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Judgment
The present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the State of West Bengal, through the first Land
Acquisition Collector, against an order passed by the Additional 4th Special L.A. Judge at Alipore, District: South 24-Parganas in L.R.A. Execution
No. 5 of 2013.
The brief facts of the case are as follows:
The State of West Bengal took possession of the land in question pursuant to a notification dated April 23, 1976, issued under Section 3(1) of the West
Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act). The property belonged to one Munnalal Fomra (since
deceased), the predecessor-in-interest of the present award holders/opposite parties. Such requisition was made for establishment of a sub-depot of
the Calcutta Transport Corporation. The total area covered by the said notification was 3 bighas 16 cottahs 8 chattaks 1.58 sq. ft, along with structure.
Subsequently, by a notification dated April 7, 1990 published under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act, such requisitioned property was acquired by the
State. The acquired property was evaluated at Rs.72,416/- per cottah and the Collector awarded such amount to the predecessor-in-interest of the
opposite parties. The value of the acquired structure was assessed at Rs.1,72,800/-.
The original award holders took out a reference to Court under Section 8 of the 1948 Act. Such reference being allowed by the 4th Additional Special
L.A. Judge, Alipore, the State of West Bengal preferred an appeal. The award holders also filed a cross-objection. A Division Bench of this Court, by
its judgment and order dated March 3, 2000, dismissed both the appeal and the cross-objection.
Against such order of this Court, the award holder/cross-objector preferred
Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2001 before the Supreme Court. Such appeal was allowed, thereby setting aside the order of the Division Bench of this
Court to the extent that the cross-objection had been dismissed and the matter was remanded to this Court for disposal of the cross-objection on
merits in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to both parties.
Upon remand, the matter was taken up for hearing and another Division Bench of this Court decided such cross-objection, bearing C.O.T. 1423 of
1995, arising out of F.A. No. 151 of 1998, by its judgment and order dated March 7, 2012.
By the said order, this Court held that the valuation of the acquired land and structure were to be assessed respectively at Rs. 3,50,000/- per cottah
and Rs.3,54,825/-.
75 per cent of the land value per cottah was awarded for 14 cottah of unacquired property at premises No. 84, A.J.C. Bose Road. The solatium
awarded by the L.A. Judge, at 30 per cent on the market value of the acquired land and structure, less the amount already paid by the L.A. Collector,
was held to be justified by this Court.
The interest awarded at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from April 7, 1990 for one year and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum till
payment, less the amount paid, on the market value of the acquired land, including solatium thereon, was also affirmed by this Court.
9 per cent per annum over the amount awarded for injurious affectation of the unacquired portion of 14 cottahs of land from April 7, 1990 for one year
and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum till payment was granted by this Court.
The rent compensation awarded at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from date of taking possession, that is, April 26, 1976 to April 6, 1990, less the
amount already paid by the L.A. Collector, was also affirmed.
The cross-objectors were held to be entitled under Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 1894 Act) to 12
per cent per annum on the market value for the period from the date of taking possession till payment of award.
The cross-objection was allowed in part by modifying the judgment and order of the L.A. Judge to the above effect.
Civil Appeal No. 4769 of 2013 was preferred against the aforesaid judgment and order of this Court, which culminated in disposal of such appeal by
the Supreme Court vide order dated April 19, 2017. By such order, the judgment and order of this Court was modified to the limited extent that the
quantum of unacquired land, specified as 14 cottahs by this Court, was reduced to 4 cottahs.
Meanwhile, L.R.A. Execution No. 5 of 2013 was levied by the award holders/opposite parties, who had been impleaded in the litigation upon being
substituted for the original award holder Munnalal Fomra, for execution of the award. In connection with such execution case, calculations as to the
correct figure relating to the awarded amount, as per the version of the opposite parties, were furnished by the opposite parties. The State/petitioner
failed to furnish its calculations within the time frame previously stipulated by the Executing Court. The State/petitioner approached this Court against
several orders passed in connection with the acceptance of such calculations, by filing several revisional applications, being C.O. No. 3518 of 2017,
C.O. No. 3519 of 2017, C.O. No. 3534 of 2017, C.O. No. 3485 of 2017 and C.O. No. 3520 of 2017. All the said revisional applications were disposed
of by this Court by a single order dated November 27, 2017, inter alia directing the Executing Court to decide the actual decretal dues upon giving both
sides a short hearing on their respective calculations in that regard, if necessary by taking the aid of an expert. It was made clear in such order that
the aforesaid exercise would be completed by the Executing Court in its entirety as expeditiously as possible, without granting any unnecessary
adjournment to either party, not later than three weeks from the date of communication of such order to the Executing Court.
