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Judgment
Kh. Nobin Singh, J
[1] Heard Shri K. Jagat, learned Government Advocate appearing for the applicants/ appellants and Shri S. Thoi Thoi Meitei, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ writ petitioner.
[2] This is an application filed on behalf of the State Government praying for condonation of delay of 632 days in filing the accompanying writ appeal.
[3] The explanations for the delay are narrated in para 3 of the application which is contested by the sole respondent on the inter-alia grounds that the applicants have failed to disclose sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within time. The application was filed only after the contempt petition being filed by the sole respondent and therefore, the application is liable to be rejected. The para 3 of the application which contains the explanation for the delay reads as under:
"3. That, the Applicants beg to submit that while filing the accompanying Writ Appeal some unintentional and bona fide delay of 632 days has been caused due to the circumstances explained hereinbelow:-
i) On receipt of the Hon'ble Court's order dated 07-10-2016 passed in W.P.(C) No. 563 of 2016, the file was put up on 26-11-2016 before Deputy Secretary (Education/S) with a note requesting the Director of Education (S) for detail report on the matter.
ii) Since no status has been furnished from the Director of Education/S, OSD(L) again put up the file on 28-02-2017 before the Deputy Secretary Education/S with a note requesting the Director of Education (S) for an action taken report on the Hon'ble Court's order.
iii) On 30-03-2017 OSD (L) put up the file before the Deputy Secretary (Education/S) with a note of request to the Director of Education (S) for a detail report for compliance of Hon'ble Court's order before 26-04-2017.
iv) On 20-10-2017 OSD (L) put up the file before Deputy Secretary (Education/S) with a request to the Deputy Secretary (Education/S,) Manipur for a detailed report/ comment on the matter for compliance of the Hon'ble Court's order dated 07-10-2016 at an early date.
v) On 23-10-2017 Deputy Secretary (Education/S) again put up the file before the Principal Secretary and on 27-10-2017 Principal Secretary (Education/S) sent back the file to the Deputy Secretary (Education/S).
vi) On 08-01-2018 OSD (L) put up the file before the Joint Secretary (Education/S) with a note stating that the Director of Education (S) has intimated that the ZEO (Senapati) has been reminded for furnishing the relevant order, deputation order, service verification report, age proof certificate in respect of the petitioner. However, ZEO (Senapati) had only submitted Class-VIII passing/ reading Certificate of the petitioner as age proof Certificate. Since the said certificate is being doubtful, the ZEO has been requested to appear in person and further requested for conducting service verification report of the petitioner vide letter dated 18-12-2017. Accordingly, it was suggested that Director of Education (S) may be requested for necessary grounds for filing appeal/review against the said Court's order with the service verification report in respect of the petitioner at an early date.
vii) On 08-01-2018, Joint Secretary (Education/S) put the file before the Principal Secretary (Education/S) with a note for holding a meeting with Director of Education (S) along with ZEO, Senapati at the office of the Principal Secretary.
viii) On 12-01-2018, Principal Secretary (Education/S) sent back the file to Joint Secretary (Education/S) and Joint Secretary (Education/S) sent back the file on 16-01-2018 to OSD (L) with a note to discuss with Director of Education (S) along with their OSDs regarding the matter.
ix) On 20-03-2018, OSD (L) put up the file before the Joint Secretary (Education/S) with brief grounds for filing appeal/ review as submitted by Director of Education (S), Manipur.
x) On 21-03.2018, Joint Secretary (Education/S) put up the file before Principal Secretary (Education/S) with a note for obtaining advice/ concurrence of Law Department for filling Appeal/ Review against the order dated 07-10-2016.
xi) On 25-03-2018, Principal Secretary (Education/S) sent the file to Law Department for advice on the matter.
xii) On 10-04-2018, order for filing an Appeal against Hon'ble Court's order dated 07-10-2016 was issued by Law Department and accordingly Deputy Secretary (Education/S) vide letter dated 02-05-2018 requested the State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur to file an appeal against the aforesaid Hon'ble Court's order.
xiii) On 22-05-2018, State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur requested the Secretary (Education/S) for placing the matter before Ld. Advocate General, Manipur for his advice on the matter.
xiv) On 26-05-2018, OSD (L) put up the file before the Joint Secretary (Education/S) with a note to seek advice/ opinion of the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur as suggested by State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur.
xv) On 28-05-2018, Joint Secretary (Education/S), put up the file before the Principal Secretary (Education/S) with a note to seek opinion/ comment of the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur in the matter.
