iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 at paragraphs 11-13; and

iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 at paragraphs 3-4.

In a recent judgment, namely, State of M.P. v. Chaitram Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667, this Court referred to Postmaster General (supra), and held as follows:

The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.

We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about

17 months' time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department!

We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]

We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing.

Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.”

In the application for condonation of delay (IA.No.10698 of 2023 it has been stated that after passing of the impugned judgment dated 24.06.2019, since the officers were changed the appeal could not be filed in time. They gained knowledge on filing of the Contempt Petition No.3022 of 2022 and then the legal opinion was sought on 10.12.2023. It has further been stated that during the period March, 2020 to 28.02.2022 there was lock-down and therefore the said segment of period deserves to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the limitation. It has further been stated that even otherwise, during the period from 2019 till now there has been change in the office of Collector, SDM and Tahsildar respectively and therefore because of the fact that the incumbents who were working in 2019 did not propose to file appeal, the public land cannot be permitted to be declared as private land. With the aforesaid submission, it has been prayed that the delay deserves to be condoned.

The aforesaid evasive submissions reflect the callous attitude of the appellants/State. Even if the period from March, 2020 to February, 2022 is excluded then too for about eight months before beginning of lockdown and one year and nine months after the lockdown, the appellants/State were sleeping over the matter. They chose to seek legal opinion on 10.12.2023 only on filing of the contempt petition despite the fact that the impugned order was a bipartite order wherein the State was well represented. There is no explanation worth the name in the application, much less plausible explanation. As such, in view of the obtaining facts and circumstances of the case, together with the law enunciated above, we find it hard to condone the formidable delay of 1548 days.

Even otherwise on merits, having perused the impugned order, we are of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are based on facts available on record; therefore, impeccable and the conclusion has been drawn after applying the correct principles of law. By way of order impugned in the writ petition dated 19.01.2017, after about 67 years, the respondent-Authorities had revoked all the permissions on the basis of alleged revenue entries of Samvat 2007 (Calendar Year 1950). The learned Single Judge has in extenso dealt with the issue while setting aside the impugned order and rightly held that fate of several plot holders has been jeopardized by this action of the appellants who while taking loans from banks had relied upon the permissions granted by the appellants/State including Nazool permission. Now, at this juncture, the appellants/State cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time relying upon a disclaimer in the Nazool permission that the same, at the time of any dispute, would automatically stand cancelled. If such a recourse is allowed to prevail, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that no sanctity would be ever attachable to the permissions/approvals granted by the State Government, based whereupon people invest their lifetime savings and hard-earned money for building a home.

As such, no indulgence is warranted in the instant intra- court appeal.

Consequently, instant appeal also stands dismissed on the ground of limitation as well as on merits.