Pursuant to such order of this Court the Executing Court, vide Order No. 106 dated December 19, 2017, took up the matter for hearing the parties on
their respective calculations and held that the calculation of the decree-holder was in consonance with the orders of this Court and in accordance with
law. Accordingly, the calculation of the decree-holder was accepted, and that of the State was turned down. By the same order, an application filed
by the award holders for effecting necessary amendments to their execution application was also allowed.
Being aggrieved by such order dated December 19, 2017 passed by the Additional 4th Special L.A. Judge at Alipore in L.R.A. Execution No. 5 of
2013, whereby the calculations furnished by the award holders were accepted as correct by the executing court, the State of West Bengal has
preferred the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The petitioner/State challenges the impugned order primarily on three scores.
First, it is pointed out that additional compensation on land value at the rate of 12 per cent from April 26, 1976 to June 19, 1990 (14 years, 1 month and
23 days) was held by the executing court to have been granted for an amount of Rs.4, 72, 35,999.48 p. According to the petitioner, such amount
should,upon deduction of Rs.17, 82,449.64 p granted on account of additional compensation for unacquired land, ought to have been assessed at Rs.4,
54, 53,549.84 p. It is argued by the petitioner that the award holders are not entitled to any additional compensation for unacquired land.
The second ground of challenge by the petitioner is that the Executing Court acted without jurisdiction in awarding Rs.1,01,66,088.89 p under the head
of interest on land value, structure value, along with solatium and for unacquired land, claimed at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from June 19, 1990
to June 18,
1991. The petitioner argues that such amount was granted under the provisos to Section 7(2) of the 1948 Act, and that no such amount could be
awarded for unacquired land under the said provisions of law; moreover, the last decision of this Court, sitting in Division Bench, as affirmed by the
Supreme Court barring the quantum of unacquired land (which was modified from 14 cottahs to 4 cottahs), did not grant the rent compensation and
additional compensation components under the concerned head. As such, the petitioner/State argues that the actual amount awardable under the said
head could only be Rs.21, 57,972.27 p and an excess amount of Rs.80, 08,182.62 p was wrongfully held by the executing court to have been awarded
in favour of the opposite parties.
The third ground on which the petitioner mounts challenge to the impugned order is that interest on land value, structure value, solatium and for
unacquired land was attributed by the executing court to the award at the rate of 15 per cent per annum on the entire period from June 19, 1991 to
May 31, 2017, which was beyond jurisdiction of the Executing Court. Such amount, according to the petitioner, could only be granted at the rate of 9
per cent per annum on the amount of compensation under the award from the date of publication of notice under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act until
payment, and thereafter at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, payable on the amount of compensation or part thereof which was not paid or deposited
before the date of such expiry. The petitioner submits that an amount of Rs.73,52,83,060/- has been attributed under the said head, including an excess
of Rs.71,43,16,733.01 p for the extra period, between February 5, 1997 and May 31, 2017, whereas such amount ought to have been granted from
June 19, 1991 to February 5, 1997 only and not thereafter.
In this context, the petitioner relies on the relevant provisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the 1894 Act and Section 7 of the 1948 Act.
In reply, the opposite parties submit that no distinction could be made between acquired and unacquired, but affected, land while computing additional
compensation as well as interest on land. It is argued that there cannot, in law, be a distinction between land which was acquired and that which,
though not acquired, was affected, causing prejudice to the claimants. In this context, it is further argued that even the two relevant Acts, being the
1894 and 1948 Act makes a distinction between acquired and unacquired but affected land only in respect of the quantum of compensation, and not
vis-Ã -vis the grant of the other components of compensation or interest.
It is categorically submitted by the opposite parties that rental compensation and additional compensation even for the unacquired lands are inherent
within the contemplation of Section 23(1A) of the 1894 Act. As such, the said categories of compensation ought to be read into the award passed by
this Court on the crossobjection, bearing C.O.T. 1423 of 1995, dated March 7, 2012. The petitioner places portions of such judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court, as modified by the Supreme Court, in this context.
Even in respect of solatium as contemplated in Section 23(2) of the 1894 Act, the petitioner submits that such amount ought to take into its reference
frame unacquired, but affected, land of the claimants.
