State of Punjab vs L.D.Grover

K.S. Tiwana, J.

On a difference of opinion between C.S. Tiwana, J. and S.S. Dewan, J., this case has been referred to me. The facts of the case need not be recounted as those are given in the judgment recorded by S.S. Dewan, J.

The charge of conspiracy against the respondents now does not survive as the State has not filed an appeal against their coaccused, who were jointly charged with them for that offence. The charges against L.D. Grover respondent under Section 420, 465, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and against Krishan Grover under Section 420/109 of the Indian Penal Code. The State now in this case asks for the conviction of these respondents for these charges. The trial Court in para No. 34 of its judgment observed :

"Therefore, the entire abovestated evidence produced by the prosecution must be accepted as correct and it has to be held that the prosecution has successfully established on the record that 22 coal wagons were booked from Kusunda and Pathredin Railway Station for different persons and for different places but the same were obtained by L.D. Grover accused on the basis of the R/Rs which were found to be forged and on the basis of the indemnity bonds."

Basing his arguments on these findings of the learned trial Judge has been argued by Shri D.S. Brar, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab, that as L.D. Grover respondent did not place any order for coal; had not paid the full price of the coal and the R/Rs were forged, the judgment of the trial Court should be reversed.

The prosecution has beyond doubt succeeded in proving that the R/Rs, which were tendered by L.D. Grover respondent at Jullunder Railway Station to take delivery of 22 wagons of coal, were forged, but mere possession of the forged R/Rs with L.D. Grover will not be sufficient to convict him of the offence charged. Before the prosecution asks for the conviction of the person charged with an offence of this nature. It has to show from unimpeachable evidence that it was to his knowledge that the documents were forged. It is only after this that the question of mens rea, which is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence, comes into a play against the accused. There can be direct evidence for forgery of a document, which is not forth coming in this case. There may not be such evidence in support of the fact that the accused had knowledge of the document being forged. The courts have to draw inferences in such cases. The inferences have to be legitimate, reasonable and must flow from evidence on record. Imagination has no part to play in the formulation of such inferences as they are to have a basis in evidence. In the case in hand, I have gone through the evidence and find that the evidence does not furnish any such sound basis from which it may be inferred to register the conviction of L.D. Grover, that he had knowledge that the R/Rs were forged. Mr. Brar argued that L.D. Grover never placed any order for the supply of coal on the firms, which supplied 22 wagons of coal and that he, per his own showing sent only Rs. 30.000/, as its price, which the price of the coal was much more. According to Shri Brar in the chargesheet against L.D. Grover the price of coal was mentioned as Rs. 60,000/.

It is a common business practice, and people who are in business knew, that it is not essential that only a person placing the order for goods can have the delivery against the R.R. The persons placing an order for a commodity can sell R.R. to another person and these many a times change many hands before the actual delivery of the goods taken against them. In this manner the fact that L.D. Grover did not place any order for the supply of coal does not show any criminal conduct on his part. He has admitted to have taken delivery of the coal wagons against R.Rs, which, at the trial, were proved forged, being a bona fide purchaser for value.

The other limb of the argument that L.D. Grover did not make full payment of the price of the coal too has very meagre support in its favour. There is no evidence on the record as to what actual price of this coal was No effort was made to prove that the price of the coal was Rs. 60,000/ as mentioned in the charge. It was sold by L.D. Grover to P.Ws. 81 to 87 against bills. Even that price does not reach the close vicinity of Rs. 60.000/. The case set up by L.D. Grover is that he paid Rs. 30.000/ to the suppliers. It is not permissible to enter into realm of conjectures to imagine the blackmarket price of the coal, when it is nobody''s case and no positive evidence has been led as to what type of the coal, it was, its market value or if it was of such a type which was not easily available in the market. The positive case of the prosecution is that the coal was sold to P.W. 81 to P.Ws. 87 against bills. No question thus arises for price the blackmarket.

Shri D.S. Brar, Assistant Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the State, failed to make out any case on the basis of these documents to reverse the wellreasoned judgment of the learned trial Judge.

An argument was put forward by the learned State counsel that Krishan Grover, who abetted the offence, was using the code words in his correspondence with L.D. Grover and he gives an indication that they were hand and gave with each other in cheating the Railways. They had business relationship as the money was being paid by L.D. Grover through Krishan Grover. That relationship ipso factor does not justify an inference of their criminal intention to commit the offence. I have gone through the correspondence referred by Shri Brar, but do not find it anything, which justifies any such adverse inference as suggested by the learned State counsel, is made out. There is no material on the record of infer if the names of persons mentioned in the correspondence between them were fictitious. No effort was made by the prosecution to find out whether those persons existed in reality or were only imaginary. Vague references in correspondence do not lead to the meanings the prosecution wants to derive, unless there are legitimate suggestions justifying appropriate inferences. The term `Pure bricks'' may be innocuous or may have meaning. If it is to be taken as a code word to mean something different, then the prosecution has to make an effort to break the code and place material before the court to suggest that the writer wanted it to be understood by the addressee in a particular way. I find no such basis made out from the record. If, this term is taken as a code word, even then it is not known what are its meanings. I cannot speculate in favour of the prosecution unless it is connected with any particular feature of the prosecution case.

It is to be kept in mind that this is an appeal against acquittal, in which a verdict of an acquittal cannot be a set aside merely on the ground that the Bench may have a different view then the one taken by the learned trial Judge. There have to be compelling reasons to set aside the judgment of acquittal. On merits, I do not find if the conclusions deduced by the learned trial Judge were such which could not be derived from evidence. If, two Court cannot be departed from. In this case, as I look at the evidence, the view taken by the learned trial Judge reasonably flows from the evidence on record. There is nothing on the record which can lead me to infer that L.D. Grover had the knowledge that R.Rs. were forged and he deliberately used those for driving a pecuniary benefit for him and put anybody else to loss. Similarly, the case against Krishan Grover for abetment is not even remotely made out.

After giving my due thought to the evidence in the case and the arguments addressed on behalf of the State, I do not think that the reasons which are necessary to set aside a judgment of acquittal are made out. Concurring with the view of S.S. Dewan, J. I dismiss the appeal.