State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Bhanu & Others

The State has filed this appeal against the judgment of acquittal dated 16.05.2000 passed in S.T. No. 185/92. The respondents were prosecuted for

commission of offence punishable under Sections 307/149, 147 and 148 of IPC. The trial Court acquitted the respondents from the offences.

The trial Court observed in para 27 of the judgment that a counter case was also registered against the complainant party. The incident had

happened near the house of one of the accused namely Sonelal. The prosecution did not explain injuries suffered by some of the accused persons.

There is a possibility that the complainant party was aggressor and the respondents inflicted injuries to the complainant party in their right to private

defence.

It is a fact that from the complainant party Durga Prasad, Sambhu, Onkar and Anandi received injuries. The allegations against the respondents are

that they had inflicted injuries at the injured persons by hard and blunt objects as well as sharp edged weapons.

Dr. Amit Shrivastava (PW-10) deposed that I had examined injured Onkar and noticed that there was a sharp cut injury on right hand's index finger

of the injured. There were other injuries on his person.

From the evidence of other witnesses, this fact has been proved that the accused persons had caused injuries to the persons of complainant party.

A counter case was also registered against the complainant party on the report lodged by Sonelal. In the aforesaid report, Sonelal alleged that at

around 12:30, when his family members were preparing meal, Durga, Sambhu, Uma, Ghasiram and Munna came there. They were armed with Farsa

and Lathis and thereafter they abused him and inflicted injuries at his son namely Munna and Bhikam. On the said report, a case was registered. This

fact has been proved from the evidence of DW-2 Daulat Singh. DW-1 Ram Prasad Yadav deposed that I witnessed the incident and both theÂ

parties had beaten each other and both the parties had received injuries. As per the spot map (Ex.P-8), the place where the incident had happened is

near the house of respondent-Sonelal.

The Apex Court in the case of Suresh Singhal Vs. State (Delhi Administration) reported in (2017) 2 SCC 737 has held as under in regard to right to

private defence:-

With regard to the evidence that the appellantwas being assaulted and in fact attempted to be strangulated, it needs to be considered whether the

appellant shot the deceased in the exercise of his right of private defence. Such a right is clearly available when there is a reasonable apprehension of

receiving the injury.

The right of private defence is contemplated by Section 97 of IPC which reads as follows:-

 “Section 97. Right of private defence of the body and of property.â€" Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99,

to defendâ€

 First â€" His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;

 Secondly â€"The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the

definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.â€​

In Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another (2010) 2 SCC 333, this court laid down the following principles which emerged upon the careful

consideration and scrutiny of a number of judgments as follows:-

 “58. The following principles emerge on scrutiny of the following judgments:

(i) Self-preservation is the basic humaninstinct and is duly recognised by the criminal jurisprudence of all civilised countries. All free, democratic and

civilised countries recognise the right of private defence within certain reasonable limits.

(ii) The right of private defence is availableonly to one who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting an impending danger and not of self-

creation.

(iii) A mere reasonable apprehension isenough to put the right of self- defence into operation. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be

an actual commission of the offence in order to give rise to the right of private defence. It is enough if the accused apprehended that such an offence

is contemplated and it is likely to be committed if the right of private defence is not exercised.

(iv) The right of private defence commencesas soon as a reasonable apprehension arises and it is coterminous with the duration of such apprehension.

(v) It is unrealistic to expect a person underassault to modulate his defence step by step with any arithmetical exactitude.

(vi) In private defence the force used by theaccused ought not to be wholly disproportionate or much greater than necessary for protection of the

person or property.

(vii) It is well settled that even if the accuseddoes not plead self- defence, it is open to consider such a plea if the same arises from the material on

record.

(viii) The accused need not prove theexistence of the right of private defence beyond reasonable doubt.

(ix) The Penal Code confers the right of private defence only when that unlawful or wrongful act is an offence.