xvi) On 21-06-2018, Ld. Advocate General, Manipur sent back the file to Commissioner (Education/S) with a request to furnish some information in order to ascertain the full factual positions pertaining to the service of the petitioner and on the same day Commissioner (Education/S) sent back the file to the Joint Secretary (Education/S) for the same as suggested by the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur.
xvii) On 25-06-2018, Joint Secretary (Education/S) sent back the file to OSD (L) with a note to ask Director of Education (S) to furnish a report in the issues as suggested by the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur.
xviii) On 26-6-2018 OSD (L) put up the file before Joint Secretary (Education/S) with a draft letter addressed to the Director of Education (S), Manipur seeking the aforesaid information.
xix) On 20-07-2018, OSD (L) put up the file to Under Secretary (Education/S) with a report furnished by the Director of Education (S) and on the same day Under Secretary (Education/S) put up the file to Joint Secretary (Education/S), Manipur.
xx) On 21-07-2018, Joint Secretary (Education/S) put up the file to the Commissioner (Education/S) with answers to the query made by the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur and on the same day, the Commissioner (Education/S) put up the file to the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur.
xxi) On 23-07-2018, the Ld. Advocate General, Manipur sent back the file to the Commissioner (Education/S), Manipur with a note that Administrative Department may furnish the same information to the Ld. State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur as follows:
(I) DEO/ Mao is not a competent authority to appoint Asst. Teacher.
(II) DEO/ Mao has got no authority to transfer employee of DE/S to the ADC on deputation.
(III) The appointment order of DEO No. 7/64/71-ED (I) dated 27-01-1972 is not in the official records of the Directorate
& hence its authenticity or otherwise cannot be ascertained.
(IV) The transfer & release order's authenticity couldn't be ascertained but it can be ascertained that even if the said orders are assumed to be genuine they can be considered as irregular orders issued by incompetent authorities.
xxii) By a letter dated 25-07-2018 State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur has been requested to file an appeal against the order dated 07-10-2016 and the said letter was received by the office of State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur on 30-07-2018.
xxiii) Since the Ld. State Government Counsel (HC), Manipur is busy with other cases and as such, Memo of Appeal could not be prepared immediately. Accordingly, the accompanying Writ Appeal has been prepared and filed. In the process of filing the accompanying Writ Appeal, there has been 632 days' delay which is not intentional but due to the circumstances stated in the foregoing paras of this Misc. Application. After deducting the statutory period of 30 days and 19 days for obtaining certified copy of the order dated 07-10-2016, there is a delay of 632 days in filing the accompanying Writ Appeal. The calculation of the numbers of days is given below:
1.
07-10-2016
-
Impugned order was passed
2.
October, 2016
-
24 days
3.
November, 2016
-
30 days1
4.
December, 2016
-
31 days
5.
January, 2017 to December, 2017
-
365 days
6.
January, 2018
-
31 days
7.
February, 2018
-
28 days
8.
March, 2018
-
31 days
9.
April, 2018
-
30 days
10.
May, 2018
-
31 days
11.
June , 2018
-
30 days
12.
July, 2018
-
31 days
13.
August, 2018
-
19 days
Total
-
681 days
(Statutory period )
-
30 days
651 days
Time taken in obtaining certified copy
-
18 days
Total
-
632 days
(xiv) Since the aforesaid delay of 632 days was caused due to the reason explained in the foregoing paras of this Misc. Application, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to consider the matter on merit after condoning the delay of 632 days. It is submitted that unless the aforesaid delay is condoned by the Hon'ble Court and consider the matter on merit, irreparable loss and injury will be caused to the Applicants.
[4] Relying upon the averments made in the application, it has been submitted by Shri K. Jagat, the learned Government Advocate that in a catena of decisions, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as well as this High Court have held that when the State is an applicant, the Court should take a lenient view as the State represents collective cause of the community and if the appeal is rejected on the ground of delay, no person is individually affected but the interest of the public in general. On the other hand, Shri Thoi Thoi, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that no sufficient cause has been shown by the State Government except showing that the file was moved from one officer to another. In view of the rival contentions, it becomes necessary for this court to revisit the decisions, laying down the law, rendered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court on the issue relating to condonation of delay.
In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 wherein the question was whether same standard in applying the sufficient cause test be applied to all the litigants regardless of their personality, the Honble Supreme Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of justice. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. In State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306, the Honble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier decisions, held:
"12. It is notorious and common knowledge, that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this court-be it by private party or the State-are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal with machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay- intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay or procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of altitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases required adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision to give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file the appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants."
