State of Madhya Pradesh vs Pappu @ Veerendra Singh & Ors

This appeal preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ''the CPC'') is directed against judgment and decree dated 22.01.1999 rendered by VI Additional District Judge, Ujjain (Shri R.R. Ahirwar) in Civil Suit No.19- A/1998, whereby Suit preferred by Respondents No.1-11 (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiffs) has been decreed.

It is not disputed that a temple known as Shri Purushottam Narayanji Temple, ''Ankpat'' is situated in Ujjain. The plaintiffs preferred an application under Sections 4 & 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 (hereinafter for short ''the Act'') for registration of Public Trust with regard to the temple. Appellant No.3 being the Registrar, Public Trust, vide order dated 15.03.1983 allowed the plaintiffs'' application and passed an order purportedly under Section 6 of ''the Act'' for registration of Public Trust. Thereafter Jankilal ? respondent No.12 (Defendant No.4 in the original suit) moved an application before Registrar, Public Trust, Ujjain (appellant No.3), praying for review of order dated 15.03.1983. Registrar, Public Trust (appellant No.3), vide order dated 05.01.1984 allowed the application and directed the reopening of the original proceedings with regard to registration of trust.

The plaintiffs claiming to be the trustees and members of Shri Agrawal Panchayat, Ujjain feeling aggrieved with review order dated 05.01.1984 filed a Civil Suit (original No.13-A/1984, later on registered as 19-A/1998) for declaration and permanent injunction on 11.07.1984 with averments that they are the trustees of temple Shri Purushottam Narayanji Mandir and that on their application submitted under Sections 4 & 5 of ''the Act'', Registrar, Public Trust, Ujjain (appellant No.3) had passed an order on 15.03.1983 for registration of the trust pursuant to which necessary entries were made in the relevant register as provided in Section 7(2) of ''the Act''. It was further averred that order dated 15.03.1983 with regard to registration of trust, having not been challenged by way of a regular Civil Suit as contemplated under Section 8 of ''the Act'' had attained finality and, therefore, Registrar, Public Trust in absence of any provision in the Act conferring power of review had no jurisdiction to review his own order, therefore, subsequent order dated 05.01.1984 passed by him for recalling his earlier order dated 15.03.1983 is without jurisdiction and, therefore, non est. It was also pleaded that Defendant No.4/respondent No.12 had no right or locus standi to file an application for review of order dated 15.03.1983, therefore, the Registrar, Public Trust (appellant No.3) committed a serious error in entertaining his application for review. The plaintiffs further averred that they served a notice under Section 80 of ''the CPC'' upon appellant No.2 & 3, however as no response was received, therefore, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction is being filed for declaration that the order dated 05.01.1984 passed by the Registrar, Public Trust (appellant No.3) is without jurisdiction and hence nullity and that the defendant/respondents be restrained from interfering with peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the land and property of the temple.

Appellants/defendants No.1-3 in their joint written statement denied that Registrar, Public Trust had no jurisdiction to review his own order. It was further averred that as the Registrar, Public Trust has passed order dated 15.03.1983 without making enquiry as contemplated by Section 5 of ''the Act'', therefore, the same could not be treated as legal; and being nullity, the same deserved to be modified in exercise of power of review which is inherent in a Court or a quasi-judicial authority. It was also pleaded that the property alleged to be trust property is in fact ''Aukaf'' land belonging to government of Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, the plaintiffs have no right to manage the temple. It was further averred that Defendant/respondent No.12, who was Pujari of the temple had a right to move an application for review and the Registrar, Public Trust, who proceeded on the basis of such application had rightly passed order dated 05.01.1984 recalling his earlier order dated 15.03.1983, therefore, the suit was not maintainable and hence, liable to be dismissed. Defendant/respondent No.12 pleading on identical lines also averred that order dated 15.03.1983 was passed by (appellant No.3) Registrar, Public Trust without following procedure laid down under the law and, therefore, defendant No.4 had every right to get the same modified/cancelled, therefore, an application for review was filed. It was also averred that plaintiffs have no right, title or interest over the property of the temple. The order in question i.e. 15.031983 regarding registration of Trusts was obtained in collusion with appellant/defendant No.3, therefore, the same was required to be reviewed. Accordingly, a prayer was made for dismissal of the suit.

