Subbalakshmi Ammal vs Ramalakshmi Ammal and Others

Ramamurti, J.—This revision petition raises a question of construction of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The properties involved in the suit originally belonged to one Subba Rao, who died in 1948, leaving behind him his widow Meenakshi, one son

and six daughters. The son died in 1950 leaving behind him his widow, Subbalakshmi. Misunderstandings arose between the mother-in-law and

the daughter-in-law, and Meenakshi filed the suit, O.S. No. 8 of 1961 for partition and separate possession of her half share in the suit properties

u/s 14 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 and Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, 1937.

Even before the passing of a preliminary decree Meenakshi died in May 1962 and her daughters filed an application to get themselves

impleaded as the legal representatives of their mother. The daughter-in-law who was the defendant in the suit raised objection that the right which

the mother, Meenakshi had was a purely personal right, that the same lapsed on her death, and that the daughters of Meenakshi had no right to

continue the suit for partition. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled this objection of the defendant and impleaded the daughters as the legal

representatives of Meenakshi. The revision petition is against this order.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that unless a woman who is entitled to her husband''s share in the coparcenary properties (under

the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act) had filed a suit and obtained her share by metes and bounds after a final decree, the right conferred

upon such a woman under the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, would automatically lapse on her death, and her stridhana heirs would not

be entitled to claim any right after the death of such woman. I am of the clear opinion that this contention is wholly untenable and utterly lacks

substance.

Apart from any authority, a plain reading of Section 3 sub-section (2) of the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, XVIII of 1937, as

amended in Madras and Section 31 of the Hindu Succession Act, Act XXX of 1956 in the light of the saving clause in Section 6 of the General

Clauses Act, Act X of 1897, will make it -clear that there can be no basis for the argument that a widow should have worked out her rights by

securing a partition by metes and bounds. However, the question as to whether it is obligatory on the part of the widow of a coparcener to file a

suit and obtain partition by metes and bounds in order to become entitled to the right which is conferred upon her under the Hindu Women''s

Rights to Property Act is covered by ample authority.

In Kuppathammal Vs. Sakthi alias Thayammal and Another, , the question came up for direct decision. In that case too it was argued that by

reason of Section 31 of the Hindu Succession Act, Act XXX of 1956, the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act, Act XVIII of 1937, had been

repealed and that a widow who had not prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 filed a suit for partition cannot claim any

right u/s 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The basis of such a contention was that the saving in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply

only if any right had accrued to the widow, and that no such right could be said to have accrued to the widow until a demand for partition had been

made by her asserting her rights under the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act. This argument was rejected, and it was held that the vesting of

the husband''s share in his widow was absolute under the statute (Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act), in the sense that the statute did not

impose any condition or require any formality to be complied with in the form of the widow being obliged to make a demand for partition. It should

be noticed that in that case the widow did not even file a suit for partition.

In Kanuri Sri Sankara Rao Vs. Kanuri Rajyalakshamma, , this view was followed by Umamaheswaram, J. In that case also it was held that the

rights conferred upon a Hindu widow under the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act are not inchoate or imperfect until a claim for partition

was made. It was also held that the moment the husband died his interests devolved upon the widow and by a claim for partition she was merely

working out the right which she had acquired under the Act.

In my opinion the question does not admit of any doubt whatsoever having regard to the wide language of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession

Act. The judgment of the Supreme Court in S.S. Munna Lal Vs. S.S. Rajkumar and Others, , has placed the matter beyond all doubt. In that case

a Hindu widow had obtained a preliminary decree for partition but died before the passing of the final decree. It was contended that as no final

decree had been passed her rights under the preliminary decree lapsed and Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act would not help her legal

representatives. The Supreme Court held that the Succession Act had made far-reaching changes in the Hindu law of Inheritance and Succession,

that the traditional limitations on the powers of disposition of a Hindu female have all been completely removed, and that under the Act a Hindu

widow is regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of the property possessed by her at the time of her death. In other words the moment the

Hindu Succession Act came into operation succession has got to be traced to the widow regarding the property (which had devolved upon her

under the Act) as her own property.

It is in this context that the significance of the opening words of Section 14 ""any property possessed by a female Hindu"" should be noticed. The

words ""possessed by a female Hindu"" have been used in a very wide and broad sense, and in the context of this section the words mean the state

of owning or having in one''s own hand or power. Possession u/s 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property

by the female. It is used in a broad comprehensive sense, and includes the right to possession. The possession might have been either actual or

constructive or in any form recognised by law. Vide V. Sampathkumari Vs. M. Lakshmi Ammal and Others, and Gummalapura Taggina Matada

Kotturuswami Vs. Setra Veeravva and Others, . In this view, I have no hesitation in holding that at the moment of the death of Meenakshi she was

in possession of her share of the property to which she became entitled under the Hindu Women''s Rights to Property Act read with Section 14 of

the Hindu Succession Act, with the result that an her death that share or that property devolved upon her heirs. Her daughters are therefore clearly

entitled to further prosecute the suit for partition filed by Meenakshi.

The order of the lower Court is correct and the revision petition is dismissed.