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Judgment
Janarthanam, J.—One Subramani (Petitioner) is the father of the detenu, Madhu. The detenu, it is said, is a forest offender. Apart from the ground case, the occurrence relating to which is said to have happened on 21.11.1995, the detenu had come to adverse notice in two other cases.
The District Magistrate of North Arcot Ambedkar District, Vellore-9 (Second Respondent) clamped upon the detenu the impugned order of detention under the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas. Immoral Traffic offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) in his proceedings D.O. No. 205/95 dated 25.11.1995 with a view to preventing him from indulging in an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
Mr. D. Veerasekaran, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, would press into service the following points for consideration:
(1) Representation dated 11.12.1995 had not been duly considered and disposed of by the first Respondent-State Government without any unreasonable and avoidable delay.
(2) The said representation had not been placed before the Advisory Board.
(3) There was utter non application of mind on the part of the second Respondent-Detaining Authority as respects the imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, in the sense of not taking into account the relevant and cogent materials in that regard.
(4) There was no due and proper intimation to anyone of the family members of the detenu informing anyone of them as respects the particular place of his detention and the relevant provisions of law under which he had been detained within a reasonable time from the date of his detention.
(5) The detenu, hailing from the State of Andrha Pradesh, knows to read and write the language in Telugu only and he does not know to read and write Tamil language and in view of the fact that copies of the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and the documents relied upon for the formulation of the grounds had been furnished to him in the language of Tamil, he was rather handicapped in making an effective and purposeful representation, and consequently, this has to be construed as a factor vitiating the impugned order of detention.
Mr. Syed Fasiuddin, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the Respondents would, however, repel such submissions and produce the relevant files for perusal and consideration of this Court.
Point No. 1: From a perusal of the files, it transpires that the representation dated 11.12.1995, but signed on 12.12.1995 had been received by the first Respondent Government on 13.12.1995. On 14.12.1995, remarks had been called for from the second Respondent Detaining Authority. The communication calling for remarks had been received by the second Respondent Detaining Authority on 19.12.1995. On 21.12.1995, the second Respondent Detaining Authority sent the same to the first Respondent-Government, which, in turn, received the same on 22.12.1995 and on that date itself, the file was initially circulated to the Under Secretary and then to the Joint Secretary, on 26.12.1995, the file had been circulated to the Minister for Law, who, in turn, after taking into consideration the materials available in the file however, passed an order rejecting the representation on 27.12.1995. The order of rejection so passed has been subsequently communicated to die detenu.
Thus, it is crystal clear that the representation, which was received by the first Respondent on 13.12.1995 had been disposed of on 27.12.1995, that is to say within a period fourteen days from the date of its receipt. In between those two dates, namely, between 13.12.1995 and 27.12.1995, there were five holidays. 16.12.1995 and 17.12.1995, were holidays, as being Saturday and Sunday. Likewise, 23.12.1995, and 24.12.1995 were holidays, as being Saturday and Sunday. 25.12.1995 happened to be a holiday for Christmas. Even giving due allowance for those five holidays, there remains only nine working days for consideration and disposal of the representation. Thus, in fact, the representation had been disposed of with all promptitude and speed within a period of nine working days without any delay at any level by the first Respondent Government. This point, urged as such, bristles next to nothing and the same is consequently rejected.
Point No. 2: From a perusal of the file, we are able to find that the said representation had been placed before the Advisory Board on 5.1.1996 and the Advisory Board, in fact, considered the same and the relevant materials are traceable to pages 419 and 421 of the file produced before us for our perusal.
In this view of the matter, this point also deserves outright rejection and consequently, the same is rejected as untenable.
Point No. 3: According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the second Respondent Detaining Authority in considering the question of imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his farther indulging in prejudicial activities affecting the maintenances of public order had not taken into account the relevant and cogent materials for coming to such a conclusion. In support of such a submission, the said learned Counsel relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin v. Government of Delhi 1994 SCC (Cri.) 354.
(a) In that case, the Petitioner-detenu was arrested in connection with an alleged offence under the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. Bail petitions filed by him was dismissed finally on June 9, 1992 and no bail application had been moved by him thereafter. The detention order in fact was passed on August 11, 1992.
(b) In that context, Their Lordship of the Supreme Court said that no material was available before the Detaining Authority indicating that the Petitioner detenu was likely to be released or that such release was imminent and or that the authority was satisfied about the said aspect and so saying, they quashed the detention order.
(c) There is absolutely no quarrel with the proposition laid down by Their Lordship of the Supreme Court in that case and we, in fact, bow our head in reverence and we have to simply follow such a decision under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
The question here, in the instant case, is whether there are no relevant and cogent materials for the second Respondent Detaining Authority to come to the conclusion that there was imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his further indulging in prejudicial activities affecting the maintenance of public order. This aspect of the matter had, in fact, been considered by the second Respondent-Detaining Authority in paragraph 5 of the grounds of detention, which is getting reflected as below;
I am aware that Thiru Madhu, is in remand in the Central Prison, Vellore, and there is imminent possibility that he may come out on bail for the offence u/s 21(d) , (e) and (f) and 36(A) of Tamil Nadu Forest Act V of 1982, read with Section 36(b) of Tamil Nadu Forest (Amendment) Act 45 of 1979 and 44 of 1992 and Tamil Nadu Sandalwood Possession Rules, 1970. I am also aware that in similar case accused are enlarged by the same court or the superior court after lapse of some time. And if he comes out on bail he will indulge in further tree felling activities which will be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Further the recourse to normal forest law would not have the desired effect of effectively preventing him from indulging in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and therefore there is a compelling necessity to pass an order of detention with a view to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities in future.
