State of Punjab vs Amar Singh

J.S. Sekhon, J.—This judgment will also dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986.

The sole controversy involved in Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986 and Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986 is whether the povisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiate the trial in a summons case if the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused and no permission is taken from the Court for extending the period of investigation.

In Criminal Appeal No. 98/DBA of 1986, a case under Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Amar Singh, respondent on 25-9-1984. Admittedly, the investigation of that case was not completed within a period of six months. Similarly, in Criminal Appeal No. 75/DBA of 1986, a case u/s 304A of the Indian Penal Code was registered against Baldev Singh, accused-respondent on 1-1-1984. In this case also, the prosecution failed to file any charge-sheet or complete the investigation within a period of six months without obtaining any order from the Court.

In both these appeals, after framing of the charge of the trial Court and recording the evidence of some witnesses, it was pointed out to the trial Court that the trial is vitiated under the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial Court acquitted the accused respondent by placing reliance on a single Bench judgment of this Court in Dr. J.S. Parwana v. State 1985 (2) R Cri R 59 and of the Delhi High Court reported in Raj Singh v. State 1984 (1) RCR 581 : (1985 Cri LJ 41 (Delhi).

Feeling aggrieved against the impugned order of acquittal, the State has come up in appeal.

We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length. The provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as under: --

167(5). Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.--

If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfied the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interest of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary.

This Section provides the procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours of the arrest of the accused. There is no dispute that the above provisions have been added by the Legislature in the present Code of Criminal Procedure obviously to limit the time of investigation into petty offences under the Indian Penal Code which are triable as summons cases as per the. provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in turn implies that the speedy trial or prompt administration of justice was the main consideration behind the incorporation of these provisions. A bare glance through the above-referred provisions leaves no doubt that the Legislature in its wisdom has barred the continuation of the investigation after the expiry of period of six months from the date of arrest of the accused. There is no indication, direct or indirect therefrom that the investigation already conducted within the period of six months would also stand vitiated or that the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months in summons cases would vitiate the entire trial or result in acquittal of the accused. In other words, it can be well said that the evidence collected during the investigation beyond the period of six months would be rendered inadmissible by these provisions and not the evidence which was collected earlier by the investigation. Moreover, the Magistrate has been given the powers to extend the period of investigation under the circumstances of a particular case. Under Sub-section (6) of this Section, the Sessions Judge has been invested with the powers to review such order of the Magistrate. Thus, the perusal of the provisions of Sub-section (5) also provides an oblique indication that the Legislature have struck a balance between justifiable protracted investigation and the investigation unnecessarily delayed beyond a period of six months in summons cases. Consequently, by no stretch of imagination, it can be held that the violation of the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code would result in vitiating the entire trial.

It appears that when the trial Court passed the impugned order of acquittal in both these cases, the judgment of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in State v. Jai Bhagwan Singh 1985 Cri. L J 932 was not brought to its notice. In that case, the Division Bench had overruled the earlier view of the single Bench of Delhi High Court in Raj Singh v. Delhi Administration 1984 (1) RCR 581: (1985 Cri LJ 41 Delhi relied upon by the trial Court by holding that the evidence collected within a span of six months after the arrest of the accused could be used against him and not the one collected thereafter and that the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 167(5) of the Code would not vitiate the entire trial or render the entire evidence inadmissible.

The matter does not rest here as view of the single Bench of this Court in Dr. Parwana''s case (supra) was also dissented upon in Rovinderpal Singh Vs. Union Territory, by a Single Bench of this Court. In that case, the decision of Delhi High Court in Jai Bhagwan Singh''s case (supra) was relied upon. Again a Single Bench of this Court in Gange Ram v. Union Territory, Chandigarh 1986 (2) RCR 139 has taken similar view by holding that the trial cannot be declared as a nullity merely on the ground that the challan was put in the Court after the expiry of period of six months from the arrest of the accused in a case u/s 304A of the Indian Penal Code.

For the reasons recorded above, the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in Dr. J.S. Parwana''s case (supra) cannot be said to be a good law and is hereby overruled.

The question then arises whether under the particular circumstances of these cases, the matter be sent back to the trial Court for retrial. In this regard, it is noteworthy in the case of Amar Singh, which is a case under Sections 279/337 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, only minor injuries are involved besides damage to the car of the complainant to the extent of Rs. 50/- only. In view of the minor nature of offence and factum that Amar Singh, accused-respondent has suffered harassment of the pendency of the investigation trial and appeal against him for a period of more than four years, it is not a fit case for sending back for fresh trial. Thus, no further action is called for in this appeal.

The case of Baldev Singh, accused-respondent (in Criminal Appeal No. 75-DBA of 1986), stands on different feeting as due to his rash and negligent driving, one life was lost. Thus, this case is sent back for retrial with the direction that the trial court shall use only that evidence against the accused which was collected within six months from the date of his arrest. The trial Court shall also take into consideration while awarding sentence, the period of harassment which this accused has undergone during the pendency of this appeal before this Court. This appeal stands accepted. Baldev Singh, respondent is directed to appear before the trial Court on 9-10-91 and furnish requisite bonds to its satisfaction.