High CourtsDivision Bench

State of West Bengal vs Asoke Kumar Maity & Ors

Calcutta High Court · Decided on 19 March 2025 · Citation: (2025) 03 CAL CK 1037

HON’BLE JUDGES
Harish Tandon, J · Prasenjit Biswas, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
MAT No. 2098 Of 2024 With CAN No. 1, 2 Of 2024
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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 1,468 words

Prasenjit Biswas, J

1.

This instant Intra Court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 22.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Bench of this Court in WPA 27361 of 2023 by which the writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the authorities to release the gratuity and leave salary of the private respondent within a period of one month from the date of communication of the order.

2.

The instant appeal is barred by limitation since there is delay in preferring this appeal. Therefore, this application has been taken out at the behest of the appellant for condoning such delay. As per report submitted by the Additional Stamp Reporter of this Court there is a delay of 182 days in instituting this appeal challenging the impugned order.

3.

The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring this appeal, has been mentioned in the application that delay was caused due to frosty machinery to which the appellant functions and various approvals which are required from multiple authorities for preferring this appeal as delineated in this application.

4.

The impugned order was passed on 22.04.2024 and the instant appeal is filed challenging the impugned order causing delay.

5.

We have no hesitation to say that a casual and deliberate attempt was made to delay the filing of the appeal for considerable period of 182 days. It was within the knowledge of the State that the appeal had to be filed within the statutory period of limitation as enshrined in the Act; even then the appellant/State did not make any sincere effects in order to file an appeal within the period of limitation as provided in the Act. Now, the appellant took the plea that the file was being moved from one place to another for discussion. From reading of the statements made in the petition it is clear that all the papers were moved from one authority to another in a most apathetic manner without adhering to the requirement of law. It is not known why this was done. At every stage, delay was caused. From the statements as made out in the petition it appears that this was done deliberately. The applicant/State is not a privileged litigant and cannot claim any privilege. They are at par with the private individuals. In the case of condonation of delay, the Court cannot exercise the jurisdiction in an arbitrary or fanciful manner but on the established judicial principles. We are not unmindful that after expiry of the period of limitation a valuable right accrues to the other side and the Court ought not to be light hearted to disturb one’s legal right. There is no sacrosanct immunity to the State and its officers from the provisions of the Limitation Act.

6.

Mr. Tapan Kr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the State submits that the appeal should be heard on merit as substantial question of law is involved in the matter in dispute. The appeal has merit and there is chance of success of the appellant and, as such, the appellant may not be thrown away at this stage. So, the delay in preferring this instant appeal challenging the impugned order may be condoned and the matter should be heard on merit.

7.

The law of limitation is substantial and, therefore, the principle laid down is to be scrupulously followed while condoning the delay under the law of limitation. The law of limitation has got a specific purpose and object and more specifically to avoid prejudice to the respective parties. In the event of prolongation or protraction of the litigation undoubtedly and for an unspecified period when the specific law of limitation has got a specific purpose and object, then the power of discretion is to be exercised cautiously. Power of discretion cannot be exercised in the absence of any reason. In other words, powers can be exercised by the Court for the purpose of passing orders only have recording reasons which must be candid and convincing and must be passed on certain sound legal principles.

8.

The condonation of delay serves as a pivotal mechanism to safeguard the fundamental tenets of access to justice and to avert the denial of relief based solely on procedural delays. It stands as a staunch guardian of the principles of fairness, equity, and the sacrosanct right to be heard. The general principle underlying the condonation of delay is that courts have discretionary power to extend the time limit in cases where the delay was due to genuine and valid reasons. The courts examine each case on its merits and consider factors such as the explanation for the delay, the sufficiency of the cause shown, the absence of negligence, and the potential prejudice caused to the other party. The term “sufficient cause” isn’t defined explicitly and varies on a case-to-case basis. The Court has a wide discretion in determining what constitutes as sufficient cause, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

9.

Insofar as the question as to condonation of delay by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned, delay can be condoned if 'sufficient cause' is shown and the approach of the courts should be liberal guided by legal principles. At the same time, dilatory tactics, if borne out from materials, shall be treated sternly and liberal approach cannot be extended to those persons. It is noticed that the State and its instrumentalities used to file litigations with prayer to condone delay and in almost all the cases of the said nature, except a few, there are some hidden forces, who had worked in preventing timely filing of litigations, could be decipherable. We must have to say that there is callous negligence or lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials of the Government to conduct litigations, timely and properly, to protect the interest of the State, though they are duty bound to be vigilant in this regard.

10.

After hearing of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and after perusing the contentions as made out in the petition, we are of the opinion that the period of delay has not at all been counted for and no sufficient cause has been made out for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The provisions of law are applicable upon the department of Government and the private party and there should not be any distinction unless the statute itself makes it. So, the department of the Government cannot be treated differently. What we gather from the materials on record that the appellant/State is guilty of such inaction or negligence in preferring the instant appeal within the time frame as provided in the Act. Therefore, at times when the materials would show that hidden forces in the form of officials behind the curtain meddled in not filing the litigations within time as part of liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, some sort of leeway or concession could be provided to the State, in order to protect the interest of the public at large.

11.

We are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

12.

It is discernible from the materials on record that the appellants/applicants have demonstrated their non seriousness in filing of the present appeal within the statutory period of limitation and have caused a delay of 182 days from the date of impugned judgment dated 22.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Bench of this Court. It is not the case of appellant that the impugned judgment has been passed ex-parte and was not within their knowledge. The inevitable conclusion of the above discussion is that since the State being impersonal machinery is the appellant and the delay is the outcome of deficiency and derelictions on the part of its officials in acting in time, some concession is to be given to the State.

13.

Accordingly, delay petition being CAN 1 of 2024 stands allowed subject to the payment cost of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand).

14.

Appellant is directed to deposit the said amount with the State Legal Services Authority which should be used for the benefit of juveniles within a period of four weeks from this date and in default of payment the order passed by this Court will stand automatically be vacated.

15.

Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees.