High CourtsDivision Bench

State of Orissa and Others vs Pradipta Kumar Samantra

Orissa High Court · Decided on 14 October 2009 · Citation: (2010) 1 ILR (Ori) 178

HON’BLE JUDGES
L. Mohapatra, J · B.N. Mahapatra, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition (C) No. 1772 of 2002
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 1,000 words

L. Mohapatra, J.—The State and its functionaries are the Petitioners before this Court assailing the order of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar dated 20th March, 2002 passed in O.A. No. 1878 of 2001 filed by opposite party No. 1.

2.

Opposite party No. 1 was appointed as Field man Demonstrator on ad hoc basis for 89 days against an existing reserved vacancy caused due to promotion of the incumbent by order dated 2nd April, 1994. Again by order dated 31.7.1994 he was given a fresh appointment in the same capacity for a further period of 60 days. While continuing on ad hoc basis in the manner stated above, he approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 2271 of 1994 for regularization of his services. The said O.A. was disposed of as withdrawn on 6.7.1999. Because of pendency of the O.A. filed by him, he was allowed to continue on ad hoc basis. Thereafter by order dated 10.12.2001 he was terminated from service on the ground of having been appointed irregularly. While O.A. No. 2271 of 1994 was pending before the Bhubaneswar Bench, opposite party No. 1 also filed O.A. No. 1923(C) of 1991 before the Cuttack Bench, Cuttack for quashing the order dated 8.6.2001 in which the Agriculture Department directed the Director, Soil Conservation to terminate all irregular appointees. Further during pendency of the said O.A. No. 1923(C ) of 2001, the order of termination having been passed, opposite party No. 1 filed the present O.A. challenging the order of termination. His case before the Tribunal was that he was not an irregular appointee and his services had been regularized with effect from 31.7.1996. His services having been regularized, he could not be treated as an irregular appointee and his services could not be terminated without issuing a notice to show cause.

3.

From the impugned order it appears that a note of submission was filed on behalf of the present Petitioners before the Tribunal wherein it was stated that the Assistant Soil Conservation Officer is the appointing authority for Field man Demonstrators and the opposite party No. 1 had been appointed irregularly for which under the orders of the Department his services were terminated. The Tribunal in the impugned order though observed that there is no document indicating regularization of opposite party No. 1 in service, allowed the O.A. solely on the ground that opposite party No. 1 having worked on ad hoc basis for a considerable length of time, his termination from service without a notice to show cause is illegal.

4.

Learned Counsel for the State assailed the impugned order on the ground that opposite party No. 1 had been appointed on ad hoc basis against a sanctioned vacancy on tenure basis, which was being extended from time to time. He having no right to hold the post, is also not entitled to a notice prior to termination of his service.

None appeared for opposite party No. 1 at the time of hearing.

5.

Annexure 1 to the writ application shows that opposite party No. 1 was appointed on ad hoc basis against an existing reserved vacancy for a period of 89 days vide order dated 2.4.1994 and under Annexure 2 by order dated 31.7.1994 he was given a fresh appointment for a further period of sixty days. While the matter stood thus, he approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 2271 of 1994 for regularization of his services. The Department did not dispense with his services because of pendency of the said O.A. As is evident from Annexure 3, only after the said O.A. was withdrawn on 6.7.1999, steps were taken for removing irregular appointees including the Petitioner and his services were terminated in 2001. The question for consideration is as to whether opposite party No. 1 is entitled for a notice before the order of termination was passed or not. Annexures 1 and 2 clearly indicate that the appointment was for a specified period and in case of tenure appointments, law is well settled that the services comes to end on expiry of the period. In case of Dr. L.P. Agrawal Vs. Union of India and others, and in the case of State of U.P. and Another Vs. Dr. S.K. Sinha and Others, the Apex Court observed that if one is appointed for a tenure, it comes to an end automatically and does not require any order of termination by the employer. In the case of State of Punjab and others Vs. Surinder Kumar and others, , the Court observed that an employee appointed for a tenure, his service is not governed by any statutory rules, and he is bound by the terms and conditions incorporated in his appointment letter and there is no reason why the Court should not enforce the same. Alternatively, if such ad hoc appointment of opposite party No. 1 is treated to be temporary appointment, law is well settled that such employee has no right to hold the post and he is not entitled for any opportunity of hearing before the services are dispensed with as his termination does not amount forfeiture of any legal right. In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Ravindra Kumar Misra Vs. U.P. State Handloom Corpn. Ltd. and Another, , Triveni Shankar Saxena Vs. State of U.P. and others, and Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain and Others, . In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of tenure appointments and temporary appointments, there is no need to issue a notice to show cause before terminating the services of such employee and, therefore the Tribunal was not justified holding that opposite party No. 1, who was holding a tenure post or had been appointed on temporary basis for a specified period, had a right of notice before the order of termination was passed.

6.

Accordingly, we allow the writ application and set aside the impugned judgment.