State of Punjab vs Harnek Singh

Sethi, J.—In all these appeals, the FIRs and subsequentproceedings pending against the respondents under theprovisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988(hereinafter referred to as "the 1988 Act") were quashed bythe High Court in exercise of the powers vesting in it underSection 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused-respondents had been apprehended while accepting the bribeby laying the trap under the 1988 Act. The High Court foundthat as the investigations had not been conducted by theauthorised officers under the 1988 Act, the same werevitiated and deserved to be quashed.

The questions of law to be adjudicated upon in theseappeals are:

(1) Whether the notifications issued by the StateGovernment in exercise of the powers conferredupon it u/s 5A(1) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1947 (since repealed) empoweringand authorising Inspector of Police to investigatethe cases registered under the said Act are notsaved under the saving provisions of the re-enacted Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

(2) Whether the aforesaid notifications not beinginconsistent with the provisions of the re-enactedAct continue to be in force and be deemed to havebeen issued under the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988 till aforesaid notification aresuperseded or specifically withdrawn."

Most of the facts in these appeals are not disputed.It is agreed that during the subsistence of the Preventionof Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the1947 Act"), the Government of Punjab issued a notificationon 9.7.1968 authorising Inspectors of Police, for the timebeing serving in the State Vigilance Department or who maybe posted in future to serve with the said agency toinvestigate the offences under the 1947 Act with the Stateof Punjab so long as they remain posted in the said agency.In supersession of the notifications dated 9th July, 1968,the Government of Punjab issued another notification on12.8.1968 u/s 5A(1) of the 1947 Act authorisingsuch inspectors of police to investigate the offences underthe Act even beyond the State of Punjab and the restrictionsof investigation within the State of Punjab were removed.The 1947 Act was repealed on 9.9.1988 by re-enacting the1988 Act being Act No. 49 of 1988. FIRs against therespondents were, concededly, registered after the cominginto force the 1988 Act and the investigation conducted bythe Inspectors of Police who had been authorised toinvestigate the offences by notifications issued under therepealed Act off 1947. The accused-respondents filedpetitions u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C. (hereinafterreferred to as "the Code") for quashing the FIRs registeredand the proceedings pending against them on the ground thatthe inspectors who had investigated the cases were not theauthorised officers in terms of Section 17 of 1988 Act.

In reply to the notices issued by the High Court, theState filed counter affidavit submitting therein that theinvestigating officers were authorised to investigate thecase as provided by first proviso to Sub-section (1) ofSection 5A of the 1947 Act. It was contended that in viewof the provisions of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act read withSections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act, thenotifications issued by the State of Punjab under 1947Act were still in force which empowered the Inspectors ofthe Police of the Vigilance Department to investigate thecases under the 1947 Act.

The learned Judge, who disposed of the petitions forquashing the FIRs and the subsequent proceedings vide thejudgment impugned in these appeals, first dealt with theproblem of prevalent corruption in society and described itas cancer eating the bone marrow of the society. He,however, found that the repeal of an Act amounting to itsrevocation, annulment and abrogation, the effect of whichwas that the repealed Act or Ordinance did not exist on thestatute book. The only exception being the savingprovisions in the repeal statute. Referring to Section 30of the 1988 Act the learned Judge held:

"It is manifestly clear that the legislature hadthe intention to bodily lift the provisions ofSection 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, andincorporate the same in the Amending Act of 1988and (no other provision) of the General ClausesAct. If the legislature had intended to apply anyother provision or whole of the General ClausesAct, 1897, it would have so said clearly insteadof saying that Section 6 only would apply or wouldhave said nothing in that regard and in thateventuality, whole of the Act of 1897 would haveits application. It is trite law that even when asaving clause reserving the rights and liabilitiesunder the repealed law is absent in a newenactment, the same will neither be material nordecisive on the question of different intentionbecause in such cases Section 6 of the GeneralClauses Act will be attracted and rights andliabilities acquired, accrued under the repealedlaw will remain saved unless there is something toinfer that legislature intended to destroy therights and liabilities already accrued. It,therefore, appears clear that the legislatureintended to apply Section 6 only and not the wholeof the Act."

Regarding the continuity of the notifications after the 1988Act, the learned Judge observed:

"These notifications were issued under Sub-section(1) of Section 5-A of the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1947, and Inspector of Police serving in theSpecial Inquiry Agency in the Vigilance Departmentof the Punjab Government or who were to be postedin future to serve in the said agency wereauthorised to arrest and investigate the case forthe commission of the offence under the Act of1947. The notifications enure in respect of anyinvestigation legal proceedings or remedy that maybe instituted, continued or any such penalty,forfeiture or punishment that may be imposed underthe Act of 1947, as if the repealing Act orRegulations had not been passed. Thesenotifications referred to above, were notexpressly saved by saving provision contained inSection 30(2) of the Act of 1988. Thesenotifications, therefore, would not enure orsurvive to govern any investigation done or legalproceedings instituted in respect of casesregistered under the repealing Act, 1988, after itcame into force w.e.f. 9th September, 1988."

After holding that the investigation had not been conductedby the officers as authorised u/s 17(1) of the1988 Act, the proceedings against the respondents werequashed vide the judgment impugned.

Mr. Inderbir Singh Alag, Advocate appearing for theappellant, contended that the impugned judgment is notsustainable in view of the mandate of Section 30 of the 1988Act and Section 6 read with Section 24 of the GeneralClauses Act. It is argued that as notifications issuedunder Section 5A of the 1947 Act had survived the repeal ofthe State Act, there was no necessity of issuing any newnotification. There being no inconsistency between Section5A of the 1947 Act and Section 17 of the 1988 Act, theearlier notifications are deemed to be in existence andInspector of Police authorised to investigate the offencesunder the 1988 Act.

Appearing for some of the respondents Mr. Ranjit Kumar,Senior Advocate contended that in view of the change in thenature and scope of Prevention of Corruption Act as to itsambit and applicability, the penal statute requires to bestrictly construed. As the repealing and saving Section 30of the 1988 Act refers only to Section 6 of the GeneralClauses Act, the other provisions of the General Clauses Actcannot be relied upon for the purposes of ascertaining thelife of the notifications issued under the 1947 Act. It issubmitted that what is saved by the repealed Act, are onlythe proceedings already having arisen under the repealed Actand nothing more than that. According to him Section 24 ofthe General Clauses Act cannot be pressed into serve forthe purpose of deciding the effect of the repeal in thecontext of notifications issued under 1947 Act.

Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned counsel appearing for some ofthe respondents contended that the provisions made in twoenactments being inconsistent, as is evident from the schemeof the Acts, Sub-section (2) of Section 30 would not savethe notifications issued under the 1947 Act. He contendedthat the Legislature intended not to apply an otherprovisions of the General Clauses Act, as is evident from thementioning of the application of Section 6 of the said Actonly in Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act.

Learned counsel appearing for the other respondentsmade similar submissions to support the impugned judgment inthese appeals.

Realising that provisions made int he Indian Penal Codewere not adequate to meet the exigencies of the time, animperative need was felt to make a law to eradicate the evilof bribery and corruption for which the 1947 Act wasenacted. The said Act was amended twice by Criminal LawAmendment Act of 1952 and later in 1964. Ultimately thesaid Act was repealed by the 1988 Act being Act No. 49 of1988. The new Act has made the anti corruption law moreeffective by widening its coverage and by strengthening itsprovisions.

Chapter IV deals with the investigation into casesunder the Act and Section 17 provides:

"17. Persons authorised to investigate. -Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no policeofficer below the ran,--

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special PoliceEstablishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay,Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in anyother metropolitan area notified as suchunder Sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),of an Assistant Commissioner of Police;

(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent ofPolice or a police officer of equivalentrank.

shall investigate any offence punishable underthis Act without the order of a MetropolitanMagistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, asthe case may be, or make any arrest thereforwithout a warrant:

Provided that if a police officer not below therank of an Inspector of Police is authorised bythe State Government in this behalf by general orspecial order, he may also investigate any suchoffence without the order of a MetropolitanMagistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, asthe case may be, or make arrest therefore without awarrant:

Provided further than an offence referred to inClause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shallnot be investigated without the order of a policeofficer not below the rank of a Superintendent ofPolice."

Section 30 of the Act provides:

"30 Repeal and saving.--(1) The Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947) and the CriminalLaw Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952) are herebyrepealed.

(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but withoutprejudice to the application of Section 6 of theGeneral Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), anythingdone or any act in taken or purported to have beendone or taken under or in pursuance of the Acts sorepealed shall, in so far as it is notinconsistent with the provisions of this Act, bedeemed to have been done or taken under or inpursuance of the corresponding provision of thisAct."

