High CourtsDivision Bench

State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Jaisingh

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 30 July 2018 · Citation: (2018) 07 MP CK 0279

HON’BLE JUDGES
Hemant Gupta, CJ · Vijay Kumar Shukla, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 378(3) · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 366A, 376(1)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No..117 of 1998
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Judgment

43 paragraphs · 1,059 words

The present appeal is filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order dated 22-09-1997, passed by the First Additional

Sessions Judge, Sagar in S.T.No.249/97, whereby the accused person has been acquitted from the charges under sections 366-A and 376(1) of I.P.C.

2.

The prosecution case is that the accused had committed rape with the prosecutrix between the period from 30-04-1997 to 03-05-1997. It is admitted

fact that the prosecutrix and the accused person are residents of the same village. It is alleged that on 30-04-1997, the accused asked prosecutrix and

her friend to accompany him to go to the city and also asked them to bring ornaments and cash amount otherwise he will kill the family members. The

prosecutrix had taken ornaments from the house and also cash amount of Rs. 3000/- and they accompanied the accused from village Bamhori BikaÂ

to village Berkhedi and thereafter from that place they went to Narsingpur by bus in the night at 2 A.M. and they stayed in a room of Auto man.

It is alleged that in the room, the accused had committed rape with the prosecutrix against her consent and will. It is alleged the he also committed

rape with her friend. On the next day they had come to Jabalpur by bus and purchasing was done at Jabalpur. It is alleged that in the night again in a

field, he committed rape with the prosecutrix and her friend. On the next day, they went to Sagar from Jabalpur and in the night they reached at

Kudari and stayed in the courtyard of the house of the accused where the accused is again said to have again violated the prosecutrix and her

friend. On the next day i.e. 03-05-1997 the accused had taken both of them to maternal uncle of the prosecutrix at village Makronia. From there one

Mohan Singh is said to have taken all these three persons to village Bamhori Bika. It is said that on the way to return, the accused fled away.

3.

On 04-05-1997, the report was lodged at PoliceStation Surkhi. The report is Ex.P-2. In the meantime, report regarding missing of the prosecutrix

was lodged by her father Govind on 01-05-1997. Her missing report is Ex.P-13 and her father was examined as PW-1. The prosecutrix was examined

by Dr. Shashi Thakur (PW-9). She did not find any injury on her person. She opined that no definite opinion can be given about the rape. For

confirming of age, she referred her to Radiologist. Dr. Jinesh Diwakar (PW-8) deposed that the age of the prosecutrix is between 14 to 16 years

and she was found to be physically grown up. In FSL report, the semen was found on the undergarment of the prosecutrix but there was no semen

on the vaginal slide of the prosecutrix.

4.

The learned trial court after appreciating the evidenceof the prosecutrix, who was examined as PW-4 and her friend (PW-7)Â found that the story

of the prosecution is not trustworthy as the prosecutrix stated that they had accompanied the accused from village Bamhori Bika to village Barkhedi

and thereafter they went to Narsinghpur by bus in the night and thereafter they stayed in the house of Auto bala in Narsinghpur. At no point of

time they raised any alarm during long travel. On the next day, she came to Jabalpur by bus and also shopping was done but again there was no alarm

or any complaint to any person. They stayed at Jabalpur and went to Sagar again by bus and then stayed in one house in Kudari. It has also been

stated that the accused had taken them to her maternal uncle at village Makronia. Thus, there was no kind of resistance or alarm for a long period

from 30-04-1997 to 03-05-1997. It was also found to be highly unbelievable that the accused had committed forcible sexual intercourse in the presence

of her friend and no alarm raised by her friend. The accused had taken them to their maternal uncle after committing rape. This also renders the

prosecution case unbelievable. The statement of the prosecutrix was not corroborated with the medical evidence. No injury has been found on her

person except one bite on the cheek which could not have been found sufficient to prove the fact that the prosecutrix was subjected to forcible sexual

intercourse. From the facts it was also established that the prosecutrix had travelled with the accused persons alongwith her friend from 30-04-

1997 to 03-05-1997 to many places by public transport but no alarm was raised either by the prosecutrix or by her friend.

5.

Further the age of the prosecutrix has been assessedby the Doctor between 14 to 16 years on the basis of X-ray report which is not conclusive

proof of the age as it varies either side for a period of 3 years.

6.

In view of aforesaid assimilation of facts and evidence, we do not find any error in the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court in

appellate jurisdiction. The scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is settled in various judgments.

7.

In the case of Harbeer Singh vs. Sheeshpal and others, (2016) 16 SCC 418 the Apex Court referred earlier jugements rendered in the cases of

State of U.P. vs. Harihar Bux Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 167; State of U.P. vs. Ashok Kumar, (1979) 3 SCC 1; State of U.P. vs. Gopi, 1980 Supp SCC

160; State of Karnataka vs. Amajappa, (2003) 9 SCC 468; State of U.P. vs. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271; State of U.P. vs. Guru Charan, (2010) 3 SCC

721; State of Haryana vs. Shakuntla, (2012) 5 SCC 171; and Hamza vs. Muhammedkutty, (2013) 11 SCC 150 and held that in the case of acquittal,

the courts would not ordinarily interfere with appreciation of evidence on on the findings of fact, unless the same is perverse or manifestly illegal or

grossly unjust. Mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record, is not a ground for reversing conviction.

8.

Thus, in the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the present appeal is devoid of merit, and we find no ground to interfere with the

order passed by the learned trial Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.