SUKHBIR SINGH vs National Insurance Co. Ltd.

THIS matter has come up before us for deciding the preliminary issue of the maintainability of this proceeding.

IT would be quite proper to look at certain facts giving rise to the present proceeding. The applicant was the owner of one light commercial vehicle bearing RTO Registration No. HRJ 3959 (the vehicle for convenience). IT was insured with respondent No. 1 with a comprehensive insurance risk vide Policy No. 193/ 6309905 and the insurance policy was very much in force during March, 1983. The vehicle met with an accident on 30th March, 1983. The applicant lodged a claim with respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 3 duly acknowledged its receipt on behalf of respondent No. 1. That claim did not come to be settled by and on behalf of the respondents. After serving a notice to the respondents on 9th December 1995, the applicant filed a suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge at Jind for recovery of Rs. 59,120/-. IT came to be registered as Civil Suit No. 86 of 1986. IT came to be partly decreed in favour of the applicant by the order passed by the concerned Sub-Judge on 18th August, 1992. The applicant carried the matter in appeal to the extent the full claim was not decreed. The respondents also carried the matter in appeal against the decree passed in favour of the applicant. Both the appeals were preferred before the District Judge at Jind. By the order passed by the District Court in both the appeals, the applicant''s appeal came to be dismissed and the appeal preferred by the respondents came to be accepted and the decree passed by the lower Court came to be set aside. Thereupon the applicant has approached this Commission under Section 12B of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (the MRTP Act for brief), for compensation in the sum of Rs. 42,000/- being the book value of the vehicle with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 1st April, 1983 till payment and damages to the tune of Rs. 5,000/- and for other incidental reliefs. The respondents have filed their reply and have resisted the compensation application on various grounds. IT has inter alia been contended that the applicant''s application is not maintainable. According to the respondents, respondent No. 1 is a public undertaking and it was not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Commission on the date of the alleged accident, that is, on 30th March, 1983. The respondents have also contended that this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain and to try this application in view of Section 4 of the MRTP Act. They have also further contended that the application is hopelessly time-barred. On the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the issues were framed on 5th January, 1998. The issues include the issue as to the maintainability of the present proceeding. By the same order, the issue of the maintainability of the proceeding was ordered to be tried as a preliminary issue.

We have heard learned Advocate Ms. Kaur for the applicant. It is unfortunate that Advocate Mr. Pradeep Gaur has not remained present to assist this Commission on the issue of the maintainability of the proceeding though the said issue has been raised at the instance of the respondents.

IT is not in dispute that respondent No. 1 is a public undertaking. IT is again not in dispute that it was not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Commission prior to 27th September, 1991. IT is again not in dispute that the accident in question occurred on 30th March, 1983. On that date the respondent was not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Commission by virtue of Section 3 of the MRTP Act. This Commission had an occasion to examine whether or not a "public undertaking enjoying protection under Section 3 of the MRTP Act would be amenable to the provisions thereof with respect to an act done or an action taken while such a public undertaking was enjoying immunity from applicability of provisions thereof in its ruling in the case of NPR Motors v. Maharashtra State Electricity Board, reported in (1995) 3 CTJ 177 (MRTPC). The Division Bench of this Commission has ruled that such an undertaking would not be amenable to the jurisdiction of this Commission if the act done or action taken was during the period when such undertaking was immune from applicability of the MRTP Act. The aforesaid Division Bench ruling is on all fours applicable in the present case. As pointed out hereinabove, the accident in question occurred on 30th March, 1983. Respondent No. 1 enjoyed immunity from applicability of the MRTP Act at that time. This Commission has, therefore, no jurisdiction to institute any enquiry proceeding or to entertain any compensation application against respondent No. 1 or for that matter any other respondent under the MRTP Act. Even otherwise, this Commission will not have jurisdiction in view of Section 110F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the M.V. Act for brief). It lays down that the jurisdiction of any and every Civil Court to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area for which such Claims Tribunal has been constituted is barred. It is not the case of the applicant that no Claims Tribunal has come to be constituted for the area in which the alleged accident has taken place. In fact the Appellate Court has set aside the decree passed by the lower Court on the ground that the compensation claim ought to have been preferred before the competent Claims Tribunal.

IT cannot be gainsaid that this Commission is practically a Civil Court for deciding disputes between the parties arising under the MRTP Act. Simply because this Commission is named as the Commission would not make it less a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 110F of the M.V. Act. In its Full Bench ruling in the case of Director General Investigation and Registration v. Holy Angels School, reported in (1998) 6 CTJ 129 (MRTPC), this Commission has held that this Commission is a Court for the purposes of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, this Commission can be treated as a Civil Court for all practical purposes. It may be noted that the term "Civil Court" has not been defined in the M.V. Act. It has not been defined in the MRTP Act. It has also not been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897. Its meaning will, therefore, have to be ascertained from the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court. In its ruling in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, reported in AIR 1956 Supreme Court 66, the term "Court" has been interpreted in the context of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It has been held therein: "It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court shall have, apart from having some of the trappings of a Judicial Tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement."

The present Commission answers the aforesaid test laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court for determining whether or not any particular Authority, Commission or Tribunal is a Court-in the strict sense of the term. This Commission has no doubt certain trappings of a Judicial Tribunal as mentioned in Section 12 of the MRTP Act. It has also power to grant temporary injunctions under Section 12A thereof. It has also power to award compensation as provided in Section 12B thereof. Its orders under the aforesaid statutory provisions contained in Sections 12A and 12B thereof are enforceable as decrees or orders made by a Court in suit proceedings. This Commission has also power to punish for its own contempt under Section 13B thereof and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is designed to have effect subject to certain modifications mentioned therein. It thus becomes clear that this Commission has certain trappings of a judicial Tribunal. It needs no telling that this Commission is empowered to give a decision or a definite judgment which has finality and validity by virtue for Section 36D and Section 37 of "the MRTP Act. The orders passed by this Commission there under are final subject to appeal to the Hon''ble Supreme Court under Section 55 thereof. In that view of the matter, this Commission does satisfy the test of "Court" laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of Brajnandan Sinha (supra).

IT cannot be gainsaid that the nature of disputes arising in the proceeding instituted in this Commission would partake the nature of civil disputes. A Civil Court has to adjudicate upon civil disputes. In that view of the matter, this Commission can be treated as a Civil Court, and as such the bar created under Section 110F of the M.V. Act would squarely apply to this Commission. Any contrary interpretation would amount to usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal by this Commission in such cases as the present one.

IN view of our aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that this compensation application is not maintainable in law and this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain and to adjudicate upon such compensation application. We accordingly answer the issue as to the maintainability of the present compensation application in favour of the respondents and against the applicant. IN the result, this compensation application fails on the ground that it is not maintainable and this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain or to adjudicate upon it. It is hereby rejected with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. It is, however, clarified that this order of this Commission shall not preclude the applicant from approaching the appropriate Claims Tribunal for redressal of his grievances against the respondents, if so desired and advised. C.A. dismissed.