It is relevant, at this stage, to take note of theprovisions of Section 5A of the 1947 Act which provided:

"5A. Investigation into cases under this Act - (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code ofCriminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898), no policeofficer below the rank, --

(a) in the case of the Delhi Special PoliceEstablishment, of an Inspector of Police;

(b) in the presidency-towns of Calcutta andMadras, of an Assistant Commissioner ofPolice;

(c) in the presidency-town of Bombay, of aSuperintendent of Police; and

(d) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent ofPolice,

shall investigate any officer punishable underSection 161, Section 165 or Section 165A of theIndian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or u/s 5of this Act without the order of a PresidencyMagistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, asthe case may be, or make any arrest thereforwithout a warrant:

Provided that if a police officer not below therank of an Inspector of Police is authorised bythe State Government in this behalf by general orspecial order, he may also investigate any suchoffence without the order of a PresidencyMagistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, asthe case may be, or make arrest therefore without awarrant:

Provided further that an offence referred to inClause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 shallnot be investigated without the order of a policeofficer not below the rank of a Superintendent ofPolice.

(2) If, from information received or otherwise, apolice officer has reason to suspect thecommission of an offence which he is empowered toinvestigate under Sub-section (1) and considersthat for the purpose of investigation or inquiryinto such offence, it is necessary to inspect anybankers' books, then, notwithstanding anythingcontained in any law for the time being in force,he may inspect any bankers' books in so far asthey relate to the accounts of the personsuspected to have committed that offence or of anyother person suspected to be holding money onbehalf of such person, and take or cause to betaken certified copies of the relevant entriestherefrom, and the bank concerned shall be boundto assist the police officer in the exercise ofhis powers under this sub-section:

Provided that no power under this sub-section inrelation to the account of any person shall beexercised by a police officer below the rank of aSuperintendent of Police, unless he is speciallyauthorised in this behalf by a police officer ofor above the rank of a Superintendent of Police.

Explanation.-- In this sub-section, theexpressions "bank" and "bankers' books" shall havethe meaning assigned to the in the Bankers' BooksEvidence Act, 1891 (18 of 1891)."

For deciding the controversy it is also necessary totake note of the provisions of Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act which provide as under:

"6. Effect of repeal. - Where this Act, or anyCentral Act or Regulation made after thecommencement of this act, repeals any enactmenthitherto made or hereafter to be made, then,unless a different intention appears, the repealshall not-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing atthe time at which the repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of anyenactment so repealed or anything duly doneor suffered thereunder: or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation orliability acquired, accrued or incurred underany enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishmentincurred in respect of any offence committedagainst any enactment so repealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceedings orremedy in respect of any such right,privilege, obligation, penalty, forfeiture orpunishment as aforesaid,

and any such, investigation, legal proceeding orremedy amy be instituted, continued or enforced,and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment maybe imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulationhad not been passed."

Continuation of orders, etc., issued underenactments repeated and re-enacted - Where anyCentral Act or Regulation is, after thecommencement of this Act, repealed and re-enactedwith or without modification, then unless it isotherwise expressly provided, any appointment,notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-lwmade or issued under the repealed Act orRegulation, shall so far as it is not inconsistentwith the provisions re-enacted, continue in force,and be deemed to have been made or issued underthe provisions so re-enacted, unless and until itis superseded by any appointment, notification,order, scheme, rule form or bye-law made or issuedunder the provisions so re-enacted and when anyCentral Act or Regulation, which, by anotification u/s 5 or 5A of theScheduled District Act, 1874 (XIV of 1974), or anylike law, has been extended to any local area,has, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawnfrom the re-extended to such area or any partthereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulationshall be deemed to have been repealed and re-enacted in such area of part within the meaning ofthis section."

The General Clauses Act has been enacted to avoidsuperfluity and repetition of language in variousenactments. The object of this Act is to shorten thelanguage of Central Acts, to provide as far as possible, foruniformity of expression in Central Acts, by givingdefinition of series of terms in common use, the stateexplicitly certain convenient rules for the construction andinterpretation of Central Acts, and to guard against slipsand oversights by importing into every Act certain commonform clauses, which otherwise ought to be inserted expresslyin every Central Act. In other words the General ClausesAct is a part of every Central Act and has to be read insuch Act unless specifically excluded. Even in cases wherethe provisions of the Act do not apply courts in thecountry have applied its principles keeping in mind theinconvenience that is likely to arise otherwise,particularly when the provision made in the Act are basedupon the principles of equity, justice and good conscience.

