Tribunals and Commissions

SUB-POST MASTER vs RAMBHAI PUNABHAI PADSALA

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 25 April 2016 · Citation: 2016 2 CPR 455

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ajit Bharihoke, Rekha Gupta
CASE NUMBER
1066 of 2016
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Judgment

25 paragraphs · 1,888 words
1.

The petitioner being aggrieved of concurrent finding of the District Forum as also the State Commission, Gujarat has preferred this revision petition.

2.

Briefly put, facts relevant for the disposal of the revision petition are that the respondent/complainant filed a consumer complaint against the petitioner alleging that he had opened three SCSS accounts jointly with his son for 12 Lakh, 10 Lakh & 8 Lakh respectively on 1.12.2009, 1.1.2010 and 23.3.2010. Subsequent to opening of the account it was pointed out that as per Post Office Saving Bank Manual Volume 1 Chapter 6 of SCSS Rule 172 (2) the petitioner could not have opened the account jointly with his son. Therefore, the said accounts were closed and the money was paid back to the respondent. While paying the money the petitioner deducted 1% of the deposited amount i.e. Rs.30,000/- in terms of Rule 9 of Chapter 6 of POSB Vol.1. Respondent being aggrieved of deduction of the said amount raised a consumer dispute in the District Forum, Amreli. The consumer complaint was contested on the ground that the joint accounts were opened against the rules and 1% of the amount of deposit was rightly deducted in terms of rules.

3.

The District Forum vide its order dated 7.1.2015 allowed the complaint and directed the petitioner to pay a sum of 30,000/- deducted from his account alongwith interest @ 6% from the date of the order till the realization of the amount. Besides 500/- were awarded as cost of litigation.

4.

Being aggrieved of the order of the District Forum the petitioner preferred an appeal in the State Commission. The State Commission after hearing the parties did not find any fault with the order of the District Forum and dismissed the appeal. The petitioner instead of paying the paltry amount awarded by the Fora below has filed the revision petition.

5.

The revision petition, however, has been filed after the expiry of 90 days period of limitation with a delay of 82 days. The petitioner has thus filed IA/3370/2016 for condonation of delay. The reason for condonation of delay in filing of the revision petition is detailed in paras-3 & 4 of the application which are reproduced as under: - " That it is submitted that as the petitioner has to obtain permission from the department and also to get appointed the counsel from the panel of the Government, it took time and thus could not be filed with the statutory period.

That it is further submitted that as the maximum of the records of the trial court as well as the Hon''ble State Commission was in its vernacular language i.e. Gujrati and it took lot of time in getting the entire records translated into English."

6.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the delay in filing of revision is unintentional and it has occurred because of time consumed in taking administrative decision to file revision petition and also for getting the documents translated from Vernacular to English.

7.

Before adverting to the explanation given by the petitioner for the delay, it would be useful to have a look on the law relating to condonation of delay. Recently, Hon''ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held: "24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under ;

" 29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

30.

Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts'' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of

compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."

The Court further observed:

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

29.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties

with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30.

Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

31 . In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

32.

In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs."

8.

The law relating to condonation of delay is well settled. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 , it has been observed as under: "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant".

9.

In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108 Apex Court has observed as follows:

"W e hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition.

10.

Hon''ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) observed as under: "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras."

11.

In the light of the above position in law, we do not find the explanation given for delay satisfactory, as it is bereft of details. It does not disclose the specific dates pertaining to movement of file from one seat to other. It does not disclose as to on which date the permission for filing the revision petition was granted and when the initiative was taken to get the documents translated from Vernacular to English. We may also point out that the application has been drafted in a very casual manner. In para-5 it is stated that there is a delay of 68 in filing of the revision petition whereas in para-7 it is mentioned that no prejudice would be caused to the respondent if delay of 81 days in filing of revision petition is condoned. From this it is evident that the person who drafted the application for condonation of delay has not applied his mind to the facts and he drafted it in a very casual manner making contrary statements in paras-5 & 7 of the application. Therefore also we find no justification in condoning the delay in filing of revision petition.

12.

In view of the discussion above, we do not find merit in the application for condonation of delay. It is accordingly dismissed. As a consequence revision petition is also dismissed as barred by limitation.