High CourtsDivision Bench

Subhash Chand Dhiman vs State of Haryana and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 19 October 2006 · Citation: (2007) 113 FLR 144 : (2007) 145 PLR 358

HON’BLE JUDGES
J.S. Narang, J · Arvind Kumar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 · Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Section 25F
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 797 words

Arvind Kumar, J.—These petitions filed by the petitioners Subhash Chand Dhiman and Vinod Kumar Dhiran respectively pray for setting aside of orders dated 19.7.2000 passed separately by the appropriate Government, by dint of which, prayer of the petitioners for referring the industrial dispute raised separately by them, to the Labour Court, for adjudication, has been turned down. Since a common question as to whether the orders passed way back in July, 2000 can be challenged now after a lapse of more than 6 years or not is involved in both the petitions, therefore, we propose to dispose them of by passing a common judgment in C.W.P. No. 16616 of 2006.

2.

We have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner at length and have gone through the file carefully.

3.

Ft emerges out from record that both the petitioners were workmen of respondent No. 2. They were discharged from duty simplicitor on 23.6.1999 following some charges of misconduct (indiscipline). All the benefits u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for brevity, the Act) were also given. Feeling dissatisfied with the same, they raised an industrial dispute by serving demand notices. The appropriate Government vide the impugned orders dated 19.7.2000 after considering the factum of receipt of final payment by the petitioners from the management through cheques, did not accede to their request of referring the dispute to the Labour Court and rejected their demand notices. The petitioners, as already noticed above, have challenged the orders dated 19.7.2000, through the instant petitions, after a lapse of more than 6 yeaRs.

4.

The contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Act to raise the dispute. It is open to a party to approach the Court even belatedly and in that eventuality, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal can properly mould the relief by refusing or awarding part-payment of back wages and has referred to the decision rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajaib Singh Vs. The Sirhind Co-Operative Marketing Cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another, .

5.

Ajaib Singh''s case (supra) is of no help to the petitioners as the same relates to delayed demand notice, which is not the case here. Moreover, Ajaib Singh''s case (supra) has been noticed in the case of Haryana State coop. Land Dev. Bank v. Neelam 2005(2) R.S.J. 438 and it has been held that "the decision of Ajaib Singh''s case (supra) must be held to have been rendered in the facts and situation obtaining therein, no ratio of universal application can be culled out therefrom. We are of the considered view that the instant petitions have to be rejected out rightly on the ground of delay and latches alone. In the Instant case the impugned order is dated 19.7.2000. The workmen have challenged the same after a delay of more than 6 yeaRs. No cogent explanation is forthcoming to show that under what circumstances, the petitioner could not lay challenge to the impugned orders dated 19.7.2000. In absence of any explanation, the petitioners cannot and should not be permitted to challenge the impugned orders after a lapse of more than 6 years, as per their own whims and wishes. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, has clearly held that an aggrieved party has to move the Court within a period of six months or at best within one year of the date when caused of action accrued. The Supreme Court has observed as follows:

It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Ccurts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Articles 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matteRs.

Sadasivaswamy''s case (supra) has been followed by this Court in the case of Harvinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. 2005 (2) S.L.R. 587.

6.

For the discussion made above, we dismissed the instant petitions on the ground of delay and laches alone. We further refrain ourselves from referring to the other contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner qua the legality or illegality of the enquiries conducted against the petitioners and that the exceeding of jurisdiction by the appropriate Government while denying reference of the dispute to the Labour Court.