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Judgment
6 paragraphs · 692 wordsHeard Sri Vinay Kumar, the learned Standing Counsel for the State/petitioners and Sri Arvind Vashisth, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1.
The State has filed the present writ petition questioning the order dated 18th January, 2008 passed by the Public Services Tribunal, by which the respondent No. 1 was reinstated without payment of salary. It transpires that the respondent No. 1 was initially appointed as a Constable in the year 1987-88 u/s 2 of the Police Regulations on a vacant post and had been working since then. It has come on record that the services of the respondent No. 1 were dispensed with in the year 1991, but was set aside by the appellate order by an order dated 31st December, 1993 and the respondent No. 1 was reinstated in service. Subsequently, the services of the respondent No. 1 was terminated by an order dated 19th July, 1998 under the provisions of U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 on the ground that the services of the respondent No. 1 was purely temporary and that his services were no longer required and consequently, the services of the respondent No. 1 was terminated with immediate effect by providing him one month''s pay in lieu of a notice.
The respondent No. 1, being aggrieved, filed a claim petition before the Public Services Tribunal, which was allowed by the impugned order. The Tribunal found that the respondent No. 1 was appointed by due procedure of law on a clear vacancy in the year 1987-88 and as per the provisions of the Police Regulations, he was deemed to be on a probation which period has expired and nothing has been brought on record to indicate that the period of probation was extended from time to time. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the services of the respondent No. 1 was deemed to have been regularized. The Tribunal found that the Rules of 1975 could not be invoked and that the respondent No. 1 could have been removed for his misconduct by invoking the provision of paragraph 541 of the Police Regulations.
Before this Court, the learned Standing Counsel invited the attention to the written statement filed by them before the Tribunal indicating that the respondent No. 1 Constable was a habitual absentee and in this regard, invited the attention of paragraph 4 of the written statement which indicated that the respondent No. 1 had absented himself on various days without authorized leave between the period 1995 to 1998. The learned counsel, consequently, submitted that the simpliciter order of termination was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.
We are not impressed by the aforesaid submission of the learned Standing Counsel. The law contemplates that a person duly appointed on a substantive post can only be removed by adopting the procedure contemplated under the Rules and Regulations. The petitioners have invoked the provision of Section 3 of U.P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975 by holding that the respondent No. 1 was a temporary employee and that his services were no longer required and accordingly, gave one month''s pay in lieu of notice while terminating his services. Rule 2 of the Rules of 1975 defines temporary service to mean officiating or substantive service on a temporary post, or officiating service on a permanent post under the Government. In the present case, there is a clear finding that the respondent No. 1 was appointed on a vacant post u/s 2 of the Police Regulations as per the procedure. There is no averment in the writ petition that the respondent No. 1 was appointed only on a temporary basis nor anything has been indicated that the respondent No. 1 was appointed on an officiating or on a substantive service on a temporary post. The finding given by the Tribunal that the respondent No. 1 was appointed by due procedure of law on a clear vacancy under the Police Regulations has not been questioned.
In the light of the aforesaid, we find no reason to interfere in the impugned order. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.
