State Of Madhya Pradesh & Others vs Babulal

This Appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 is directed against the order

dated 04/08/2016 passed in Writ Petition No.560/2005.

There is delay of 172 days in filing the Appeal, condonation whereof is being sought vide I.A. No.2579/2017; though opposed by respondent; however,

for the reasons which find mention in the application which prevented the Appellants from filing the Appeal within the period of limitation, we are

satisfied that sufficient cause is made out. Consequently, the delay is condoned. I.A. No.2579/2017 stands disposed of.

Writ Petition at the instance of respondent was directed against the order dated 30.06.2004, whereby he was compulsory retired on the charges of

misconduct being proved in a departmental enquiry.

The charges levelled against the respondent were :

The enquiry officer in his report though did not find the respondent guilty of charge No.1 demanding Rs.200, but found the conduct doubtful. As regard

to charge No.2, the enquiry officer did not find it proved.

It observed :

The disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the finding of the enquiry officer recorded his dissenting note and noticed the respondent on

11/06/2004. Pertinent it is to note that while disagreeing with the finding recorded by the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority relied on the

preliminary enquiry report (esjs }kjk foHkkxh; tkap uLrh ,oa miyC/k lk{; dk xgu v/;;u djus ij izkFkfed tkap fjiksVZ ,oa vkosnd galeq[kyky]xq.kcUr ,oa

HkjrHkkbZ ds dFkuksa esa vk;s rF;ksa rFkk iwoZ esa izLrqr vkosnu i= dFku ,oa 'kiFk i=ksa ds vk/kkj ij nksuksa vkjksfi;ksa ij vkjksi dzekad&2 dks

izekf.kr ikrk gwWaA). However, while passing the order of punishment of compulsory retirement the disciplinary authority mentioned of both the

charge being proved. These in-consistencies and the material on record led learned Single Judge set aside the order of compulsory retirement on the

finding that the disciplinary authority relied upon the preliminary enquiry report in drawing the conclusion that the charges stood proved which is

contrary to law laid down in Nirmala J. Jhala Vs. State of Gujarat & Another, (2013) 4 SCC 301.

Though, the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge is being criticized of having encroached upon the administrative predominance in report of

domestic enquiry. However, trite it is that a judicial intervention is permissible where findings are perverse.

In the case at hand, the enquiry officer does not find the charge of taking Rs. 200 proved nor he finds charge No.2 could be established by the

prosecution. But merely presumption draws a conclusion about the conduct of the respondent. The disciplinary authority also assigned reasons which

are not supported by cogent material evidence.

In Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 10, their lordships pleased to observe:

“6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the

departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and

assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review

available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the

conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an

ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority.

In Nand Kishore vs. State of Bihar, (1978) 3 SCC 366, it was held that the disciplinary proceedings before a domestic Tribunal are of quasi-

judicial character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some evidence, that is to say, such

evidence which, and that too, with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious state

as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to sustain the charges framed against

the delinquent, he cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer would be perverse.

The findings, recorded in a domesticenquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on

record or are not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of that

evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of A.P. vs. Rama Rao 1964 2 LLJ 150, in which the question was whether the High

Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India

vs. Prakash Chand Jain, and Bharat Iron Works vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 518. In Rajinder Kumar Kindra vs. Delhi Admn.

(1984) 4 SCC 635, it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no

reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based

on no legal evidence and the findings are its mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of

nonapplication of mind and stands vitiated.

Normally the High Court and this Courtwould not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of ""guilt"" is

based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny.

A broad distinction has, therefore, to bemaintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at

on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is

some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be the conclusions would not be treated

as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.â€​

In the case at hand, evident it is from the enquiry report that the department failed to prove charge No.1 & 2 levelled against the respondent/petitioner

and that enquiry officer only presumed that the conduct of respondent was doubtful. However, there is not cogent material on record to substantiate

the said presumption. Even the disciplinary authority while disagreeing the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of preliminary enquiry

report had drawn a presumption of establishing of charge No.2 against respondent/petitioner. However, while passing final order without any

foundation, the disciplinary authority holds the respondent/petitioner guilty of both the charges.

The findings arrived at on the basis of preliminary enquiry is not sustainable in view of the law laid down in Nirmala J. Jhala (Supra).

“47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made

against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry.

“A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in

support of the case were [to be] believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out or not the relevant consideration is

whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived

at on that evidenceâ€. (Vide: Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79, AIR p.85, para 27) [See also: The Bangalore Woollen Cotton and

Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. B. Dasappa, AIR 1960 SC 1352, V.C. Shukla & Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1980 SC 1382; Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad

Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276 and Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, AIR 2005 SC 570).â€​

Having, thus, considered, we find no error of judgment arrived at by learned Single Judge while allowing the petition by setting aside the impugned

order of compulsory retirement.

Consequently, Appeal fails and is dismissed.

No costs.