State of Uttar Pradesh and Another vs Chandra Pal Singh and Another

R.H. Zaidi, J.—By means of this petition, Petitioners challenged the validity of the order dated 26.8.1981, contained in Annexure IV to the writ petition, passed by the Respondent No. 2 allowing the claim petition filed by the respondent No. 1 and quashing the order of dismissal passed against him, directing the State of U.P. and others to treat the Respondent No. 1 in service in the same position in which he was placed prior to the order of dismissal.

From the material on the record, it appears that Chandra Pal Singh, Respondent No. 1 was appointed as Assistant Agriculture Inspector Group-III by the Director of Agriculture, U.P. Subsequently, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the Respondent No. 1 by the District Agriculture Officer, Ghaziabad and he himself conducted the enquiry. After conducting the said enquiry, the District Agriculture Officer submitted his report against the Respondent No. 1 on the basis of which an order of dismissal dated 11.4.1977 contained in Annexure III to the writ petition was passed by the Director of Agriculture.

The Respondent No. 1 challenged the validity of the aforesaid order of dismissal passed against him before the Tribunal and filed the above noted claim petition No. 217/F/3/1980.

The f3. P. Services Public Tribunal III. Lucknow (hereinafter referred as the service tribunal), by means of its impugned order dated 26.3.1981 allowed the claim petition. The operative portion of the Judgment/award of the tribunal dated 28.8.1981 is quoted below:

In the result, we quash the dismissal order, Annexure III, and hold that the Petitioner is entitled to be treated in service in the same position in which he was placed prior to the order of dismissal. The opposite parties are directed to deal with the Petitioner according to law. Costs on the parties.

As stated above. In this petition the order dated 26.8.1981 has been challenged by the State of U.P. and the District Agriculture Officer, Ghaziabad.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and thoroughly gone through the record of the case.

Learned standing counsel, who represented the Petitioners, contended that the order of dismissal was passed by the appointing authority, i.e., Director of Agriculture himself. Therefore, the same cannot be said to be Invalid. He further contended that by means of Government Order dated 15.6.1961, the District Agriculture Officer was appointed as appointing authority of Assistant Agriculture Inspector Group III, therefore, he had the Jurisdiction to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and conduct the enquiry and that simply because the proceedings were initiated by the District Agriculture Officer and enquiry was conducted and report was submitted by him against the Respondent No. 1, the order of dismissal cannot be held to be invalid.

Learned Counsel representing the Respondent No. 1, on the other hand, contended that the said Respondent was admittedly appointed by the Director of Agriculture, U.P. The Director of Agriculture, U.P. was the appointing authority of Assistant Agriculture Inspector Group III, subsequent change by means of a Government Order or otherwise designating any body as appointing authority will not authorise the authority subsequently appointed as appointing authority will have no jurisdiction to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and to conduct the enquiry as Under the law the disciplinary proceedings could be initiated and enquiry could be initiated by the appointing authority himself and the disciplinary proceedings could be conducted by the appointing authority himself or Under the order by any other authority or officer. He further submitted that in the present case. District Agriculture Officer cannot be treated as appointing authority within the meaning and terms used Under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the proceedings of enquiry conducted by the District Agriculture Officer were null and void and on the basis of the report submitted by the District Agriculture Officer, the Director of Agriculture had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Respondent No. 1 from the service.

I have perused the impugned order/award of the Service Tribunal. In my opinion, the Service Tribunal rightly upheld the claim of Respondent No. 1. It has rightly been held that the subsequent change of the appointing authority will not authorise the authority subsequently appointed to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, to conduct the enquiry and to submit the enquiry report to the appointing authority. The Director of Agriculture, U.P. even did not authorise the District Agriculture Officer either to initiate the disciplinary proceedings or to conduct the enquiry. The appointing authority means the authority which actually appointed the officer to the service, which has been terminated, the reference in this regard is made to Dharam v. Union of India, (1980) UPSCSC 293 ; Om Prakash Gupta Swadheen v. Union of India 1975 SLJ 675:; Parasu Ram Singh v. State of U.P. 1978 SU 68 and State of U.P. v. Shermeshwari Nath 1977 SLJ 682.

In Krishna Kumar v. The Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer and Ors. (1975)4 SCC 289, the Supreme Court pleased to hold that subsequent delegation of power to subordinate authority to make appointment to post In question would not confer power to remove the person appointed before such delegation.

Thus, the trend of authority and law lay down by the Supreme Court and this Court from time to time seems to be that the appointing authority means the authority which actually appointed the officer to the service. Under the Rules, only the appointing authority could initiate the disciplinary proceedings and could conduct the enquiry.

The Service Tribunal was, thus, right in holding that the District Agriculture Officer has no authority to initiate the disciplinary proceedings and to conduct the enquiry against the Respondent No. 1. Thus, entire disciplinary proceedings initiated, enquiry conducted and report submitted against the Respondent No. 1 by the District Agriculture Officer was null and void and on the basis of the same, the Director of Agriculture had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Respondent No. 1 from service.

In view of what has been stated above, no case for interference Under Article 226 of the Constitution has been made out. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed with costs.

It is further directed that the Petitioner will immediately comply with the orders of the Tribunal dated 26.8.1981.