State of Madhya Pradesh vs Firm Saraswati Cotton Ginning Industries and another

Both these review petitions have been filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh against a common judgment dated 12.05.2010 whereby F.A.No. 254/2002 as well as F.A.No. 204/2002 have been disposed of. The suits filed for declaration, permanent injunction as also for possession was decreed in favour of the respondent vide judgment and decree dated 13.02.2002. Thereafter, first appeal was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh registered as F.A.No. 254/2002 and F.A.No. 204/2002. The first appeal was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh and the second was filed by Municipal Council, Mandsaur.

Briefly stating the facts giving rise to these petitions are that the respondent/original plaintiff i.e. M/s. Saraswati Cotton Ginning Factory, Station Road, Mandsaur filed a suit on May 15, 2000 against the State of M.P. and Municipal Council, Mandsaur. In the aforesaid suit, a declaration qua the ownership of the land in question was sought by the plaintiff-firm. A permanent injunction was sought against the defendants not to dispossess the plaintiff-firm from the suit land. Since, during pendency of the suit, the plaintiff-firm was dispossessed from the land in question, therefore, by way of amendment, a prayer for possession of the suit land was also included.

As per the plaint, the suit land was divided into two parts. The land comprised in surveys No. 469 and 475 to 481 and 590 to 592, measurings 16 Bighas and 8 Biswas, was categorised as land falling in heading (a) of the plaint. 56% of land comprised in surveys No. 482 to 485, 586, 588, 589, 510 and 511, measurings 13 Biswas and 6 Bighas, was included in the heading (b) of the plaint. Whereas, the plaintiff-firm sought a declaration of ownership and possession, qua the land included in the heading (a) of the plaint, the aforesaid declaration and possession was sought qua 56% of the suit land included in heading (b) of the plaint.

The plaintiff-firm pleaded that in the year 1925, the suit land, included in heading(a), had been given on lease to Raibahadur Seth Tikamchand by Customs and Excise Department of the erstwhile princely State of Gwalior, for running a ginning factory. Later on, on May 9, 1942, a Patta was executed in favour of the aforesaid lessee-Raibahadur Seth Tikamchand, when the said land was given by way of Pukhta Mourusi Patta. The plaintiff-firm pleaded that the said Pukhta Mourusi Patta was converted into a Pakka Tenant. On August 26, 1955, the said land was sold through a registered sale deed to M/s. J.M. Cotton Ginning and Pressing company and the possession thereof was also given to the said purchaser. Through a later sale deed dated February 7, 1968, the said M/s. J.M. Cotton Ginning and Pressing Company sold the said land to the plaintiff-firm. Possession of the said land was also given. The name of the plaintiff-firm was duly entered in the revenue record as owner thereof. On March 13, 1987, on an application filed by the plaintiff-firm, the Collector, Mandsaur, granted the requisite permission to the plaintiff-firm to develop a colony in the said land. Accordingly, a colony, named as Dashrath Colony, was developed on the land in question. The plots in the said colony were sold and the purchasers of the said plots, after obtaining the due approval/permission from the Municipal Council, Mandsaur, raised the construction of hundreds of the houses thereupon. According to the plaintiff-firm, the necessary tax had been paid by the plaintiff-firm for the purposes of the aforesaid colonization to the Municipal Council, Mandsaur.

With regard to the land comprised in heading (b) of the plaint, it was pleaded by the plaintiff-firm that the aforesaid land, measuring 13 Bighas and 6 Biswas, was with Omkarlal, Ramprasad and Suresh Seth etc., who were Pakka Krishaks of the said land. On October 13, 1928, the aforesaid persons had given the said land to Raibahadur Seth Tikamchand, by way of Mourusi Patta, for running a Karkhana. The rights into the said land were also transferred by Raibahadur Seth Tikamchand in favour of M/s. J.M. Cotton, Ginning and Pressing Company, who further transferred the same to the plaintiff-firm. However, on April 6, 2000, through a registered sale deed, the plaintiff-firm had purchased 56% of the rights in the said land from the original owners Omkarlal, Ramprasad and Suresh Seth etc.(their successors).