On the basis of the pleadings as many as 10 issues were framed by the learned trial Court. A prayer was made to decide issue No.3 relating to jurisdictional competence of Registrar, Public Trust to pass order dated 05.01.1984 by reviewing his own order, however, the same was declined by the learned trial Court, vide order dated 09.11.1997. Order dated 09.11.1997 was challenged before this Court by way of Civil Revision No.371/1987 which came to be decided, vide order dated 25/07/1991, whereby the learned trial Court was directed to decide the question of maintainability of suit and jurisdictional competence of Registrar to review his own order as preliminary issue. Accordingly, learned trial Court, vide order dated 28.01.1983 decided both the issues as preliminary issues. It was held that the suit is maintainable. It was further held that Registrar, Public Trust had no jurisdiction to review his own order, therefore, order dated 05.01.1984 passed by Registrar, Public Trust reviewing and recalling his earlier order dated 15.03.1983 was without jurisdiction.

The learned trial Court, vide the impugned judgment found that basically and substantially the plaintiffs have sought a declaration that order dated 05.01.1984 passed by the Registrar, Public Trust (appellant/defendant No.3) is without jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void. Consequential, relief of permanent injunction was also sought. The learned trial Court was of the view that as the issue with regard to jurisdictional competence of Registrar has already been decided by his predecessor, therefore, it was not necessary to deal with the issue No.4-9 which in fact did not arise for determination in view of the averments made by the parties and reliefs prayed by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, learned trial Court declined to decide the issue No.4-9 and decreed the suit for declaration, injunction as prayed in the plaint.

In this appeal, the impugned judgment and decree so also order dated 28.01.1993 passed by learned District Judge, Ujjain deciding preliminary issues are challenged on the ground that learned trial Court has committed a serious error in holding that the Registrar, Public Trust had no jurisdiction to review his own order. It is further contended that the learned trial Court ought to have decided all the issues which are framed and that serious error has been committed by not deciding issue No.4-9, which are framed on the basis of pleadings. Accordingly, a prayer has been made to set aside the impugned judgment and decree.

Per contra, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that law is well settled that Registrar, Public Trust or for that matter a quasi-judicial Authority has no jurisdiction to review his own order unless power in this regard is specifically conferred by the statute. ''The Act'' does not confer any such power, therefore, the Registrar committed serious illegality in reviewing his own order. Reliance this regard is placed on the decision of this Court in Julious Prasad vs. State of M.P. and others, 2010 (1) MPLJ 659, and pronouncement of the apex Court in Haryana State Industrial Corporation vs. Mavasi and others, (2012) 7 SCC 200.

The law is well settled that power of review is a creature of statute and that unless such power by express stipulation is conferred upon a Court or quasi-judicial Authority, the same cannot be exercised. In Haryana State Industrial Corporation (supra), the apex Court in this regard has held thus (para-26): "26. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is a creature of the statute and no Court or quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered to do so."

Dealing with the power of the Registrar, Public Trust to review his own order, a Division Bench of this Court in Julious Prasad (supra) has held as under (para 13) : "13. It is now well established that a quasijudicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. It is not disputed that the provisions of the M.P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 and the Rules made thereunder do not confer any power of review on the Registrar."

It is not disputed at the Bar that ''the Act'' does not stipulate that Registrar, Public Trust enjoys any power of review. The pronouncement of the apex Court (supra) is clear that power of review is a creature of statute and no Court or quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its judgment or order unless it is legally empowered to do so. In Julious Prasad (supra), it is expressly held that provisions of ''the Act'' and the Rules made thereunder do not confer any power of review on the Registrar, therefore, it can be said without hesitation, that order dated 05.01.1984 passed by Registrar, Public Trust, reviewing his earlier order dated 15.01.1983 being without jurisdiction is a nullity and, therefore, unsustainable.

In these premises, the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief of declaration, so also the consequential relief of permanent injunction. Hence, it cannot be said that the learned trial Court has committed any error in granting the decree of declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for by the plaintiffs.

Resultantly, this appeal, being devoid of merits, deserves to be and is accordingly, hereby dismissed with costs.