State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Sunderlal Dhritlahre

The instant appeal was received on transfer from the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, wherein vide order dated 25.08.2000 leave to appeal was granted and the same was registered under the head of ‘criminal appeal’.

The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State challenging the judgment of acquittal dated 06.03.2000 passed by the learned 1st Additional Special Judge in Special Criminal Case No.2/99, whereby the respondent has been acquitted of the charges punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Brief facts of the case are that the respondent Sunderlal Dhritlahre was posted as Nayab Tahsildar at District Durg in the year 1998. The complainant Rajendra Kumar had filed an application for mutation of his land. It is alleged that the respondent had demanded Rs.2,000/- as bribe from the complainant for mutation of his land and subsequently, amount of Rs.500/- was said to be given on 16.06.1998. Thereafter, the complainant reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police (Special Police) Lokayukt, Raipur against the respondent by filing an application (Ex-P/18). The preliminary enquiry was done, thereafter a trap team was directed to be constituted by the SP, Lokayukt. The tape recorder was given to the complainant to record the conversation between him and the respondent/accused. On 16.06.1998 at about 7 am, trap team reached at Bemetara. The complainant Rajendra Kumar (PW-7) was sent to the respondent’s house. N. S. Thakur (PW-1), a shadow witness, also went with him. The complainant gave Rs.500/- bribe money to the respondent and gave indication of the same to the trap team. The respondent was caught red handed and on search, Rs.500/-, total 5 notes of Rs.100/- was seized from him. The solution of sodium carbonate was prepared and on wash, the colour of respondent’s hand changed to pink. After completion of other enquiry and procedures, charge sheet was filed against the respondent. The charges were framed under Section 7 and 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses. The statement of the accused was also recorded under Section 313 of CrPC., in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication.

The Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record acquitted the respondent of the charges punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Hence, this appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State.

Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned Special Judge is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the respondent of the aforesaid charges levelled against him by recording a finding perverse to the record, therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. The learned Trial Court has failed to see that the complainant Rajendra Kumar had supported the prosecution on material aspects and was declared hostile for limited purposes only. The other prosecution witnesses have proved the seizure of money from the possession of the respondent. The finding and conclusion drawn by the court below is illegal, perverse and contrary to record, hence the judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt, as such the learned Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent of the aforesaid charges levelled against, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

The learned Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record found that there is no proof of demand of bribe money by the respondent. Mr. P. L. Shrivastava (PW-5) admitted the fact that when they entered into the house of the respondent, one person was sitting with the respondent but the prosecution did not examine the said person. It was found that the prosecution did not explain anything about that person as to who was that person and this person could have enlightened the case and explained better as to what conversation took place between the respondent and the complainant. P. L. Shrivastava (PW-5) also admitted this fact that when fingers of respondent were sunk  into water, then the colour of fingers was dusky (matmaila) but not pink. The complainant and other witnesses have stated different versions of trap and procedures.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Muralidhar alias Gidda and another vs State of Karnataka (2014) 5 SCC 730 has held in paras 11 & 12 as under:-

“11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed:

“7……….the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.”

The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu, Madan Mohan Singh, Atley, Aher Raja Khima, Balbir Singh, M.G. Agarwal, Noor Khan, Khedu Mohton, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade, Lekha Yadav, Khem Karan, Bishan Singh, Umedbhai Jadavbhai, K. Gopal Reddy, Tota Singh, Ram Kumar, Madan Lal, Sambasivan, Bhagwan Singh, Harijana Thirupala, C. Antony, K. Gopalakrishna, Sanjay Thakran and Chandrappa. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:

(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court;

(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal;

(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and

(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.”

Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid legal proposition, it is quite vivid that the prosecution had to prove demand and acceptance of bribe by the respondent beyond all reasonable doubt, but the prosecution has failed to prove the same. The finding recorded by the learned Special Judge acquitting the respondent of the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is based on the material available on record. As such, this Court finds no illegality in the impugned judgment acquitting the respondent of the aforesaid charges, particularly when there is a settled legal position that if on the basis of record, two conclusions can be arrived at, the one favouring the accused has to be preferred. Even otherwise, the prosecution has utterly failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the Trial Court is fully justified in recording the finding of acquittal, which is based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record. Furthermore, in case of appeal against the acquittal, the scope is very limited and interference can only be drawn if finding recorded by the Trial Court is highly perverse or arrived at by ignoring the relevant material and considering the irrelevant ones and in the present case, no such circumstance is there warranting interference by this Court.

Accordingly, the criminal appeal preferred by the State being bereft of any substance is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.