On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings and history of the land in question various reliefs such as declaration of ownership, injunction and repossession were claimed and were allowed. As stated above, the appeals filed by the appellants have already been dismissed and now the appellants who were defendants/respondents in suit/first appeals are seeking review by way of present petitions.

Plaintiff/respondents were aggrieved of issuing a show cause notice in the year 1994 from the SDO, Mandsaur u/s 181 and 182 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code whereby it was claimed that since the land in question was given only on lease for running a Karkhana and the original purpose having not been followed and the land being used for other purposes, therefore, possession of the land was liable to be taken back. The show cause notice was contested by the respondents specifically stating in this case that the patta was granted prior to October 2, 1959 and therefore the provisions which were sought to be passed of the claim to repossess the property was not attracted in this case. However, without affording any opportunity to the respondents, an order dated 12.05.2000 whereby the Collector, Mandsaur directed taking over the possession of the land in question. Thus the respondent/original plaintiff filed the suit on 15.05.2000 which was decreed in favour fo the respondent after framing of issues and recording evidence on behalf of the parties. Thus aggrieved of the aforesaid order, separate first appeals were filed. The learned Single Judge after hearing the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the Municipal Council, Mandsaur dismissed the appeals vide impugned order which is a detailed order.

A perusal of the order shows that after discussing the evidence which came on record and the findings returned by the trial Judge, which clearly holds that in this case, the appellants were not the owners of the suit land at any stage and infact it was the ancestors of the first respondent who were the owner of the land and were entitled to continue with the possession. As such both the appeals were dismissed.

It is against these appeals the present review petitions have been filed which are admittedly belated. There is a delay of 529 days. Even though no application for condonation of delay was filed alongwith the review petitions, but later on filed applications under Order 41 Rule 3(A) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The reasons which were given for seeking condonation of delay are as follows:-

The explanation as furnished have been contested on behalf of the respondents who have filed reply and have stated that the reasons given for condonation of delay are not sustainable in the eyes of law. They are frivolous and reflects upon the lethargy of the applicants. It has been submitted that a bare perusal of the application goes to show that it is nothing but an eye wash over the things. It was just a concocted story put forth by the applicant/State to make out a case for condonation. It is submitted that only a stereo typed application has been filed by the applicant. On their own showing the Collector, Mandsaur on July 19, 2010 asked the then S.D.O''s about the opinion of the Government Advocate and the S.D.O. took more than one year even to contact the Government Advocate. To justify this delay, false excuses about the law and order, excessive rains, transfer of officials and festivals have been taken which are unbelievable and cooked up to make out a case for condonation of delay, which are not digestible and palatable.

Learned counsel appearing for the Government has submitted that in this case the property was given on lease for running a Ginning factory and merely because some registered lease documents have been executed in favour of the respondents showing them as owner of the property this could not have changed their status. They were also not entitled to sell the property. It is submitted that even if some sale deeds have been executed that would also not give them a private right of ownership. Learned counsel has also submitted that in the case of Government being a litigant, a liberal approach should be taken by this Court for condoning the delay. Learned counsel has relied upon the following judgments State of Bihar and Another Vs. Abhay Chand Bothra, ; State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and Others, ; P. Venkataraju Vs. Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition), ; State of Karnataka Vs. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead) by Lrs. and Others, ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, ; State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others, ; Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, .

In the case of State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others (supra), it has been observed by the Apex Court that:

It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court-be it by private party or the state-are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest.

The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining everyday''s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.

Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from the perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.

Learned counsel appearing for the applicant relied emphatically on the observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that when an application is filed by the State, it must be considered that State is an impersonal machinery working through his officers or servants. In that case, considering that the delay was of only 109 days, the delay was condoned.

In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji and others (supra), considering that there was a delay of only four days, the delay was condoned. However, in the matter the following principles were led down for interpreting words '' sufficient cause'' as finds place in section 5 of the Limitation Act. It has been observed that

The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ''merits''. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-"Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of 0. XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."

Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

"Every day''s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour''s delay. every second''s delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the ''State'', which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the ''State'' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. The Courts therefore have to informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides.

The next judgment relied upon is the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and another Vs. Abhay Chand Bothra (supra). In the said case, taking into consideration the steps taken by the State including lodging of FIR against guilty officials, after two years, the delay in filing SLP was condoned. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereunder:

On 14th December, 1998, this Court, while issuing notice for final disposal of the SLP and directing an ad-interim stay of the impugned order, condoned the delay in filing of the SLP in view of "special facts and circumstances and, in particular, the statements made in the affidavit filed before the High Court." Subsequently, on 4th January, 2000, this Court made the following order:-

The Letters Patent Appeal has been dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court as barred by time. We have perused the application filed in the High Court u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. It appears that the departmental authorities were deliberately trying to work against the interest of the Revenue. Mr. B.B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the State submits that against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur who had committed other irregularities also, proceedings were instituted. He refers to Page E of the list of dates and events in that behalf. He, however, is unable to tell us as to the nature of the proceedings or action, if any, has been taken against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur. Mr. B.B. Singh seeks six weeks'' time to furnish the information.

We have pointed to Mr. Singh that if no action has been taken against the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Birpur till date, an adverse inference may have to be drawn against the State.

We are informed by Mr. B.B. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the State that action has since been initiated against, the concerned official and even a First Information Report has been filed and investigation is in progress.

Another judgment relied upon by the applicant is the judgment delivered by the two judges bench of the Apex Court in the matter of State of Karnataka Vs. Y. Moideen Kunhi (dead by LRs) and others (supra). In this case, while dealing with the delay in appeal filed by the State and considering the word '' sufficient cause'', the Apex Court condoned the delay by imposing heavy costs of Rs. 10 lacs on the exchequer. Some paragraphs relevant arising out of the aforesaid judgment are para nos. 19 to 23. These paragraphs are reproduced hereunder

On perusal of the explanation offered it is clear that the officials who were dealing with the matter have either deliberately or without understanding the implications dealt with the matter in a very casual and lethargic manner. It is a matter of concern that in very serious matters action is not taken as required under law and the appeals/petitions are filed after long lapse of time. It is a common grievance that it is so done to protect unscrupulous litigants at the cost of public interest or public exchequer. This stand is more noticeable where vast tracts of lands or large sums of revenue are involved.

Even though the courts are liberal in dealing with the belated presentation of appeals/applications, yet there is a limit upto which such liberal attitude can be extended. Many matters concerning the State Government and the Central Government are delayed either by the nature of bureaucratic process or by deliberate manipulation of the same by taking advantage of loopholes in the conduct of litigation. Several instances have come to the notice of this Court where as noted above appeals have been filed where the revenue involved runs to several crores of rupees. It is true that occasionally delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances.

The case at hand is a classic example where the circumstances are the same. More than 4000 acres of land are involved out of which, according to the State, nearly 3500 acres constitute forest land. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skillful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable.

The expression ''sufficient cause'' as appearing in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the ''Limitation Act'') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, . Para 8 of the judgment reads as follows:

The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.

Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes sufficient cause; for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning--of course, within reasonable limits--is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M.R., in the In re National Bank of Wales Ltd. (1899) 2 Ch. 629 673 observed, though in a different context:

Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them.

Keeping in view the importance of questions of law which are involved we are inclined to condone the delay subject to payment of exemplary costs which we fix at rupees ten lakhs to be paid within a period of 8 weeks to the respondents. The delay is condoned subject to the payment of the aforesaid amount as costs. After making the payment the receipt thereof shall be filed before this Court alongwith an affidavit. Only after the payment is made the special leave petitions shall be listed for admission. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

In that case, the land involved in question was more than 4000 acres and there was delay of 14 years. It was a case of playing a fraud relating to non-surrender of the land. Other judgments referred to above was also discussed in this case.

On the other hand, the respondents have referred to resent judgments of the Apex Court which have taken note of the earlier judgments, but have also laid down further directions. One such judgment is the judgment delivered in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (supra).