The words "anything duly done or suffered thereunder"used in Sub-clause (b) of Section 6 are often used by theLegislature in saving clauses which is intended to providethat unless a different intention appears, the repeal of anAct would not affect anything duly done or sufferedthereunder. This Court in Hasan Nurani Malak Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nagpur and Others, hasheld that the object of such a saving clause is to save whathas been previously done under the statute repealed. Theresult of such a saving clause is that the pre-existing lawcontinues to govern the things done before a particular datefrom which the repeal of such a pre-existing law takeseffect. In Universal Imports Agency and Another Vs. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Others, thisCourt while construing the words "things done" held that aproper interpretation of the expression "things done" wascomprehensive enough to take in not only the things done butalso the effect of the legal consequence flowing therefrom.

Section 24 of the General Clauses Act deals with theeffect of repeal and re-enactment of an Act and the objectof the section is to preserve the continuity of thenotifications, order schemes, rules or bye-laws made orissued under the repealed Act unless they are shown to beinconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted statute.

In Neel alias Niranjan Majumdar Vs. The State of West Bengal, , the petitioner therein had challengedthe order of his detention under Sub-section (1) read withSub-section (3) of Section 3 of the West Bengal (Preventionof Violent Activities) Act, 1970. Sub-section (1) read withSub-section (3) of Section 3 authorised District Magistrateto direct detention of any person in respect of whom he wassatisfied that such detention should be ordered with a viewto prevent him from acting prejudicially to the security ofthe State or the maintenance of public order. Sub-section(2) of Section 3 contained a special definition of theexpression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the securityof the State or the maintenance of public order" to mean theacts enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) thereof. Clause (d)provided:

"(d) committing, or instigating any person tocommit, any offence punishable with death orimprisonment for life or imprisonment for a termextending to seven years or more or any offenceunder the Arms Act, 1959 or the ExplosiveSubstances Act, 1908, where the commission of suchoffence disturbs, or is likely to disturb, publicorder."

In the grounds of detention it was mentioned that thedetenue indulged in activities including causing injurieswith a sword. u/s 2(1)(c) of the Arms Act, theword "arms" was defined to mean articles of any descriptiondesigned or adapted as weapons for offence or defence whichincluded firearms, sharp-edged and other deadly weapons.Section 4 of the Arms Act empowered the Central Government,if it was of opinion that having regard to the circumstancesprevailing in any area it was necessary or expedient in thepublic interest that acquisition, possession or carrying ofarms, other than firearms, should also be regulated, it mayby notification direct that the Section shall apply to thearea specified in such a notification and thereupon noperson shall acquire, have in his possession or carry inthat area arms of such class or description as may bespecified in that notification, except under a licenceissued under the provisions of the Act or the rules madethereunder. It was found that no notification, ascontemplated by Section 4 of 1959 Act had been issued. Butin 1923 such a notification was issued u/s 15 ofthe earlier Indian Arms Act of 1878 which in terms wassimilar to Section 4 of the 1959 Act. The question posedbefore the court was whether Act No. XI of 1878 having beenrepealed, the said notification issued u/s 15thereof can still be said to be operative. Dealing withsuch a situation this Court held:

"Section 6(b) of the General Clauses Act, however,provides that where any Central Act or regulationmade after the commencement of the Act repeals anyearlier enactment, then, unless a differentintention appears, such repeal shall not "affectthe previous operation of any enactment sorepealed or any thing duly done or sufferedthereunder". Section 24 next provides that whereany Central Act is repealed and re-enacted with orwithout modification, then, unless it is otherwiseexpressly provided, any notification issued undersuch repealed Act shall, so far as it isinconsistent with the provisions re-enacted,continue in force and be deemed to have been madeunder the provisions so re-enacted unless it issuperseded by any notification or order issuedunder the provisions so re-enacted. The new Actnowhere contains an intention to the contrarysignifying that the operation of the repealed Actor of a notification issued thereunder was not tocontinue. Further, the new Act re-enacts theprovisions of the earlier At, and Section 4 inparticular, as already stated, has provisionspractically identical to those of Section 15 ofthe earlier Act. The combined effect of Sections 6 and 24 of the General Clauses Act is that thesaid notification of 1923 issued u/s 15of the Act of 1878 not only continued to operatebut has to be deemed to have been enacted underthe new Act."

In Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Subodh Kumar Dutta and another, the cognizance of theoffence had been taken by Special Court constituted underthe West Bengal Special Courts Act. After cognizance hadbeen taken, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 came tobe repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 w.e.f.9.9.1988. The accused filed a Criminal Revision Petition inthe High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings in thecase pending against him before the Special Court in whichthe principal ground raised was the violation of fundamentalright of the accused to speedy trial. During the argumentsthe accused was permitted to raise a plea that the SpecialCourt, trying the bribery case, had no jurisdiction to takecognizance of the offence under the Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1947 as that court had not been constituted pursuant toSection 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 whichhad repealed the 1947 Act. Taking note of Section 26 of the1988 Act, the Single Judge of the High Court opined that thecognizance taken by the Special Court on 9.7.1988 under the1947 Act was not saved and thus quashed the proceedings.Interpreting Sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the 1988 Act,this Court held that a bare look at the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 30 shows that anything done or anyaction taken or purported to have been taken under or inpursuance of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 shall bedeemed to have been taken under or in pursuance of thecorresponding provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988. In view of this specific provision, the cognizance ofthe offence taken by the Special Court stood saved.

In Nar Bahadur Bhandari etc. Vs. State of Sikkim and Others, it was held that Sub-section (2) ofSection 30 of the 1988 Act, on the one hand ensures that theapplication of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is notprejudiced, on the other it expressed a different intentionas contemplated by the said section. The last part of sub-section introduced legal fiction whereby anything done oraction taken under or in pursuance of 1947 Act shall bedeemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance ofthe corresponding provision of the 1988 Act. The fiction isto the effect that the 1988 Act had come into force whensuch thing was done or action was taken.

In Madhavan Nair Vs. Ramankutty and Another, this Court held that atcommon law the normal act of repealing the statute ordeleting the provision is to obliterate it from the statutebook as completely as if it had never been passed, and thestatute must be considered as a law that never existed. Tothis rule an exception is engrafted by the provisions ofSection 6(1). If a provision of a statute isunconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour ofpending proceedings, all actions must stop where theomission finds them, and if final relief has not beengranted before the omission goes into, it cannot be grantedafterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 inspecial Act may modify the position.

There is no dispute that when an Act is repealed butre-enacted, it is almost inevitable that there will be sometime lag between the re-enacted statute coming into forceand regulations being framed under the re-enacted statute.In The Chief Inspector of Mines and Another Vs. Lala Karam Chand Thapar etc., this Court observed that:

"However, efficient the rule making authority may be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the re-enacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable. It is conceivable that any legislature, in providing that regulations made under its statute will have effect as if enacted in the Act, could have intended by those words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and re-enacted, (as is more than likely to happen sooner or later). The regulations will have no existencefor the purpose of the re-enacted statute, and thus the re-enacted statute, for some time atleast, will be in many respects, a dead letter.The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the purpose be which induced the draftsmen to adopt this legislative form as regards the rules and regulations that they will have effect "as if enacted in the Act", it will be strange indeed if the result of the language used, be that by becoming part of the Act, they would stand repealed, when the Act is repealed. One can be certain that that could not have been the intention of the legislature. It is satisfactory that the words used do not produce that result."

We do not find any force in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that as reference made in Sub-section(2) of Section 30 of 1988 Actis only to Section 6 of General Clauses Act, the otherprovisions of the said Act are not applicable for the purposes of deciding the controversy with respect to the notifications issued under the 1947 Act. We are further of the opinion that the High Court committed a mistake of lawby holding that as notifications have not expressly been saved by Section 30 of the Act, those would not enure or survive to govern any investigation done or legal proceeding instituted in respect of the cases registered under the 1988Act. There is no dispute that 1988 Act is both repealing and re-enacting the law relating to prevention of corruptionto which the provision of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act are specifically applicable. It appears that as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to repealed enactments, the Legislature in its Wisdom thought it proper to make the same specifically applicable in 1988 Act also which is a repealed and re-enacted statute. Reference to Section 6 of General Clauses Act in Sub-section(1) of Section 30 has been made to avoid any confusion or misunderstandingregarding the effect of repeal with regard to actions taken under the repealed Act. If the Legislature had intended not to apply the provisions of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act to the 1988 Act, it would have specifically so provided under the enacted law. In the light of the fact that Section 24 of the General Clauses Act is specifically applicable to repealing and re-enacting statute, its exclusion has to be specific and cannot be inferred by twisting the language of the enactments. Accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents would render the provisions of 1988 Act redundant inasmuch as appointments, notifications, orders, schemes, rules, by-laws, made or issued under the repealed Act would be deemedto be non-existent making impossible to working of the re-enacted law impossible. The provisions of the 1988 Act are required to be understood and interpreted in the light of the provisions of the General Clauses Act including Sections 6 and 24 thereof.

