SUB POST MASTER, Sub Post Office, Adampur vs UPENDER CHORASIA

THE complainant is a resident of village Sahit, District Samastipur (Bihar). He was employed as labourer and was working with M/s. Prem Kumar Raj Kumar at their shop at Adampur. He had sent three money-orders of Rs. 2,000 each to Phultin Chorasia, Madan Chorasia and Ram Vrish all residents of village Sahit, District Samastipur (Bihar) from whom he had taken the aforesaid amount as loan. THE money orders were issued under receipt Nos. 4550, 4551 and 4552 dated 5.5.2005 by the Post-Master, Sub Post Office, Adampur District Hissar. However, these money orders were not delivered to the addressees upto the date of filing of the complaint which is 2.8.2005. Alleging deficiency of service against the opposite parties, the complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the District Forum by filing the present complaint wherein he prayed for issuance of directions to the opposite parties to pay the amount of the money orders; to pay interest @ 18% per annum and Rs. 10,000 as compensation on account of mental agony and harassment caused to him. On notice the opposite parties admitted that three money orders as detailed in the complaint had been paid to the payees on 1.8.2005. At the same time they pleaded that the complaint filed was not maintainable under the provisions of the Indian Post Office Act. Accordingly, it was prayed that the complaint merited dismissal. THE District Forum found no substance in the stand of the opposite parties and while accepting the complaint directed the appellant-opposite parties to pay Rs. 2,000 as compensation and cost of litigation as well as for mental agony and harassment caused to the complainant in respect of the above stated complaint. At the same time further direction was given that if the compliance was not made within three months of the order, the opposite parties shall also be liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum from the date of default till payment. Aggrieved by the said order the present appeal has been filed by the appellant-opposite parties.

LEARNED Counsel representing the appellant-opposite parties has been heard at length. Learned Counsel representing the appellant-opposite parties while challenging the order dated 18.1.2007 of the District Forum vehemently urged that the District Forum had ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 48 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1898) which bars the jurisdiction of the District Forum even to try the complaint and on that ground the order under challenge deserves to be set aside. In order to appreciate the submission made, notice has to be taken of the relevant provisions of Section 48 of the Act, 1898 which read as under: "No suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted against the Government or any officer of the Post Office in respect of: (a) xxxx (b) xxxx (c) the payment of any money order being refused or delayed by, or on account of any accidental neglect, omission or mistake, by or on the part of an officer of the Post Office, or for any other cause whatsoever, other than the fraud, or wilful act or default of such officer."

The above provisions do say that no fault can be attributed to the officials of the appellants where it is not proved on record that they have not committed any act of default. Shelter was taken from the side of the appellants under Section 6 of the Act, 1898 which deals with the exemption from liability for loss, misdelivery, delay or damage to the postal articles in the course of transmission by post. Rule 220 of the Post Office Guide Part-I was also pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellants during the course of arguments because it says that no responsibility shall be fixed on the Post Office for the wrong payment of the money order on the ground stated therein. He further submitted that Section 6 of the Act, 1898 has been interpreted by the National Commission in its judgment dated 18.9.2002 in Revision Petition No. 15 of 1997, Head Post Master, Post Office, Railway Road, Kurukshetra, Haryana and Others v. Vijay Rattan Aggarwal; Post Master, Imphal and Others v. Dr. Jamini Devi Sagolband, I (2000) CPJ 28 (NC)=2000 (1) Con.LT 577; and in Revision Petition No. 314 of 2003, Union of India and Others v. R.C. Puri, II (2007) CPJ 49 (NC), wherein it has been held that the complainant is not entitled for compensation on account of postal delay. Further reference was made to the case, The Director, Postal Services A and N Islands, Port Blair and Another v. Miss Shyamali Ganguly, IV (2003) CPJ 65 (NC)=2004 (1) CPC 12 and Sub-Postmaster & Anr. v. Anik Lal, I (2002) CPJ 384=2002 (1) Con.LT 359, wherein it was stated that Postal Department was not liable on account of postal delay in payment of money order. He also contended that in case "the District Forum had not rendered any finding that delay had occurred on account of wilful act of the officials concerned and for that reason the order of the District Forum is against the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, 1898 and so explained in the above mentioned cases.

THE above stated provisions came to be considered in Post Master, Ranipet H.O. and Another v. Shri N.B. Janaki Raman, 2002 (1) CPC 208, wherein in para No. 4 of the order it was observed that, "a bare perusal of Section 48(c) would show that it does not give blank immunity to the appellants. If there is a fraud or wilful act or default on the part of any officer of the Post Office, appellants will certainly be liable. It may be that fraud or wilful act has to be proved by the complainant and so also the default. But when the default is so extensive like in the present case no proof or evidence on the part of complainant is required to prove the default on the part of the Post Office. As to what is the wilful or default, we need not go to any treatise on the interpretation of these terms or to any judgment for the purpose. We have to see from a consumer point of view as to what is wilful or default when interpreting a particular provision. As a matter of fact default of two months in sending the telegraphic money order could also be a wilful act. No circumstance has been brought on record by the appellants to show that there has not been any wilful act or default on the part of any of its officers. For this gross act of default in not sending the telegraphic money order in time after receiving charges of the same, respondent has certainly suffered a great deal of anguish and mental harassment". In the light of the principles laid down in the above mentioned cases, the controversy needs to be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances brought on record on this case because the facts of one case cannot be put into the strait jacket of another case and basically the facts of each case are the real parameters which enable us to decide the dispute raised. It is clearly brought on record that after the above stated three money orders of Rs. 2,000 each were booked on 5.5.2005, a complaint with regard to their non-receipt was made to the opposite parties and thereafter the opposite parties had issued the money orders, the payments of which were made to the addressees on 1.8.2005. In this manner there has been a delay of almost three months in delivering the amount of the money orders to the addressees. In the fact of above stated evidence, no other evidence was required to be established with regard to wilful default of the officers/officials of the opposite parties in not delivering the amount of the money orders within a reasonable period of time and deficiency of service on the part of the opposite parties is fully substantiated on record.

