State of Punjab and Others vs Ex. ASI Sat Pal

Paramjeet Singh, J.—Present regular second appeal has been filed by the appellants-defendants against the judgment and decree dated 26.05.1997 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur, as well as, against the judgment and decree dated 02.12.1993 passed by learned Sub Judge II Class, Gurdaspur, whereby suit of the respondent-plaintiff is decreed to the effect that the dismissal order dated 21.01.1988 and order dated 24.06.1988 are illegal, unjust and against the principles of natural justice and the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to reinstatement with continuity in service from the date of his dismissal. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for declaration to the effect that dismissal order dated 21.01.1988 of the plaintiff-respondent and rejection of appeal vide order dated 24.06.1988 are illegal, unjustified, cryptic, unconstitutional, unacceptable, discriminative, against the principles of natural justice, police rules and against the well settled law and norms of service rules, regulations and are non-speaking. It was further prayed that the plaintiff-respondent is entitled to be reinstated in service with continuity of service from the date of his dismissal and entitled to all back emoluments. The learned Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 02.12.1993, after appreciating the evidence, decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent to the effect that the dismissal order dated 21.01.1988 passed by defendant No. 4 and order dated 24.06.1988 passed by defendant No. 3 are illegal, unjust and against the principles of natural justice and the plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement with continuity in service from the date of his dismissal and entitled to all back emoluments as if the impugned orders had never been passed. Against the said judgment and decree, the defendants-appellants preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur, which was partly allowed vide judgment and decree dated 26.05.1997, the decree of the learned Trial Court was modified and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent for declaration was partly decreed holding that the order of dismissal dated 21.01.1988 was illegal, null and void. But the plaintiff-respondent was not held entitled to any consequential relief of service including salary from the date of dismissal till he joined because he remained absent. Hence, this regular second appeal by the State.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record

At the admission stage on 02.04.1998, the following substantial question of law was framed:

Whether the Court can interfere with the punishment imposed merely on the ground that the plaintiff has put in service for 25 years.

When the case came up for arguments on 30.03.2012, the learned counsel for the appellants pleaded that another substantial question of law arises in the present case and the same was framed as under:

Whether the Senior Superintendent of Police has power to terminate the services of Assistant Sub Inspector?

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Court cannot interfere with the punishment imposed merely on the ground that a person has put in service for 25 years. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in Chairman and MD V.S.P. and Others Vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu, to contend that the court''s power is very limited to interfere with the penalty. Reliance has been placed upon the following passages contained in paragraphs 19 to 22 which reads as follows:-

A subsequent explanation before another authority, which had not been pleaded in the departmental proceedings, cannot by itself be a ground to hold that the principles of natural justice had not been complied with in the disciplinary proceedings.

The jurisdiction of the High Court in this regard is rather limited. Its power to interfere with disciplinary matters is circumscribed by well-known factors. It cannot set aside a well-reasoned order only on sympathy or sentiments. (See Maruti Udyog Ltd. Vs. Ram Lal and Others, Ravishwar Manjhi and Others Vs. State of Jharkhand, SBI v. Mahatma Mishra (2006) 13 SCC 727 ;State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007) 11 SCC 681; State of M.P. and Others Vs. Sanjay Kumar Pathak and Others, and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Others Vs. Surji Devi,

Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The superior courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved. (See Sangfroid Remedies Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

22.The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India also cannot, on the basis of sympathy or sentiment, overturn a legal order.

The Supreme Court in a more or less identical circumstance dealt with the case of a police inspector who did not obey the transfer order and went on medical leave, but refused to submit himself for examination by the medical board. When he was dismissed and that punishment was interfered with by the Tribunal, the Supreme Court took exception to the tribunal in setting aside the order of dismissal, vide its judgment in Secretary to Government and Others Vs. A.C.J. Britto,

Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that the respondent has been dismissed from service after following due process of law. Learned counsel further contended that the courts can interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority only when they are satisfied that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of the charges alleged and proved against a delinquent employee.

The said contention has been opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent to contend that Courts can interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority when the action taken is against the settled principles of law. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Pritam Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, In that case, person who had put in 31 years of long service was compulsorily retired on flimsy charges and the Apex Court had interfered with the penalty. This judgment is of no help to the respondent as the facts of the present case are different.

In catena of decisions, it is held that Court should not interfere with the administrator''s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was showing to the conscience of the Court. In view of Wednesbury principles, the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision for that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision.

In view of this, the judgment passed by the Lower Appellate Court is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside.

The second issue raised in this case is whether the Senior Superintendent of Police was competent to impose the penalty of dismissal. This matter has been considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others vs. Manohar Lal, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 201 and also finding has been recorded by the Lower Appellate Court that Senior Superintendent of Police is competent to pass the order of dismissal. The finding recorded by the Lower Appellate Court reads as under:

On the other hand, the learned Govt. Pleader has made a reference to State of Punjab and Others Vs. Manohar Lal, In this report case Manohar Lal respondent was compulsorily retired by the Senior Superintendent of Police. It was held by the Addl. District Judge, Gurdaspur, that Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur was not competent to order the dismissal of the plaintiff as he was earlier promoted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and that the Senior Superintendent of Police was junior to the rank of the D.I.G. of Police. The judgment of first appellate Court was affirmed by the High Court. The Full Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Addl. District Judge holding that S.S.P. was competent to pass the order of a compulsory retirement of a Sub Inspector. It was argued in that cased that under rule 13.9 promotion to the rank of ASI was to be made by the D.I.G. Of Police and that the S.P. Was competent authority to make the impugned order. It was observed by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that it has been provided under Punjab Police Rule 12.1 that Superintendent of Police is competent to make the appointment of a Sub Inspector of Police and Asstt. Sub Inspector Police and as such, was competent to order the compulsory retirement of a Sub Inspector. The point involved int his case is almost the same which has been involved in the case in hand. In case State of Punjab vs. Manohar Lal, it was argued for the delinquent official that the S.P. was not competent to pass an order of compulsory retirement as he was promoted to the rank of ASI by the D.I.G. of Police. But this argument did not prevail with the Hon''ble Supreme Court that under police rule 12.1 Superintendent of Police was competent to pass an order of compulsory retirement. In the case in hand also the plaintiff/respondent is governed by the Punjab Police Rule. He was promoted as an ASI by the Deputy Inspector General of Police but under Punjab Police Rule 12.1 the S.P./S.S.P. is the competent authority to pass an order of dismissal being punishing authority. I am bound by the observations made by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court and as per observations made in this case, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal for having been passed by the S.S.P.

In view of this, I am of the view that the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court is required to be set aside and is ordered accordingly. However, the authorities will be at liberty to pass fresh order keeping in view the past record of the respondent who has rendered 25 years of service. Present appeal is allowed accordingly.