(x) A person who is in imminent andreasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of self-defence inflict any harm even extending to

death on his assailant either when the assault is attempted or directly threatened.â€​

The Apex Court further in the case of Bhagwan Sahai & another Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2016) 13 SCC 171 in regard to non-

explanation of injuries suffered by the complainant parties has held as under:-

 “7. The High Court has also noted that both the sides had taken a plea that the land in question where the occurrence had taken place is in their

possession. One of the injured Malli Devi-PW6 also deposed, as noted by the High Court, that the parties were having dispute with the accused over

land. The High Court has also noted the Judgment of this Court in the case of Lakshmi Singh and others v. State of Bihar, (19876) 4 SCC 394 which

was relied upon by the counsel for the accused persons in support of private defence and for acquittal on the ground of non-explanation of death and

injuries on the side of the accused. The High Court drew correct inferences from the aforesaid judgment but proceeded to convict the appellants on

the misconceived ground that since both the parties had withheld the origin and genesis of the occurrence and since it cannot be determined as to

which party was the aggressor, the case had to be decided against the accused persons treating it as a case of free fight between the parties.

The aforesaid view of the High Court is devoid of legal merits. Once the Court came to a finding that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis

and origin of the occurrence and also failed to explain the injuries on the person of the accused including death of father of the appellants, the only

possible and probable course left open was to grant benefit of doubt to the appellants. The appellants can legitimately claim right to use force once

they saw their parents being assaulted and when actually it has been shown that due to such assault and injury their father subsequently died. In the

given facts, adverse inference must be drawn against the prosecution for not offering any explanation much less a plausible one. Drawing of such

adverse inference is given a go-bye in the case of free fight mainly because the occurrence in that case may take place at different spots and in such

a manner that a witness may not reasonably be expected to see and therefore explain the injuries sustained by the defence party. This is not the

factual situation in the present case.â€​

The Apex Court has further held in the case of V. Sejappa Vs. State by Police Inspector Lokayukta Chitradurga reported in (2016) 12 SCC 150 in

regard to principle of law if the appeal is against acquittal:

 In Muralidhar alias Gidda and Anr. v. State of Karnataka (2014) 5 SCC 730, this Court noted the principles which are required to be followed by

the appellate court in case of appeal against order of acquittal and in paragraph (12) held as under:-

 ""12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu AIR 1954 SC 1, Madan

Mohan Singh AIR 1954 SC 637, Atley AIR 1955 SC 807, Aher Raja Khima AIR 1956 SC 217, Balbir Singh AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal AIR

1963 SC 200, Noor Khan AIR 1964 SC 286, Khedu Mohton (1970) 2 SCC 450, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (1973) 2 SCC 793, Lekha Yadav (1973) 2

SCC 424, Khem Karan (1974) 4 SCC 603, Bishan Singh (1974) 3 SCC 288, Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228, K. Gopal Reddy (1979) 1 SCC

355, Tota Singh (1987) 2 SCC 529, Ram Kumar (1995) Supp 1 SCC 248, Madan Lal (1997) 7 SCC 677, Sambasivan (1998) 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan

Singh (2002) 4 SCC 85, Harijana Thirupala (2002) 6 SCC 470, C. Antony (2003) 1 SCC 1, K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9 SCC 291, Sanjay Thakran

(2007) 3 SCC 755 and Chandrappa (2007) 4 SCC 415.

 It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against

acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:

(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour ofan accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his

favour by the trial court;

(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit ofreasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal;

(iii) Though, the powers of the appellate court inconsidering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions

but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of

seeing the demeanour of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the

judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if

such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with

such conclusions is fully justified; and

(iv) Merely because the appellate court onreappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the

judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in

the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.

From the above quoted judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, principle of law is that the accused need not prove the existence of right of private

defence beyond reasonable doubt and a person who is imminent has reasonable danger of losing his life or limb may in exercise of self defence inflict

any harm and non-explanation of injury suffered by the complainant party is fatal to the case of prosecution. The Apex Court has further held that the

Appellate Court be slow in disturbing findings of facts recorded by the trial Court. If the conclusion of the trial Court is palpably wrong or based on

erroneous view of the law, then the High Court can interfere. In the present case, the incident had happened in front of the house of accused Sonelal.

The complainants themselves admitted that they had gone to the house of Sonelal to complain that why he had prevented them from taking out the

sand from a particular place. This fact has been negativated by the trial Court by observing that a quarrel had taken place and as per the evidence, the

complainant party was also having arms.

Looking to the evidence on record and principle of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, in our opinion, the conclusion reached by the trial Court

could not said to be palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law. Consequently, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is hereby

dismissed.