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Judgment
Mr. Justice Gopal Krishan VyasÂ
All above appeals are filed by the State of Rajasthan and others under Article 225 read with Section 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952
against the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 17.10.2016 passed in SBCWP No.9409/2014 (Meera Siksha Samiti, Sangariya Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors.) whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition preferred by the respondent no.1 and set aside the order dated
26.9.2014 passed by the State of Rajasthan.Â
 As per the facts, the respondent society was running Meera Girls College and Meera Girls Higher Secondary School at Sangaria, District â€
Hanumangarh, vide its resolution dated 25.07.2010 proposed acquisition of the educational institutions by the State Government and approached the
State of Rajasthan in this regard. The Joint Secretary to the Government, Higher Education (Group-III) Department vide its order dated 31.8.2013
communicated to the Director, College Education that the State Government has accepted the request of the Managing Committee for takeover the
said institution by the State Government alongwith movable and immovable assets and granted administrative sanction to takeover the private college
â€" Meera Girls College, Sangaria (Hanumangarh). In the communication it is indicated that it bears the concurrence of Finance (Exp.I) Department
and further observed that formal financial sanction will be issued separately. In pursuance to the aforesaid communication dated 31.08.2013, the
Director, College Education, Rajasthan, Jaipur constituted a Committee to undertake the procedure to takeover the institution and submit the same on
or before 10.09.2013.Â
On 04.09.2013, the Dy. Director, Planning issued a communication for seeking information. Admittedly, by registered surrender deed dated 20.09.2013
was executed by the respondent -Society in favour of Government of Rajasthan through Nodal Officer whereby the movable and immovable
properties of the institution were relinquished in favour of the State. Thereafter vide communication dated 26.09.2013 issued by the Joint Director,
College Education to the Joint Secretary, Higher Education (Group-III) Department, it was informed that the State Government has already issued its
administrative sanction to takeover the college. On 29.09.2013, one Indraraj Singh Chetiwal was posted from Government College, Suratgarh to
Government Girls College, Sangaria, Hanumangarh as Acting/Working Principal, who took over the charge on 02.10.2013 from Dr. Harmendra Singh
Garcha. Thereafter, the Director, College Education by its order dated 04.10.2013 delegated the financial powers to the said Indraraj Singh
Chetiwal on 04.03.2014 and one Smt. Manju Bishnoi was transferred from Govt. College, Kaladera to Government Girls College, Sangaria.Â
As per the pleadings, the above actions whereby the administrative sanction was issued by the Government, surrender deed was executed by the
respondent-Society, Principal was appointed and employees were transferred from other Government College, the process of takeover the college
was completed, but suddenly after one year by order dated 26.09.2014 (Annex.- P/1), it was ordered that six colleges indicated in the order, which
were taken over by the State Government, the said orders are de-notified with immediate effect and cancelled. The Joint Director, College Education
vide communication dated 27.10.2014 submitted by the representation dated 02.10.2014 from the employees seeking payment of 13 months
outstanding salary. The respondent-Society preferred the writ petition to question the action of the State in cancelling the order of taking over the
college.Â
Before learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that the order dated 26.09.2014 has been passed in gross
violation of principles of natural justice without providing an opportunity of hearing and the order is nonspeaking order, no reasons are indicated, no
provision has been quoted for such action, therefore, the order impugned is bad in the eye of law. It is also submitted that there is no provision in law
for de-notifying any institution once it is taken over. In support of aforesaid arguments, the respondent-petitioner made reference of provisions of
the Rajasthan Civil Services
(Appointment and other Service Conditions of Employees of Private Institutions and other Establishments taken over by the Government), Rules 1977
(„the Rules of 1977‟) and submitted that under the Rules of 1977, there is no provision for de-notification or cancelling the order of takeover the
institution, once the process of takeover was completed, merely by passing an administrative order, the same cannot be cancelled therefore, the action
of the State Government is in violation of principles of natural justice because no opportunity of hearing was given to the society before passing
such order and it is also pointed out that after taking over of the institution, the salary etc. of the teachers have not been paid and therefore prayed that
the order impugned may kindly be quashed. In support of above arguments, attention of the learned Single Judge was invited towards the judgment
in case of Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner & Ors.: AIR 1978 SC 851 and Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana : (2013)
11 SCC 293 and submits that the order impugned may kindly be quashed. Â
The appellant respondents refuted all the allegations and  said that as per the office record there was no such decision of the State Government to
take over the institution in question, but somehow the order was passed to take over the institution with movable and immovable property, but in
fact, there was no such decision taken by the State, therefore, no interference is called for.Â
The learned Single Judge after considering the entire facts of the case allowed the writ petition solely on the ground that order impugned is against the
principles of natural justice because no opportunity of hearing was given prior to passing non-speaking order, therefore, such type of order is not
sustainable in law. The learned Single Judge further observed that the reasons indicated in the reply of the State regarding lack of financial
consent is              incorrect on its face as it is obvious from the order dated 31.8.2013 that the order was issued with
concurrence of Finance Department.  The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition while following the judgment in case of Mohinder Singh