In Divisional Manager, Plantation Vs. Munmi Barrack, (2005) 2 SCC 237 wherein there was delay of 103 days in filing the appeal, the Honble Supreme Court held that in a case of that nature where serious questions of law were raised, the Division Bench of the High Court should have taken a liberal view on the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant where the respondent workmen could have been adequately compensated on monitory terms. In State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752, the Honble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier decisions, held:
"15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise -is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants."
In Pundlik Jaiam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer Jaigaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 wherein one of the issues was as to whether the averments disclosed any sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 1724 days in filing the appeals, the Honble Supreme Court held:
"31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings."
In Basawaraj & anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein the Honble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the expression "sufficient cause and held:
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, Parimal v. Veena and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai.)
In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao.)
It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation". The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury‟s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts- The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence".
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a partys own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.)
In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
[5] Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that any appeal or application except the one mentioned therein, may be admitted after the expiry of prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As has been observed by the Honble Supreme Court, the statute of limitation is founded on public policy with its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. The expression "sufficient cause" is not defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word "sufficient" is enough for a particular purpose or as much as one needs. Similarly, the word "cause" means reason. In some cases as mentioned hereinabove, the Honble Supreme Court has examined the expression "sufficient cause" holding its meaning that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bonafide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case and in other words, the expression "sufficient cause" means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him from approaching the court within limitation. The point that needs to be considered by this court is with regard to the principles to be followed while examining the sufficient cause in respect of an application for condonation of delay keeping in mind the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court that what constitutes "sufficient cause" cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules and in particular, as regards the application for condonation of delay filed by the State. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Officer, Anantnag (supra) and G. Ramegouda Majorete Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897, the Honble Supreme Court took the view that a State or its instrumentalities must receive liberal consideration in matters relating to condonation of delay, while the Honble Supreme Court, by taking a slightly contrary view, held in the case of Union of India Vs. Tata Yadogawa Ltd. & ors., 1988 (4) JT 472 that even giving that latitude namely, the delay on account of movement of files, there must be someway or attempt to explain the cause for such delay. In State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao (supra), the Honble Supreme Court, considering the manner in which the government decisions are taken, held that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is the public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should therefore be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. It appears that while laying down the said law, the Honble Supreme Court took a similar view as that of the one in State of Bihar Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh‟s case (supra) but did not take into account the decision rendered in Union of India Vs. Tata Yadogawa‟s case (supra). In Pundlik Jaiam Patil case (supra), the Honble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the issue relating to condonation of delay and held that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay, they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is the same for the citizen and for the governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In Basawaraj case (supra), the decision of which is rendered recently in the year 2013, the Honble Supreme Court revisited the expression "sufficient cause" and after referring to its earlier decisions, summarised the law as mentioned hereinabove.
[6] The subject matter in issue relates to the condonation of delay in preferring the appeal by the State of Manipur. Having perused the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court as aforesaid, this court is of the view that in matter relating to application for condonation of delay, there is hardly any difference between a citizen and the State. The only difference appears to be that keeping in mind the circumstances in which the governmental decisions are taken, certain amount of latitude is permissible subject to the condition, as observed in Pundlik Jaiam Patil‟s case (supra), that the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In the present case, the judgment and order dated 07-10-2016 was passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.563 of 2016 and on receipt thereof, the file was put up before the Deputy Secretary (Education/S), Government of Manipur probably by the OSD (L), for the first time, on 26-11-2016 and three times, thereafter, on 28-02-2017, 30-03-2017 and 20-10-2017 for which there is no explanation at all. Thus, it took almost a year for the Deputy Secretary (Education/S), Government of Manipur to put up the file before the Principal Secretary (Education/S), Government of Manipur when it was sent to him only on 27-10-2017. After the file was moved, from one officer to another, for several days, on 10-04-2018 an order was issued by the Law Department for preferring an appeal. However, that was not the end of the journey of the file and it went on moving till when an opinion was sought for from the learned Advocate General, Manipur who gave it on 23-07-2018. The question of latitude will arise only when, at least, one reason is given by the State Government for explaining the delay which it failed to do so and in other words, when the officers dealing with the file, are not sincere in the discharge of their duties and do not bother about the interest of the general public, the question of latitude will not arise at all. Moreover, it is nowhere mentioned in the application that the delay has occurred owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents which may ultimately result in the suffering of the public interest and that the State Government has proposed to take action against the erring officials. In the absence of a cause or a reason, leave alone the sufficiency thereof, the delay cannot be condoned by this court with the result that the instant application is not sustainable in law. In other words, no attempt has been made by the State Government to show as to what prevented it from preferring the appeal within a year from the date of judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and therefore, the application being devoid of any merit, is liable to be dismissed by this Court.
[7] For the reasons stated hereinabove, the application stands dismissed.