High CourtsDivision Bench

State of U.P. vs Shiv Ram and Others

Allahabad High Court · Decided on 27 November 2009 · Citation: (2009) 11 AHC CK 0092

HON’BLE JUDGES
Uma Nath Singh, J · S.N.H. Zaidi, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 3, 4 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 304B, 498A
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

6 paragraphs · 269 words
1.

This application for leave to appeal arises out of judgment dated 12.8.2009 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.-1, Lakhimpur Kheri, in Sessions Trial Nos. 261 of 2006, under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, recording acquittal of accused-respondents while convicting the husband of deceased.

2.

We have heard learned State Counsel and perused the trial court judgment as also the grounds of appeal.

3.

Learned State Counsel submitted that prosecution witnesses, namely, parents of the deceased girl were consistent in implicating all the family members and despite such evidence, the trial court has only held the husband guilty and recorded acquittal of the accused respondents.

4.

We have carefully considered the submissions of learned Counsel and we notice that the reasoning given by the trial court, does not suffer from any perversity and infirmity. The respondents are admittedly step brothers of the husband of deceased as begotten by a different father. They have been staying in a different village with separate mess. Thus, there was no question of demand of dowry on their part.

5.

In view of the aforesaid and also for the reason that the Apex Court has taken consistent view that if on appreciation of evidence, two views are possible, the view taken by lower court in the facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of the accused should be taken as probable and reasonable view. We are not inclined to grant this leave to appeal.

6.

Thus, we find no valid ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal. Hence, this application for leave to appeal is dismissed.