High CourtsSingle Bench(2007) 12 MAD CK 0222

Sugumari vs The Secretary to Government, Home Department and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 7 December 2007

HON’BLE JUDGES
G. Rajasuria, J
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 2195 of 2007 (O.A. No. 6359 of 2001) and M.P. (MD) No. 1 of 2007

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Judgment

53 paragraphs · 1,027 words

G. Rajasuria, J.—The petitioner filed Original Application in O.A. No. 6359 of 2001 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal;

consequent upon its abolition, the said Original Application was transferred to this court and re-numbered as W.P. 2195 of 2007, to call for the

records relating to the impugned order of Removal from service passed by the fourth respondent herein in his proceedings in C.No. A2/14612/98

dated 02/07/1999 and confirmed by the third respondent herein in his proceedings C.No. A2/10562/IG/99 dated 27/08/1999 and further

confirmed by the second respondent herein in his proceedings No. AP. III(2)/268031/99 dated 28/12/1999 and quash the same and direct the

respondents to reinstate the Applicant into service with all consequential monetary and service benefits.

2.

Heard both sides.

3.

The nutshell facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this writ petition would run thus:

The petitioner while serving as Woman Constable bearing No.4196 in the Tamil Nadu Special Police, VI Battalian, Madurai. It so happened that

she was found illegally in the room of the Inspector of Police, her superior, during midnight under questionable circumstances which resulted in

framing of charges as against the Inspector of Police as well as the writ petitioner herein. Ultimately, the enquiry officer after examining witnesses

and probing into the matter, arrived at the conclusion that the charges were not proved and detailed in his report which was sent to the fourth

respondent, Deputy Inspector General of Police, concerned, who disagreed with the finding and after complying with the procedure, ordered her

removal from service.

4.

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, such an order, she has preferred this petition on the main ground that the petitioner has been deprived

of one opportunity of appeal as the appellate authority assumed to himself the power of the original disciplinary authority in dealing with the matter

and imposed the punishment of removal. The petitioner also ultimately would pray that leniency might be shown as she was only at the relevant time

of the incident, a recruit of one year and half only.

5.

Per contra, the Government Pleader filed counter denying and refuting the allegations and highlighted that the procedure followed was correct

and appropriate punishment was imposed.

6.

The point for consideration is as to whether the appropriate authority dealt with the matter properly and passed orders and whether the

punishment imposed was disproportionately severe?

7.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner drawing the attention of this Court to the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and

Appeal) Rules, 1955, would submit that the appropriate disciplinary authority for ordering her removal from service at the relevant time was only

the fifth respondent, the Commandant and not the fourth respondent, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, who happened to be the appellate

authority. The schedule appended to the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, would clearly contemplate

that the Commandant as the disciplinary authority is competent to order the removal of Woman Police Constable like the petitioner herein from

service and not the Deputy Inspector General of Police as he happened to be the appellate authority.

8.

It is a trite proposition of law that one right of appeal should not be deprived to the charged official. The enquiry officer arrived at the conclusion

that no charges were made out and such a report should have been submitted only to the disciplinary authority namely the Commandant and it is

not known under what circumstances the Deputy Inspector General of Police straight away received the report and passed orders disagreeing with

the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer.

9.

De hors such defects, it has been highlighted during arguments that co-delinquent namely the Inspector of Police concerned was departmentally

dealt with and he was removed from service by virtue of the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who happened to be the

appropriate disciplinary authority for him. But, there is nothing to show that there was any joint enquiry for the Inspector of Police concerned and

the writ petitioner. In the case of joint enquiry, the higher disciplinary authority concerned among the two disciplinary authorities, will be the

disciplinary authority, but in this case, I could see that there was no joint enquiry. The enquiry was separately conducted for the writ petitioner. In

such a case, the appropriate disciplinary authority namely, the Commandant should have dealt with the matter and on that ground, the order of

removal could be interfered with.

10.

Nevertheless, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would rely on the precedent relating to the matter of one Panchavarnam, who was

imposed lesser punishment in similar situation, vide proceedings dated 22.12.1998 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police

(Enforcement) Chennai. The perusal of the said precedent available in the Police Department would show that the said Panchavarnam was treated

leniently relating to similar charges.

11.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore would make an extempore submission that the writ petitioner would be satisfied if any

direction is given to the same authority, namely the Deputy Inspector General of Police to reconsider the matter for lesser punishment instead of

setting aside the entire proceedings resorted to by him.

12.

A fortiori, I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Ex facie and prima facie, it appears

from the charge itself, the Inspector of Police was in a dominating position and the writ petitioner herein was only a recruit, but owing to ignorance,

immaturity and helplessness, she might have been knowingly and unknowingly made to undergo such conduct.

13.

I am of the firm opinion that the Deputy Inspector General of Police, the fourth respondent would consider this aspect and take a decision for

imposing any other punishment other than the one of removing her from service. It has also been brought to my notice that by virtue of the order of

the Administrative Tribunal, she continues in service and by this time, she has put in more than five years of service.

14.

Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No costs.