The petitioner points out to a set of calculations apparently produced by the petitioner/State before the Supreme Court which, according to the
petitioner, did not make any distinction between acquired and unacquired lands for the purpose of the present dispute. It is pointed out further from
such calculations that apparently interest as per the order of this Court was calculated for a period encompassing April 7, 1990 to June 6, 2013, and
therefore belied the contention of the State that the award holders are entitled to interest only up to February 5, 1997. It is relevant to mention here
that such calculations, dated March 4, 2013, apparently done by the Land Acquisition Collector, Kolkata, was used in connection with the present
dispute at an earlier stage.
The learned senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner places reliance on a judgment reported at (1994) 5 SCC 593 (K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of
Kerala and others), as well as the judgment reported at (2013) 1 SCC 353 (Tukaram Kana Joshi and others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development
Corporation and others) to emphasise the proposition that the concept of additional compensation is to enable the affected claimants to purchase fresh
land at a subsequent point of time. Since, if the market value is frozen at the juncture when the land was acquired and due credit is not given to the
subsequent increment in valuation of land, it would unjustly prejudice the claimants. According to the said senior counsel, such corrective measure to
take care of the addition to market value ought to be extended not only to the acquired land but also to the unacquired but affected land. According to
him, there could not be any reasonable basis for distinction between two types of lands as far as such additional compensation is concerned.
The next judgment relied on by the opposite parties is reported at (2001) 7 SCC 211 (Sunder vs. Union of India). Placing reliance in particular on
paragraph nos. 19, 20 and 24 of the said report, it is submitted that the sums indicated in Sub-Sections (1A) and (2) of Section 23 of the 1894 Act are
only sequels or concomitant adjuncts of the determination of the total amount indicated in SubSection (1) of the said section. No judicial exercise is
required to quantify the said sums because the section itself specifies the percentage to be worked out for the purpose of adding to the total amount
arrived at under Sub-Section (1). It was further held in such report that, what the legislature intended was to make an aggregate amount under Section
23 of the Act to reach the hands of the person as and when the award is passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land.
Any delay in making payment of the said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. Splitting up of the
compensation into different components for the purpose of payment of interest in Section 34 was not for the contemplation of the legislature when that
section was framed or enacted.
The next judgment cited is reported at AIR 2010 SC 1754 (Haridwar Development Authority vs. Raghubir Singh). Relying in particular on paragraph
no.
13 of the said judgment, the opposite parties argue that Sections 34 and 28 of the Act of 1894 together cover the entire amount of compensation
awarded. The award of interest on the enhanced amount under Section 28 of the Act is the normal rule and the refusal of interest should be by
assigning special or specific reasons. Moreover, the interest payable in regard to the increase in compensation, which is awarded by the reference
Court or any appellate court, is awarded under Section 28 of the Act.
The opposite parties then cite the case reported at AIR 2012 SC 2721 (Mehrawal Khewaji Trust vs. State of Punjab) for the proposition that the
interest awardable under Section 28 of the Act of 1894 would include within its ambit both the market value and the statutory solatium and that in view
of the same, it is clear that the person entitled to the compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the aggregate amount including solatium.
In paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment, it was further held that the claimants would be entitled for interest on solatium and additional market value if
the award of the reference Court or that of the appellate Court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium and additional market
value or where the claim had not been rejected wither expressly or impliedly.
This apart, the award holders/opposite parties argue that the petitioner’s argument as to the interest being payable till date of payment, that is
February 5, 1997, is fallacious since such payment did not indicate how much of such amount paid was allocated to the relevant heads and it may very
well be that the amount paid was meant for some other heads than those carrying interest.
As such, the opposite parties conclude that none of the objections of the petitioner-State to the calculations, furnished by the opposite parties and
accepted by the executing court below, are supported by law. There could not be any justification for withholding the additional compensation for
unacquired but affected land and for depriving the award holders from interest for the entire period claimed.
The petitioner-State, in answer, points out to the provisions of Section 23 of the Act of 1894 itself. It is submitted by the Advocate General, appearing
for the State, that the said section itself is very clear as to the scope of granting additional compensation as well as interest. It is submitted on behalf of
the State that the provisions of the said section clearly indicate that the term ‘market value’ relates to only to the land acquired and not to any
unacquired land. Moreover, Section 7 of the Act of 1948 clearly stipulates the respective dates and rates of interest payable.
Even falling back upon Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, it is submitted, there cannot be any ambiguity as to the dates till which interest is
payable, and at what rate. The petitioner-State submits that the quantum of interest proposed by the State is perfectly in consonance with such
statutory dates whereas those sought to be projected by the award holders are de hors the statutory provisions.