There is no substance in the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the provisionmade in two enactments were inconsistent and Sub-section(2)of Section 30 would not save the notification issued underthe 1947 Act. The consistency, referred to in Sub-section(2) of Section 30 is with respect to acts done in pursuanceof the Repealed Act and thus restricted it to such provisionof the Acts which come for interpretation of the court and not the whole of the scheme of the enactment. It has beenconceded before us that there is no inconsistency between Section 5A of the 1947 Act and Section 17 of the 1988 Actand provisions of General Clauses Act would be applicableand with the aid of Sub-section (2) of Section 30 anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken in pursuance of 1947 Act be deemed to have been doneor taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of 1988 Act. For that purpose, the 1988 Act, by fiction, shall be deemed to have been in force at the timewhen the aforesaid notifications were issued under the then prevalent corresponding law. Otherwise also there does not appear any inconsistency between the two enactments except that the scope and field covered by 1988 Act has been widened and enlarged. Both the enactments deal with the same subject matter, i.e. corruption amongst the publicservants and make provision to deal with such a menace.

To justify the impugned judgment and to impress upon us the inconsistency in the two provisions, the learned counselappearing for the respondents referred to some communications included in the paperbook from pages 109 to 120. It is submitted that the aforesaid correspondence in the form of Annexure P-2 to P-5 showed that the Government had applied its mind under the re-enacted law and took a conscious decision that Inspectors of Police were not competent to investigate the offences punishable under thenew Act and that only officers above the brand of Dy.Superintendent of Police should investigate the cases under the Act. Reference to the aforesaid letters is bases upon misconception. In none of the letters the Government is shown to have taken any decision as argued. The aforesaid documents are the letters exchanged between differentofficials of the Police Department of the State of Punjabwhich are not referable to any specific decision of the State Government. In the Memo of Appeal and the Rejoinder Affidavit filed on behalf of the State it is specifically submitted that the proceedings of the high level meetingpresided over by the Chief Secretary, referred to by the respondents as decision of the Government, "is internalcommunication between different wings of the Government andcannot be made basis to conclude that State Government had neither any intention to keep alive the notifications underthe Old Act of 1947 nor have any intention to empower the Inspector of Police in the Vigilance Department to investigate the afresh cases. It is also relevant that as per the Old Act, since there were notifications which were valid under the New Act by virtue of Section 6 and 24 of General Clauses Act unless these were formally rescinded,the same hold good and the notings on the file to any effectcannot be made basis for striking down those notifications".

It is, therefore, evident that the notifications issued by the Government of Punjab, in exercise of the powersconferred u/s 5A of the 1947 Act, empowering and authorising the Inspectors of Police posted in Special Inquiry Agency of the Vigilance Department, Govt. of Punjabto investigate the cases registered under the said Act were saved under the saving provision of the re-enacted 1988 Act.Such notifications are not inconsistent with the provisions of re-enacted Act and are deemed to continue in force as having been issued under the re-enacted 1988 Act till the aforesaid notifications are specifically superseded or withdrawn or modified under the 1988 Act. The investigationconducted by the Inspectors of Police authorised in thatbehalf under the 1947 Act are held to be proper, legal and valid investigation under the re-enacted Act and do not suffer from any vice of illegality or jurisdiction. The High Court committed a mistake of law in holding the aforesaid notifications as not saved under the re-enacted 1988 Act. The quashing of the proceedings on the basis of the First Information Report registered against the respondent-accused was illegal and contrary to the settledposition of law. The judgment of the High Court, impugnedin these appeals, is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

Under the circumstances, the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgments are set aside. The Trial Courts are directed to proceed with the matter in accordance with law and after framing the charges decide cases on their merits.In view of the facts that the proceedings have beenunnecessarily delayed and protracted by the respondents for a sufficiently long period, the trial courts are impressedupon to give priority to the aforesaid cases and conclude the trial at the earliest.