State of Punjab vs Gurcharan Singh

S.S. Sandhawalia, C.J.—Whether higher educational qualifications are a valid basis of classification for the purpose of the grant of a higher pay scale within the same service--is the significant common question which aries in these five connected cases before the Full Bench.

The bare matrix of facts necessary for the consideration of pristinely legal issue may be picked from R.S.A. No. 1712 of 1973 (State of Punjab v. Gurcharan Singh ) Gurcharan Singh was an employee of the erstwhile State of Pepsu as a Library Restorer in the Central State Library, Patiala, in the grade of Rs. 42-1/2--2--62. On the subsequent merger of Pep-u with Punjab, he became an employee of the Punjab Government in the same scale. Later, on the formation of the new States of Punjab and Haryana with effect from November 1, 1966, he was allocated to the State of Punjab in the Grade of Rs. 45 -2--75 However, the Punjab Government revised the grade of Library Restorers from Rs. 45--2--75 to Rs. 100--4 -- 140�5--180, but imposed a specific condition that an employee who was Matriculate with a certificate of Library Science would alone be entitled to the revised grade. Since Gurcharan Singh respondent was only a Matriculate, he was denied the revised grade and, therefore, filed a suit to claim a declaration that he was entitled thereto because the classification made by the State Government in the revised grade was arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the same primarily on the basis of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in State of Punjab and another v. Lekh Raj Bowry 1967 S.L.R. 816. The State of Punjab then preferred the Second Appeal which originally came up before my learned brother G.C. Mital J Nothing a conflict of precedent within this Court and also that the observations in Lekh Raj Bowry''s case (supra), may no longer be tenable in view of the subsequent decisions of the final Court, he proposed the consideration of the case by a larger Bench vide his lucid reference order In the connected set of four Civil Writ Petition it was argued before the Division Bench in C.W. P. No. 493 of 1982--Om Parkash v. State of Haryana that the view expressed in State of Haryana v. Jagdish Singh 1983 S.L.R. 60, was in conflict, with the earlier one in Lekh Raj Bowry''s case (supra) and, therefore, the matter was admitted for hearing by a Full Bench.

Perhaps at the very threshold, we may pointedly notice that the issue herein appears to us as so squarely covered by a catena of binding precedent and an equally massive weight of persuasive judgments that it would be a sheer exercise in futility to examine the matter on first principles However, there is no gainsaying the fact that there did appear earlier a few discordant notes within this jurisdiction as also in other High Courts till the matter was settled beyond cavil by the final Court itself.

In view of the above, it seems futile for our purposes to delve beyond the locus classicus on the point which directly governs the issue in State of Mysore v. P. Narasinga Rao AIR 1969 S.C. 349. Therein the pointed question that arose before their Lordships and stands so formulated in terms was (in para 3 of the report) "whether the creation of two pay scales of tracers in the new Mysore State who were doing the same kind of work amounted to a discrimination and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution". After a consideration on principle as also on reference to existing precedents, the answer to the said question was rendered as follows whilst reversing the contrary view of the High Court of Mysore:--

In our opinion, therefore, higher educational qualifications such as success in the S.S.L.C. examination are relevant considerations for fixing a higher pay scale for tracers who have passed the S.S.L.C. examination and the classification of two grades of tracers in the new Mysore State, one for matriculate tracers with a higher pay scale and the other for non matriculate tracers with a lower pay scale is not violative of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution.

It would be plain from the above that the classification on the basis of educational qualifications (betwixt Matriculate and non-Matriculate tracers) as also the fixing of a higher pay scale within the same service was specifically upheld. This ratiosale was reiterated in The The Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Dr. (Mrs.) S.B. Kohli and Another, , wherein it was observed that for the purposes of promotion to the post of a Professor, the classification based on the higher educational qualification of a post graduate degree in Orthopaedics could in no sense be termed as discriminatory

In The The State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa and Others, the issue posed in terms was if persons drawn from different sources are integrated into one class, can they be classified for the purposes of promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications. Reversing the High Court view to the contrary, the answer to this question was rendered as follows:--

We are, therefore, of the opinion that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineer, they could for pusposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications The rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld.

The aforesaid string of three cases was then considered at length by Bhagwati J, speaking for the Court in Mohammad Shujat Ali and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Far from there being any hint of dissent, the Court affirmed, approved and accepted the statement of the law in the above said cases. In view of the somewhat vehement reliance by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners, we may observe that Shujat Ali''s case is in no way discordant with the earlier view but only elaborates and qualifies the same to the effect that once the members of the same service are held eligible for promotion to higher rank then it is not permissible for the State to fix any arbitrary quotas for promotion inter se on the supposed basis of educational qualifications.

It is manifest that the catena of aforesaid four judgments of the final Court would be conclusive on the point. However, there is an equally massive weight of precedent in almost all the other High Courts either following the said view or arriving at the same conclusion independently. It is unnecessary to advert to these cases individually and it sufficies to say that in B. Simhadri Raju and others v. V. Markandeya and others 1975 lic. 513 (reversing the view of the learned Single Judge in P. Satyanarayana Raju and Others Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, Prabhakar Ganpatrao Pokale v. The State of Maharashtra 1979 Lab. I.C. 490. The State of Karnataka by its Secretary D.H.P.C. v. M. Shivanna 1978 (2) S.L.R. 38, B.C.K. Murthy and others v. The State of Mysore A.I.R.1972 Mys 88, Ghanshyam Lal Soni v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1971 Lab & IC 1043. Dr. Rai Nandan Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar 1975 (1) S.L.R. 258, it has been held in a wide variety of services that higher educational qualifications may be a sound foundation for a higher scale of pay in the same service. Within this jurisdiction, a Division Bench of this Court in Shri Ishar Singh and others v. The State of Punjab 1977 S.L.R. 60 has in terms held that differentiation in scales of pay on the basis of educational qualifications in the same service is neither discriminatory nor violative of Articles 14 and 16. To the same effect is the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench in The State of Haryana and another v. Jagdish Singh and others (1983) 1 S.L.R. 60.

Faced with the aforesaid stone-wall of precedent, Mr. Pardeep Kumar Gupta, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners had attempted to tenuously distinguish some of the Supreme Court cases on the ground that these pertained to a classification in the realm of promotion and not for higher scales of pay in the same service This submission has only to be noticed and rejected What deserves reiteration is the fact that P. Narshinga Rao''s case was specifically one of the grant of a higher scale of pay to Matriculate tracers against non-Matriculate ones in the same service. No question of any promotional classification arose in the said case. Even otherwise, the distinction sought to be drawn betwixt a classification for purposes of promotion and that for higher pay scales is one without any legal difference The core of the issue it whether the classification on the basis of educational qualifications in the same service is sustainable on the anvil of the equality clause or not? Once it is held that it is so, it matters not whether it is made for purposes of a higher pay scale or for purposes of promotional avenues. Indeed it was argued with considerable plausibility by the other side that promotion to higher rank is more significant and vital to an employee than a mere marginal difference of pay scale. Consequently if educational qualifications can provide a valid foundation for classification for purposes of promotion, it must equally be so for the purposes of the grant of a higher scale of pay.

One must now inevitably turn to Lekh Rai Bowry''s case (supra), which has necessitated the consideration of these cases by this Full Bench. Therein inter alia, it was observed as follows:--

x x. Once this had happened, some members of the unified cadre could not be treated dissimilarly as against others of same cadre in the matter of their pay and other relevant condit, of service on the ground that some of them possessed higher better qualifications. It is settled law that the equality of opportunity guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 16 of the Constituted does not end with the stage of initial appointment, but (sic) inevitably govern all matters relating to employment including questions of emoluments, chances of promotion etc.

The aforesaid observations undoubtedly support the stand taken on behalf of the writ petitioners However, much water has flown under the bridges since these observations were made The ratio in the binding precedent of the final Court in P. Narsinga Rao''s case is directly contrary thereto and as noticed earlier the later string of Supreme Court judgments is in head long conflict with the afore-quoted observations. The view in Lekh Raj Bowry''s case (supra) is contrary to the main stream of precedent on the point and must be held as no longer good law and is hereby overruled For identical reasons, similar observations in paras 32 and 33 of the report in Mrs. J.K. Pritam Singh and others v. The State of Punjab 1967. S.L.R. 251 (which had been relied upon in Lekh Raj Bowry''s case) have also to be overruled.

To finally conclude the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative and it is held that higher educational qualifications are a valid basis of classification for the purposes of grant of a higher pay scale within the same service.

The crucial legal question having been answered as above, the cases will go back to the respective Benches for a decision on merits.

J.M. Tandon, J.

I agree.

Gokal Chand Mital, J.

I also agree.