No doubt true it is that the second Respondent Detaining Authority did not at all refer to, while considering imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his further indulging in prejudicial activities affecting the maintenance of public order, any bail application having been moved and the result thereof. He would, however, state in so positive a fashion, that in similar cases, as the detenu now got himself involved, he was aware a person, like the detenu, is enlarged on bail by the Court, before which, he is facing Prosecution or the Superior Court after the lapse of sometime. This is the ground or the basis or material on which the second Respondent Detaining Authority derived the solidified subjective satisfaction that there was an imminent possibility of the detenu coming out on bail and his indulging in further prejudicial activities affecting the maintenance of public order. Such a reasoning, we rather feel, dawned on him, as a result of the experience he gained in the day to day working of Courts. After all, in the ultimate analysis, law is nothing but the resultant product of experience and nothing more. The experience gained by the second Respondent-Detaining Authority made him to pen down so, for his deriving the subjective satisfaction as to the imminent possibility of the detenu being released on bail and his getting indulged in further prejudicial activities affecting the maintenance of public order. The reasoning, as given by the second Respondent Detaining Authority is more than adequate and sufficient for arriving at the subjective satisfaction he had derived. In such state of affairs, we rather feel, that the fact that the detenu had not filed any application before ever the impugned order of detention was passed was of no consequence. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the decision in the case of Rivadeneyta Ricardo Agustin (Supra) is of no assistant in advancing or projecting the case of the detenu to any extent whatever. We again reiterate, for the sake of emphasis, that the second Respondent Detaining Authority was rather satisfied in deriving the subjective satisfaction for clamping upon the detenu the impugned order of detention for the reason he has stated in paragraph 5 of the grounds of detention. In this view of the matter, this point, as urged by learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has to face dismal failure and the same is accordingly rejected.
Point No. 4: Admittedly, the impugned order of detention was passed on 25.11.1995 and the same had been executed on 27.11.1995, in the sense of the detenu having been detained at Central Prison, Vellore. From a perusal of the file, we are able to discern that one Subramani, father of the detenu, had been served with an intimation on 28.11.1995 informing him that his son, the detenu had been detained on 27.11.1995 at Central Prison, Vellore, pursuant to an order passed under the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. It is thus crystal clear that an intimation had been served on the father of the detenu with all relevant and required particulars on the next day of the detention of the detenu, that is to say, on 28.11.1995 itself. As such, practically there is no delay at all in serving due and proper intimation on the father of the detenu. As such, this point is also answered against the detenu.
Point No. 5: A hullabaloo, ado and much fuss had been made by learned Counsel for the Petitioner in projecting an argument that the detenu, hailing from the State of Andrha Pradesh, does not know either to read or write Tamil language and he knows to read and write only Telugu, his mother tongue and that from the fact that he had been furnished with copies of the impugned order of detention, grounds of detention and the documents relied upon for formulation of grounds of detention in Tamil, it goes without saying that the detenu''s right inhering in his favour under Article 22(5) of the Constituting of India in making an effective and purposeful representation had been infringed and consequently, the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside. Such a flamboyant argument, on the face of it, appears to be very attractive. But, the utter untenability, taking shelter under such an argument, would get pierced, if we made a deep probe into the relevant facts and circumstances of the case in that regard.
(a) First of all, not even a whisper had been made in the affidavit filed in support of the petition that the detenu knows to read and write only Telugu language and did not at all have any knowledge of Tamil language either to read or write.
(b) What is further worse is that he had not stated so in his representation dated 11.12.1995, but signed on 12.12.1995, sent to the first Respondent-Government.
(c) The further agonising factor is that in the said representation, he had not even asked for copies of all relevant documents in Telugu, so that he could make an effective and purposeful representation.
(d) Yet another factor, about which we have to take note of, is that the said representation had been sent in just English language and he had signed the said representation also in English. The said representation also runs for about three pages.
(e) The further interrogating factor is that immediately after his arrest, he was stated to have voluntarily given his confessional statement to the sponsoring authority, which is available at page 50, of the booklet of documents furnished to the detenu. The said confessional statement had been recorded in Tamil. It is not as if the detenu had given the confessional statement in Telugu and that the same had been translated and written in Tamil. But the sordid fact is that by mere perusal of such a confessional statement, one can very well, understand that the said confessional statement had been recorded as per his narration in his own words in Tamil. As the language in which it is recorded, as already stated, is after all in Tamil and for such a person, like the detenu, who has given such a statement, to say now that he had no knowledge of Tamil cannot at all be countenanced.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner intruded at this juncture and stated that the detenu, in fact, had given a representation dated 5.1.1996 before the Advisory Board claiming that he is not conversant with Tamil language at all and copies of all the relevant documents were required to be given in Telugu, a language he knows. To vouchsafe the tenability of such a statement, we looked into the file and the said representation is available at page 351, which is in English. When we pursued the said representation, we are unable to find anything having been stated, as submitted by learned Counsel for the Petitioner, as relatable to his not knowing either to read or write Tamil but only Telugu. In such state of affairs, it is nothing but an argument made for argument''s sake without any purpose at all. In such circumstances, we are of the firm opinion that a dare devil attempt had been made by the detenu to somehow or other get himself freed from the consequences flowing from the clutches of law, by resortment to raising all such untenable claims before this Court, at the time of arguments. This point also has to face a colossal failure and the same is also rejected.
In view of our findings on point Nos. 1 to 5 having gone against the detenu, it goes without saying that the Habeas Corpus petition deserves to be dismissed, and the same is accordingly dismissed.