In this context, the petitioner-State cites the judgment reported at (2011) 4 SCC 734 (State of Punjab vs. Amarjit Singh and another). Relying on such
judgment, the petitioner submits that, as held in paragraph no. 5 of such judgment, while market value and compensation are factors to be assessed
and determined by the Court, no such judicial exercise is involved in regard to additional amount payable under Section 23(1-A) and solatium payable
under Section 23(2) as they are statutory benefits payable automatically at the rates specified in those sub-sections qua the market price. No reasons
need to be assigned for grant of additional amount or solatium. The petitioner submits that it is evident from the said report that all the said additional
amount, solatium and interest are ultimately relatable to the market value of the land acquired and have to be granted in conformity with the provisions
of Section 23 of the Act of 1894.
Thus the main questions, which fall for consideration in the instant matter are:
i) Whether the award holders are entitled to additional compensation for unacquired land;
ii) Whether the award holders are entitled to interest on rent compensation and additional compensation;
iii) Whether the award holders are entitled to interest on the market value of unacquired, but affected land;
iv) Whether the award holders are entitled to interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum for the entire period between June 19, 1991 and May 31,
2017;
v) Whether the impugned order has been passed in consonance of the judgment and decree dated March 7, 2012 passed in C.O.T. 1423 of 1995,
arising out of F.A. 151 of 1998, as modified by the Supreme Court.
For arriving at any conclusion on any of the aforesaid questions, a perusal of the relevant provisions of law, as set forth below, is absolutely essential:
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:-
Section 23: Matters to be considered in determining compensation. â€" (1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land
acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration â€" first, the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification
under section 4, sub-section (1);
secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time
of the Collector's taking possession thereof;
thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such
land from his other land;
fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the
acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings;
fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of
business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and
sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under
section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land.
(1A) In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per
centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-
section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.
Explanation. â€" In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the
land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any Court shall be excluded.
(2) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such market-
value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.
Section 28: Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation. â€" If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to
have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the
Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date
of payment of such excess into Court:
Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period
of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry
of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry.
Section 34: Payment of interest. â€" When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the
Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it
shall have been so paid or deposited:
Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken,
interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of
compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.
Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948:-
Section 4: Acquisition of land. â€" (1) Where any land has been requisitioned under section 3, the State Government may use or deal with such land
for any of the purposes referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3 as may appear to it to be expedient.
(la) The State Government may acquire any land requisitioned under section 3 by publishing a notice in the Official Gazette that such land is required
for a public purpose referred to in sub-section (1) of section 3.
(2) Where a notice as aforesaid is published in the Official Gazette, the requisitioned land shall, on and from the beginning of the day on which the
notice is so published, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all incumbrances and the period of requisition of such land shall end.
Section 7: Compensation. â€" (1) Wherever any land is acquired under section 4 there shall be paid to every person interested compensation the
amount of which shall be determined by the Collector in the manner and in accordance with the principles set out in sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2) of
section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as they may be applicable:
Provided that the market value referred to in clause first of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the said Act shall, in respect of any land acquired under
this Act, be deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the notice referred to in sub-section (1a) of section 4.
(2) (a) When the compensation has been determined under sub-section (1) the Collector shall make an award in accordance with the principles set out
in section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the amount referred to in sub-sections (1), (1A) and (2) of section 23 of that Act shall also be
included in the award:
Provided that interest at rate of nine per centum per annum on the amount of compensation under the award from the date of the publication of the
notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4 until payment shall be included in the amount payable under the award:
Provided further that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date of publication of the
notice under sub-section (1a) of section 4, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said
period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.
(aa) (i) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the
Collector and the persons interested in the land, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the
land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested;
(ii) the Collector shall give in the prescribed manner immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested in the land as are not present
personally or by their representatives when the award is made.
(b) Upon an award being made under clause (a), the Collector shall proceed to make payment in accordance with the provisions of sections 31 to 33
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, so far as they may be applicable.
(3) Where any land is requisitioned under section 3, there shall be paid toevery person interested compensation, in respect of â€
(a) the requisition of such land; and
(b) any damage done during the period of requisition to such land other thanwhat may have been sustained by natural causes.