MOREOVER, the objections raised from the side of the appellants can also be examined from other angle. The remedy available to the consumer on account of deficiency of service is protected under Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1986) which provides an independent and additional remedy. Therefore, the basis for determining liability for deficiency incurred under the provisions of the Act, 1986, are entirely on a different footing than the liability to the extent laid down in Section 48 of the Act, 1898. The bare examination of the provisions of definition of "deficiency in service" contained in Section 2(1)(g) would show that it is of wide because it states "deficiency" means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service. Therefore, where the complainant proves deficiency of service in terms of the above stated provisions he has to be compensated for the loss and injury suffered by him on that account. In this case it is fully established on record that the addresse to whom the money orders were sent by the complainant had suffered on account of non-receipt of the money orders amounts and the complainant has also to face mental agony and harassment because no immediate steps were taken up by the opposite parties for the redressal of his grievance. In Raghavendra Rao v. Director General, Department of Post, III (2006) CPJ 269 (NC), for inaction and indifferent attitude of the authorities for redressal of the grievance of the complainant for non-delivery of money-order amount of Rs. 300 to his sister, Rs. 10,000 was awarded as damages. In this case the complainant had booked a money order on 23.4.2002 for a sum of Rs. 300 at Sandadiya Soudha, Parliament House Avenue, New Delhi-110001 which was payable to B.K. Suailaja c/o Prajapita Brahmakumaris Ishwariya Vishwa Vidyalaya, H.No. 75, Engineers Enclave, HUDA Colony, Gaugaram Chanda Nagar, Hyderabad. The same was returned to the complainant on 6.6.2002 with the remarks ''not in my beat''. Thereafter, the. complainant sent it by speed post money order to same payee on 6.6.2002. Notice was taken of the observation made by the Apex Court in case of Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, III (1993) CPJ 7 (SC)=1994 (1) SCC 243, wherein it was stated: "9. The Court observed that Section 2(1)(o) of the Consumer Protection Act applied to any service made available to potential users, and in the absence of any indication, express or implied there is no reason to hold that authorities created by the statute are beyond purview of the Act; no distinction can be drawn in private and public transport or insurance companies; the Legislative intention is thus clear to protect a consumer against services rendered even by statutory bodies; the test, therefore, is not if a person against whom complaint is made is a statutory body but whether the nature of the duty and function performed by it is service or even facility.

The Court considered the reality of our social life prevailing in the country and observed that various legislations and regulations permitting the State to intervene and protect interest of the consumers have become a haven for unscrupulous ones as the enforcement machinery either does not move or it moves ineffectively, ineffi-ciently and for reasons which are not necessary to be stated. The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which he faces against powerful business, described as, ''a network of rackets'' or a society in which, ''producers have secured power'' to ''rob the rest'' and the might of public bodies which are degenerating into storehouses of inaction where papers so not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsi-bility but for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society instead of bothering, complaining and fighting against it, is accepting it as part of life. The enactment in these unbelievable yet harsh realities appears to be a silver lining, which may in course of time succeed in checking the rot.

The Court further observed that the authority empowered to function under a statute while exercising power discharges public duty; it has to act to observe general welfare in common good; in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system; where it is found that exercise of discretion was mala fide and the complainant is entitled to compensation for mental and physical harassment and that the officer can no more claim to be under any protective cover.

The Court pertinently held: "It should further direct the department con-cerned to pay the amount to the complainant from the public fund im-mediately but to recover the same from those who are found responsible for such unpardonable be-haviour by dividing it proportionately where there are more than one functionaries."

This would be in consonance with the provisions of Section 14(1)(d) and (i) of the consumer Protection Act, 1986, which are as under: "14(l)(d): to pay such amount as may be awarded by it as compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence of the opposite party, [provided that the District Forum shall have the power to grant punitive damages in such circumstances as it deems fit] (i) to provide for adequate costs to parties."

For better administration/governance, the aforesaid law is required to be implemented so that the welfare schemes framed by the Government reach the common consumer and the objects of such schemes are not frustrated. Keeping the aforesaid position of law in mind, in our view, here is a vigilant consumer who approached the various authorities for redressal of his grievances met with no response and was required to approach the Consumer Fora. Before the Consumer Fora also the Department failed to respond and reply. The execution application was required to be adjourned for six times. This has caused lot of harassment and agony to the citizen. In this view of the matter, the complainant is entitled to have reasonable compensation to meet the expenses incurred and the suffering undergone by him. We have to appreciate the zeal shown by such a person in highlighting the inaction of the concerned officers despite repeated letters." The above stated observations equally apply to the facts of the present case. Under the circumstances of the case the District Forum was fully justified in accepting the complaint and awarding the compensation amount along with interest so mentioned in the impugned order.

FOR the aforesaid reasons there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.