Gill (Supra) and quashed the order dated 26.9.2014 (Anex.P/1) passed by the Dy. Secretary (Admn.), Higher Education (GroupIII) Department,
Jaipur with all consequences as if the order dated 26.9.2014 was never passed qua the said college. Â
 In these appeals the State Government has challenged the judgment dated 17.10.2016 rendered by the learned Single Judge on various grounds
and tried to satisfy this Court that there is no illegality in the action taken by the State of Rajasthan so as to quash the order dated 26.9.2014,
but there is no wishper about the fact whether any opportunity of hearing was given to the respondent institution or not.Â
Learned AAG vehemently argued that without any proper legal decision, the order was passed to take over the institution in question which is obvious
from the record of the State that no such decision was taken by the State Government to take over respondent private institution in question,
therefore, the learned Single Judge was under obligation to consider every aspect of the matter in right  perspective, but it has not been
done, therefore, the order impugned may kindly be quashed. Â
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent institution vehemently argued that no such reasons which are taken in the reply, were
communicated by the appellants before cancelling the order dated 31.8.2013. As per the record, the State Government accepted the request of
Managing Committee of private college for taking over the institution alongwith all movable or immovable assets.  It is also argued that the
learned Single Judge held that before passing impugned order no opportunity of hearing was given which is basic element of principles of natural
justice, therefore, order impugned is bad in the eyes of law.Â
After hearing counsel for the parties, we have perused the judgment and considered the law laid down by the Apex Court.Â
In case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court gave the following verdict:
“When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be
supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court
on account of a challenge, get validated by additional ground later brought out.â€
In case of SN Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in (199) 4 SCC 594 the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court  specifically held
that record of reasons is necessary. Paras nos.36 and 39 of the judgment are as under:Â
“36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial func- tions, would no doubt
facilitate the exercise of its juris- diction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also
weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These
considerations show that the re- cording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrari-
ness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decisionmaking. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application
cannot be confined to deci- sions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be
recorded should govern the decisions of an admin- istrative authority exercising quasijudicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is
subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elabo- rate as in the
decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the
reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of
reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not
give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional author- ity agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.
39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice ""is to prevent miscarriage of justice"" and secure ""fairplay in action."" As pointed out earlier the
requirement about re- cording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by
excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keep- ing in view the expanding horizon of the
principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice
which govern exercise of power by adminis- trative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application
depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the
exercise of a particular power by an adminis- trative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi- judicial functions the legislature, while conferring
the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be
recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express
provi- sion to that affect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Deci- sions (Judicial Review)
Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion
can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the sub- ject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest
underlying such a provision would outweight the salutary purpose served by the require- ment to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot,
therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.â€
In both these judgments, the Hon'ble Apex Court categorically held that order which affects civil consequences, must be passed after providing an
opportunity of hearing by reasoned order. Â
After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have perused the judgment and considered the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.Â
Admittedly, in this case, before passing the order impugned no opportunity of hearing was given to the respondent institution. It is also required to be
observed that in the order dated 31.8.2013 no reasons are incorporated whereby the respondent institution was taken over by the government,
meaning thereby, the learned Single Judge has rightly considered the fact that order has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice.Â
In view of the above, we are in complete agreement with the finding given by the learned Single Judge so as to quash the order dated 26.9.2014
passed the Dy. Secretary (Admn.), Higher Education (Group-III) Department qua the Meera Girls College, Sangaria, District Hanumangarh. Â
Therefore, there is no question to interfere in the order impugned.  However, it is made it clear that if the appellant State is still desirous to take
action so as to quash the order dated 31.8.2013, the State Government will be at liberty to give notice to the respondent institution and after receiving
reply if any and providing an opportunity of hearing, the State Government will be free to decide the question of taking over the institution by speaking
order within a period of three months.Â
Consequently, all the aforesaid appeals are hereby dismissed with above observations.Â