(4) The principle to be followed in determining compensation under sub-section
(3) shall be as follows, namely:-
(i) where the Collector and the person interested agree as to the compensation, the Collector shall make an award ordering payment of the agreed
compensation;
(ii) where the person interested cannot be traced or does not appear before theCollector when called upon to be present for the purpose of the
determination of the compensation, such amount shall be determined as compensation as appears reasonable to the Collector having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case and the Collector shall make an award ordering payment of the compensation so determined.
(iii) where there is any disagreement between the Collector and the personinterested, the compensation payable shall be the amount determined by the
Court on reference made by the Collector under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 8.
Taking up the first question framed above for adjudication, it is amply clear from the language of Section 23 of the Act of 1894, that the said section
sets out the determinants for calculating the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired, and not unacquired land. The term “market
value†refers to that of the land acquired only. As is evident from the yardsticks set out in the said section for determining such market value the
damage sustained by the person interested by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property and for similar reasons, has be relegated
to the subsidiary position of merely one of the factors for calculating compensation for the land acquired.
On the other hand, the land acquired itself is the pivot on which the entire concept of compensation revolves.
Even apart from Sub-Section (1) of Section 23, the language of Sub-Sections (1A) and (2) of the same section clearly indicate that additional
compensation and solatium are also referable ultimately to the market value of the land acquired and have no nexus, even remote, with unacquired
land, be it affected or not.
The language of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894 also refer to ‘compensation’ which, taken in the light of the cardinal provision, that is,
Section 23, is referable exclusively to “land acquired†and does not contemplate unacquired land.
If we look into the provisions of Sections 4 as well as 7 of the Act of 1948, the language of both the said sections lead to the unwavering conclusion
that all amounts provided for therein relate to compensation for the land acquired. No interpretation subjecting unacquired land to the benevolence of
additional compensation or interest is permissible from a literal interpretation of the said sections. Since such literal interpretation is shorn of ambiguity,
there cannot be any occasion to add words into the mouth of the legislature by bringing unacquired land within the fold of the provisions for additional
compensation and/or interest.
Therefore, the interpretation sought to be forwarded by the award holders/opposite parties, extending additional compensation and/or the interest
component to unacquired land, is impermissible in law.
The judgments cited by the opposite parties, although laying down the basic rationale behind the grant of additional compensation and that the sums
indicated in Sub-Sections (1A) and (2) of Section 23 of the 1894 Act are only sequels or concomitant adjuncts of the determination of the total amount
indicated in SubSection (1) of the said section. However, none of the said judgments are relevant in the present context since those do not shed light
on the issues on hand, such as whether additional compensation and interest are payable on unacquired land too, as to, till what date interest under the
Act is payable. As such, the said citations are irrelevant As such, the first and third questions raised above are held in the negative.
Taking up the second question, as to interest on rent compensation and additional compensation, the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Act of 1948,
alongwith its provisos, and Sections 28 and 34 of the Act of 1894, have to be looked into.
All the said provisions speak of interest to be imposed on the amount of compensation under the award, which in turn relates back to Section 23 of the
Act of 1894, which stipulates that compensation is to be awarded for “land acquiredâ€.
Section 7 of the Act of 1948 says that the amount of compensation will be determined by the Collector in the manner and in accordance with the
principles set out in Sub-Sections (1), (1A) and (2) of Section 23 of the Act of 1894, so far as they may be applicable, it is palpably clear that
‘compensation’ contemplates not only the market value of the land acquired but also additional compensation and solatium.
Hence, the two provisos to Section 7(2) of the Act of 1948 also refer to additional compensation and solatium when they provide for “amount of
compensation under the award†and “such compensationâ€.
This is so because the language of Sub-Sections (1A) and (2) of Section 23 of the Act of 1894 both begin with “In addition to the market-value of
the land as above provided ...........â€, thus referring to the first factor as stipulated in SubSection (1) of the Section 23 for determining the amount
of compensation. Hence, Sub-Sections (1A) and (2) do not stipulate that the additional compensation and solatium contemplated therein are not part of
compensation itself. The said two sub-sections only add to the market value of the land and not to ‘compensation’. This indicates that the term
“compensation†is comprehensive and is comprised of all three components as envisaged in the three sub-sections of Section 23 and is not
restricted to Sub-Section (1) of the said Section.
Thus the award holders are entitled to interest on rent compensation and additional compensation. The second question, as such, is decided in the
affirmative.
The fourth question relates to whether the award holders are entitled to compensation for the period from June 19, 1991 (that is, the date of expiry of
one year after the date of publication of notice under Section 4 (1a) of the Act of 1948) to May 31, 2017 (that is, even after February 5, 1997, when
payment was made pursuant to this Court’s order).
