State of Punjab vs Dewarka Dass

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.—This regular second appeal has been filed by the Defendant against the judgment and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Chandigarh, dated June 29, 1972.

Briefly, the case of the Plaintiff was that he was appointed as an upholster in the Punjab Roadways in 1968. His services were terminated vide order dated March 21, 1969, with effect from March 20, 1969, by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways, without giving him any show cause notice in contravention of the provisions of Article ill of the Constitution of India. He, it is stated, had completed continuous service of more than 240 days on the date when his services were terminated. The Plaintiff challenged the order of termination on the ground that after he had completed 240 days of service, he had become a permanent employee and his services could not be terminated in a summary manner.

The suit was contested by the State of Punjab, the Defendant. It was, inter alia, pleaded by it that the impugned order was not an order of termination but it was simpliciter order of discontinuance in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment and that the provisions of Civil Services Rules had been complied with. It was also pleaded that the Plaintiff had not completed 240 days of service.

The trial Court held that it was within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to adjudicate upon the propriety and legality of the order passed by the Defendant and, therefore, the Plaintiff could not institute the suit in the civil Court. It also held that the services of the Plaintiff had been discontinued according to the conditions of his employment. Consequently, it dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff. He went up in appeal before the Senior Subordinate Judge. Chandigarh, who reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and held that the services of the Plaintiff had been terminated illegally and that his removal was not in accordance with the Civil Services Rules. Consequently, he accepted the appeal and decreed the suit of the Plaintiff. The state of Punjab has come up in second appeal againt the judgment and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge to this Court.

The only contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the remedy of the Respondent lay before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He further submits that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present dispute.

In order to determine this question, it is necessary to refer to some provisions of the act. Section 2(k) defines ''industrial dispute''. According to the definition, ''industrial dispute'' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, or any person. It is not disputed that the transport undertaking of the state is an industry. The aforesaid definition shows that any dispute between the employer and a workman which relates to the employments or terms of employment is an industrial dispute. Section 2-A clarifies that the dismissal of an individual workman is to be considered to be an industrial dispute. It says that where any employer discharges, dismisses or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that or any and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge dismissal or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. The Labour Courts are constructed u/s 7of the Act Section 10 (1) (c) provides that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists it may by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with that dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in second Schedule to a Labour Court for adjudication. In Schedule II, item No. 3 relates to discharge or dismissal of workman including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed, the aforesaid clause shows that the labour Court can grant relief to workmen who are wrongfully discharged. Section 18 (3) says that an award of a Labour Court which has become enforceable shall be binding on all the parties to the industrial dispute.

There is no specific section in the Act by which the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred. It is, however, a settled proposition that if a special Tribunal is created, in that case the matters which are within the jurisdiction of the special Tribunal, cannot be taken cognizance of by the civil Courts. The Act was enacted inter alia to administer justice expeditiously through the forms provided therein. It has been observed in Lala Ram Swarup and Others Vs. Shikar Chand and Another, as follows:

It cannot be seriously disputed that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to deal with causes can be excluded by the Legislature by special Acts which deal with special subject-matter; but the exclusion of the Jurisdiction of the civil Courts must be made by a statutory provision which expressly provides for it, or which necessarily and inevitably leads to that inference. In other words, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts can be excluded by a statutory provision which is either express in that behalf or which irresistibly leads to that inference.

One of the points which is often treated as relevant in dealing with the question about the exclusion of Civil Court''s Jurisdiction, is whether the special statute which, it is urged, excludes such jurisdiction, has used clear and unambiguous words indicating that intention. Another test which is applied is ; does the said statute provide for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material provisions ?....

After going through the provisions of the Act, it is clear that it provides an effective remedy in the disputes mentioned in the Second and Third Schedules between the employers and the employees in industries. The Jurisdiction of the civil Courts is, therefore, impliedly barred in the matters which are covered by the Act. In this view I get support from the observations in The Nippani Electricity Company Pvt. Ltd and Anr. v. Bhimarao Laxman Patil 1968 Lab. I.C. 1571, and The Pigment Lakes and Chemical Manufacturing Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Sitaram Kashiram Konde 1969 Bom. L.R. 472.. In the former case, it was observed as follows:

The Industrial Disputes Act provides an elaborate machinery for the enforcement of rights of settlement of disputes relating to matters specified in the II and III schedules thereof. The Plaintiffs have raised an industrial dispute and such a dispute is to be settled in accordance with the provisions made in the Act. If it is so, it is clear that the Legislature intended that such disputes should be speedily settled in accordance with the machinery set up by the Act and that by implication excludes the jurisdiction of civil Court to deal with such disputes.

To the same effect, observations were also made in the other case.

Similar matter also came up before the Madras High Court in Krishnan and Another Vs. The East India Distilleries and Sugar Factories Ltd. and Another, Veeraswami J., as he then was, observed that it is well-known that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try a suit of civil nature is assumed unless it is taken away either expressly or be necessary intendment. He further observed that when the scheme and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are regarded, it is plain that they impliedly exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try industrial disputes which can well be referred for adjudication u/s 10(1).

The Learned Counsel for the Respondent has argued that in this case the civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on the Western India Match C. Ltd. v. Rameshwar Prasad 1971 Lab. IC 1447 and The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wedke 1974 Lab. L J. 66.. The facts of the aforesaid cases are distinguishable and the observations therein are of no help in the present case. In the Western India Match Company''s case, it was stated that there was no material for holding that the dispute had at any stage acquired the character of an industrial dispute. In the other case, the Plaintiffs sought for an injunction restraining Defendants from implementing or enforcing the terms of a settlement to which they were not made parties.

Adverting to the facts of the present case, it has been held by the appellate Court that the Plaintiff-Respondent had put in more than 240 days of service. The finding of fact arrived at by the appellate Court has not challenged before me. The Plaintiff-Respondent wants to take benefit of Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii) of the Act for claiming that he became permanent. The aforesaid claim of the Plaintiff Respondent has also not been challenged before me. The Plaintiff-Respondent is thus invoking the benefit of the said section in order to challenge the order of termination of bis service. In the circumstances, the Appellant''s plea that the matter could be decided by the Labour court under the Act is justified. In my view only the Labour Court has got the jurisdiction to decide this matter. I, therefore, accept the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant, and hold, that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. In this situation, the plaint is to be returned to the Plaintiff.

For the reasons recorded above, I accept the appeal and order that the plaint may be returned to the Plaintiff. In the circumstances of this case I, however, make no order as to costs.