Sudershan Singh Sidar vs Govind Vaishnav

Rakesh Mohan Pandey, J

1) Heard on I.A. No. 1/2025, an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

2) The appellants/ claimants have filed this appeal assailing the award dated 18.7.2014 passed in Claim Case No. 7/2012 by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) whereby compensation of Rs. 18,91,864/- has been awarded with interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application till its realization.

3) Learned counsel for the appellants submits that award was passed on 18.7.2014 and thereafter, case file was handed to a local counsel to prefer appeal before the High Court and appellants were under impression that appeal has already been filed but in the year 2025, when the appellants came to Bilaspur and inquired about the status of appeal, they came to know that no appeal has been filed on their behalf. She further submits that immediately thereafter, appellant No. 1 applied for certified copy of the award, which was delivered on 23.10.2025 and this appeal was preferred on 27.10.2025. She prays to condone the delay caused in filing the appeal as same has been explained properly in the application.

4) Heard.

5) In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that after death of sole earning member, the appellants are facing great difficulties to run their livelihood. It is further stated that after passing of the award on 18.7.2014, appellants handed over the case filed to a local counsel to prefer appeal in the High Court and only in year 2025, when the appellants inquired about the status of appeal, they came to know that no appeal has been preferred on their behalf till date and thereafter, the instant appeal has been preferred with delay of 3827 days.

6) It seems that the appellants remained inactive for period of 11 years, failing to inquire about the status of their appeal. Moreover, the application does not indicate that the appellants signed a vakalatnama, which further suggests a lack of diligence in pursuing their case. Given the substantial delay of 3827 days, the appellants have not provided sufficient justification for their inaction.

7) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)1 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:-

“10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below:

Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

11.Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.”

8) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:-

“19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh2 and Ors, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors3, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.

In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors4., where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation.

It  has  also  been  settled  vide  State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors.5, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer6, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.”

9) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:-

“26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”

10) In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimant have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:-

“30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimant have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).”

11) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

12) Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the appellant has not explained the delay properly, therefore the application for condonation of delay [I.A. No. 1/2025] is liable to be and is hereby rejected.

13) Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s).