In order to decide such question, a plain reading of the two provisos to Section 7 (2) of the Act of 1948 is necessary. The first proviso stipulates
interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum on the amount of compensation under the award from the date of publication of the notice under sub-
section (1a) of Section 4 of the said Act until payment. The second proviso says that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited
within a period of one year from the date of publication of the notice under sub-section (1a) of Section 4, interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per
annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid
or deposited before the date of such expiry.
One year from the date of publication of the notice under Section 4 (1a) of the Act of 1948 expired on June 18, 1991. As such, the entitlement of the
award holders thereafter would be at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, only until the date of payment. Since the date of payment relevant for the
present limited purpose was February 5, 1997, when the entire amount of Rs.3,15,68,224.34 was paid to the award holders as per direction of this
Court, interest could not have been granted for any period after such date, that is, February 5, 1997. Thus the interest granted beyond February 5,
1997 and up to May 31, 2017 was beyond the jurisdiction of the executing court.
As a result, the fourth question has to be answered in the negative. The award holders are entitled to interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum only
from June 19, 1991 to February 5, 1997, and not up to May 31, 2017 as granted by the executing court.
To answer the last question, the judgment and decree dated March 7, 2012 passed in C.O.T. 1423 of 1995, arising out of F.A. 151 of 1998, as
modified by the Supreme Court, has to be examined vis-Ã -vis the calculations accepted by the executing court in the impugned order. Such
comparison, of course, has to be limited to the objections raised by the petitioner-State in the present revision.
Since the said judgment, passed in C.O.T. 1423 of 1995, categorically provides for 9 per cent per annum over the amount awarded for injurious
affectation of the unacquired portion of 14 cottahs (modified by Supreme Court to 4 cottahs) of land from April 7, 1990 for one year and thereafter 15
per cent per annum till payment, and since such portion of the award has attained finality in view of the same not being further challenged, the
Executing Court was justified in accepting the calculations of the award holders on such score.
As to interest on the rent compensation and additional compensation components of the award, there is no reflection in the judgment of this Court as to
such interest having been granted. As such, even if the award holders were entitled to interest on that score, the same must be deemed to have been
turned down by this Court, which decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. This Court, in
C.O.T. 1423 of 1995, reflected interest to the market value of the acquired land, including the solatium amount and did not take into consideration, for
the purpose of granting interest, the rent compensation and additional compensation. As such, the Executing Court could not have accepted such latter
part of the interest.
Lastly, since the judgment of this Court was unambiguous as to having granted interest on the market value of the land acquired along with structure,
solatium and unacquired land at the rate of 15 per cent from one year after April 7, 1990 up to the date of payment, only such portion of the award,
upto February 5, 1997, could be taken into account by the Executing Court while calculating the quantum of interest, and not up to May 31, 2017.
Hence, the amount calculated as interest on and from February 6, 1997 till May 31, 2017 should be deducted from the calculations as accepted by the
Executing Court.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated December 19, 2017, whereby the Executing Court accepted the calculations as to the award, as furnished by
the award holders, is modified to the following extent:
i) The quantum of Rs.17, 82,449.64 p (4, 72, 35,999.48 â€" 4, 54, 53,549.84), on account of additional compensation for unacquired land, will be
deducted from the total awarded amount.
ii) The amount of Rs.80, 08,116.62 p (1, 01, 66,088.89 â€" 21, 57,972.27), on account of interest on rent compensation and additional compensation,
will also be deducted from the total awarded amount.
iii) Interest on land value and structure, solatium and unacquired land granted at the rate of 15 per cent per annum, for the period between
February 6, 1997 and May 31, 2017, amounting to
Rs.71, 43, 16,733.01 p (73, 52, 83,060 â€" 2, 09, 66,326.99), will also be deducted from the total awarded amount.
The Executing Court, being the Additional 4th Special L.A. Judge at Alipore, shall accordingly calculate afresh the quantum of the total awarded
amount in terms of the aforesaid observations and come to a finding as to the exact amount due to the award holders in terms of such fresh
calculation.
Such exercise shall be completed within a fortnight from the date of communication of this order to the Executing Court.
It is made clear that, while undertaking such fresh calculation, no further hearing and/or opportunity of producing any further materials shall be given
to the parties, since the matter is being remanded only for the purpose of fresh calculations in terms of the observations made in this order.
C.O. No. 250 of 2018 is disposed of accordingly, without any order as to costs.