High CourtsSingle Bench

Sudarshanprasad Pandey vs Rajaram Shukla

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 30 April 1971 · Citation: (1972) MPLJ 747

HON’BLE JUDGES
Bishambhar Dayal, C.J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 — Section 12, 12(1)(a), 12(1)(e), 13, 15
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
C.A. No. 18 of 1967
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

7 paragraphs · 522 words

Bishambhar Dayal, C.J.

This is plaintiff''s second appeal in a suit for ejectment of the defendant-tenant from an accommodation to which the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, is applicable.

The suit was filed on two grounds (1) that the tenant was in arrears of rent and had not paid the same as required by section 12(1)(a) of the Act, and (2) that the accommodation was required bona fide by the landlord for his own personal use within the meaning of section 12(1)(e) of the Act. The trial Court disallowed the ground of bona fide requirement as the requisite, period after purchase of two months had not expired. It, however, decreed the suit on the ground of arrears of rent. The tenant thereafter filed an appeal which was allowed and decree of the trial Court was reversed as the conditions necessary u/s 12(1)(a) of the Act were not complied with. A notice of demand (Ex. P.-3) had been served on the defendant-tenant on 9th March 1964 to make payment within two months. That period of two months expired on 8th May 1964. The suit in this case was filed on 6th May 1964 before the period of two months had expired. The lower appellate Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the suit as no cause of action had arisen on the date when the suit was filed.

Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contended that in any case during the pendency of the suit the tenant had failed to comply with the provisions of section 13 of the Act by making the necessary deposits and his defence ought to have been barred. The learned counsel requests that the defence of the defendant-tenant may be barred now so that he is unable to take a defence u/s 12 of the Act. Subsection (1) of section 15 starts with the following words:

On a suit or proceeding being instituted by the landlord on any of the grounds referred to in section 12, the tenant shall.

The condition precedent for the application of section 13, therefore is that the suit must be based on one of the grounds mentioned in section 12. These words must necessarily mean that the suit is properly based on one of the grounds. If none of the grounds exists in favour of the plaintiff and a suit is filed by him falsely stating any of those grounds, it cannot have the effect of applying section 12 to such a suit. In the present case it has been found that both the grounds u/s 12 of the Act which were taken by the plaintiff had not really accrued when the suit was filed. Thus, in fact, the suit was not based on any of the grounds u/s 12. In such a case the provisions of section 13 do not apply and there arising no question or non-compliance of section 13, no order barring the defence of the defendant tenant can be passed.

The appeal is, therefore, dismissed as having no force. But, in view of the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.