High CourtsSingle Bench

State of Orissa vs Satrughana Behera and fourteen Ors.

Orissa High Court · Decided on 14 January 1985 · Citation: (1985) 59 CLT 130

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.K. Behera, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 162 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 147, 337, 395, 397
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Government Appeal No. 40 of 1980
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 665 words

B.K. Behera, J.—The Respondents figured as the accused persons and stood charged u/s 395 read with Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code with having committed dacoity in the house of Kesaba Sahu (P.W. 3) at about 2 p.m. on September 5, 1979, being armed with deadly weapons and by show or force in the course of which rice and other articles had allegedly been removed. The prosecution had examined fifteen witnesses and had, in particular, relied on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, two inmates or the house or the victim and that of P.Ws. 6 and 8 all or whom had figured as witnesses to the occurrence. The Respondents had pleaded that they had falsely been involved in the commission or the offence owing to previous rivalry. On a consideration or the evidence, the trial court held that the charge had not been brought home to the Respondents awly accordingly they were acquitted of the charge. This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order or acquittal recorded by the trial court.

2.

I have heard the learned Counsel for both the sides. It is important to keep in mind that in the first information report (Ext. 1) lodged by no other person than the victim himself (P.W. 3), no allegation regarding commission o� dacoity had been made. On the other hand, a case had been registered on its basis under Sections 147 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code. This was a very significant and important aspect of which due notice bad been taken by the trial court. In the course or investigation, Krutibas (P.W. 4), the brother of P.W. 3, had submitted to the Investigating Officer a list or stolen articles. This would be construed to be a statement made to a, police officer in the course of investigation and would, therefore, be hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and rendered inadmissibly, on that account. Even assuming, however, that this could be admitted in evidence, rightly the trial court had taken note of the fact that it had not been stated therein that any of the Respondents had been responsible for looting the properties.

3.

The trial court had carefully examined the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2, two inmates of the house of P.W. 3, who were highly interested witnesses and there were material discrepancies in their evidence which need not again be catalogued in this judgment. The learned trial Judge found that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 on the one hand was discrepant and irreconcilable with that of P.W. 6. Due notice had been taken of the fact that P.W. 8, who had involved the Respondents, had been examined, in the course of investigation long after the occurrence. As would appear from the materials placed before the trial court, all was not well between both the sides and therefore, the evidence adduced from the side of the prosecution required careful scrutiny as had been done by the trial court.

4.

There had been some inconsequential seizures properties, such as, rice, from the possession of some of the trial court was correct in not placing reliance on these incriminating circumstances against the Respondents of unidentifiable Respondents and the items of seizures as.

5.

Although initially a report had been made for commission of offences punishable under Sections 147 and an of the Indian Penal Code, the case was developed at the stage of investigation to make it one of dacoity.

6.

The findings recorded by the trial court cannot be said to be unreasonable or unfounded calling for interference by this Court in an appeal against acquittal. Even assuming that another view could be taken on the evidence on record, that cannot be a ground for interference with an order of acquittal. It must however, be said that no other reasonable view could have been taken in favour of the prosecution and against the Respondents.

7.

The appeal fails and is dismissed.