In this judgment, all the previous judgments have been considered. Relevant observations which show the mind of the Apex Court in having discussed the various submissions made are as follows:

Shri A.S. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years and 3 months delay in filing the appeals are legally unsustainable and the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the explanation given by the Corporation lacked bonafides and was wholly unsatisfactory. Learned counsel emphasized that in the absence of any denial by the Corporation that it has a battery of advocates to deal with the litigation, the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar in January, 2004 to Miscellaneous Court and, thereafter, to other Courts has no bearing on the issue of delay because the suits filed by the appellants had been decided in May, 2003 and no explanation has been given as to why applications for certified copies could not be filed for 7 years and 5 months. Shri Bhasme submitted that even if one advocate/law officer was transferred from one department/division to another, nothing prevented the Corporation from taking steps to apply for certified copies of the judgment. Shri Bhasme further submitted that the story of misplacement of papers was concocted by the Corporation and the same ought to have been rejected by the High Court because the assertion made in that regard was vague to the core and no indication was given as to when the papers were traced and by whom. In support of his argument, Shri Bhasme relied upon the judgments of this Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another, .

The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay.

The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points:

a) The name of the person who was having custody of the record has not been disclosed.

b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed.

c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered and name of the person who found the same have not been disclosed.

d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial Court were not filed till 23.8.2010 despite the fact that Shri Sirsikar had given intimation on 12.5.2003 about the judgments of the trial Court.

e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against.

Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the High Court altogether ignored the gapping holes in the story concocted by the Corporation about misplacement of the papers and total absence of any explanation as to why nobody even bothered to file applications for issue of certified copies of judgment for more than 7 years. In our considered view, the cause shown by the Corporation for delayed filing of the appeals was, to say the least, wholly unsatisfactory and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years delay cannot but be treated as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court u/s 5 of the Limitation Act.

Relying upon later view of the Apex Court as discussed above, respondents submits that the reasons for condoning the delay are non-specific and prima facie seems to be concocted. The delay would cause prejudice to the private respondents who had been in possession of the property through their ancestors right from 1925. They have been enjoying the possession of the property. They have executed sale deeds and even a colony was formed after execution of the sale deeds in favour of others who have constructed their houses and are in settled possession. It has been submitted that the suit has been decided after recording evidence. The first appeal filed by the State has also been dismissed. It is therefore submitted that for the reasons stated in the application for condoning the delay, it is not a fit case where the review petitions can be allowed. It is also submitted that applicant had remedy available to them such as filing of a second appeal within limitation, but this has not been done for the reasons best known to them. Thus, it is submitted that lethargy and negligence on the part of the State cannot be used to their benefits. In addition to the judgment of the Apex Court delivered in the case of Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, respondent has also relied upon a judgment delivered in the case of Office of The Chief Post Master General and Others Vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Another, .

We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and also legal position in this case. We are satisfied that a vested right had accrued in favour of the respondents who are the admitted owners of the property in question for a period of more than 50 years. They are enjoying the property as owners thereof with full knowledge and who have even sanctioned building plans. There are registered sale deeds executed in favour of the occupiers. No suit was filed for challenging the sale deeds even though sale deeds have been registered by the Registrar who is an instrumentality of the State. Even after passing of the impugned order, utter callousness and negligence has been shown on the part of the State in filing the review petitions. There is no explanation as to why a second appeal has not been filed even though issues which are relevant are factual issues and may require scrutiny of evidence. Filing of a review petition even after 529 days reflects negligent attitude on the part of the State. There is nothing on record to show as to why any action has not been taken against the officers of the State who are responsible for the delay. A bare reading of the explanation furnished to explain the condonation of delay itself shows total lethargy and negligence on the part of the applicants which does not call for any indulgence by this Court. Thus, in view of the law laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court as stated above, we find no merit in the submissions made on behalf of the applicant seeking condonation of delay. Consequently, we dismiss the application under Order 41 Rule 3(A) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act being I.A.No. 126/2012 and consequently also dismiss both the Review Petitions of course with no order as to costs.

C.C. as per rules.