High CourtsDivision Bench

Sukhdev Dhanwar vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Chhattisgarh High Court · Decided on 7 November 2023 · Citation: (2023) 11 CHH CK 0022

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J · Sanjay S. Agrawal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376 · Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 313, 374(2) · Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Section 4, 5, 6, 8, 10
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal No. 962 Of 2016
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Judgment

23 paragraphs · 1,807 words

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J

1.

This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of CrPC has been preferred by the appellant against impugned judgment dated 15/06/2016 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Raigarh in Special Sessions Case No. 90/2014 whereby he has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter the Act of 2012) and has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 2000/- and in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 4 months.

2.

Case of the prosecution, in a nutshell, is that on 31/10/2014 in between 2-3 PM at village Bhuikurri within the ambit of Police Station Punjipathra, the appellant herein committed sexual intercourse with minor victim, aged about 3 years and 8 months and thereby, committed the aforesaid offence.

3.

Further case of the prosecution is that on 01/11/2014, victim’s mother (PW-1) lodged first information report (Ex. P/1) against the appellant that on 31/10/2014, victim was playing at the house of her uncle Harikrishna Manjhi (PW-4) and at about 3 PM, when her mother went therein to take her back to her house, she noticed that victim was not at her uncle’s house and when he asked them, they informed her that appellant came to their house and took the victim to his house to play and when victim’s aunt Yambai (PW-2) went to the appellant’s house and came back with the victim, they found out that she was crying and she had suffered injury. On the said report, after taking consent from victim’s parents, she was subjected to medical examination which was conducted by Dr. Usharani (PW-6) and her MLC report (Ex. P/6) was found positive. Slides were prepared and seized vide Ex. P/8 and the FSL report (page 68 of the paper book) was also found positive. After due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 4 of the Act of 2012 which was committed to the Court of Special Judge for trial in accordance with law. The appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence.

4.

In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses and brought on record 18 documents. Statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein he denied guilt, however, he examined none in his defence and neither brought any document on record.

5.

Learned Special Judge, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 4 of the Act of 2012 and sentenced him as aforesaid.

6.

Mr. F.S. Khare, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that as per the statement of Dr. Usharani (PW-6), victim could have suffered the injuries on her private part on account of fall and moreover, victim has not been examined before the Court and the appellant has been convicted by the Special Judge mainly relying upon the statement of victim’s mother (PW-1), as such, appellant is liable to be acquitted. In alternative, he would submit that even if the date when the offence in question is said to have been committed is considered, the unamended provision of Section 4 of the Act of 2012 will come into play, wherein the minimum punishment for offence punishable under Section 4 of Act of 2012 was 10 years’ RI and the same was amended w.e.f. 16.08.2019. Therefore, the present appellant be sentenced for a period of 10 years’ RI by reducing it from imprisonment for life, as awarded by the learned trial Court. He would reply upon the deision of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sonu Kushwaha (2023) 7 SCC 475 to buttress his submission.

7.

Per contra, Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned State counsel, would submit that prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and since the victim was aged only about 3 years and 8 months, therefore, she has not been examined before the Court and moreover, victim’s medical report (Ex. P/6) as well as the FSL report (page 68 of the paper book) have been found positive, as such, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the aforesaid offence and therefore, the instant appeal is liable to be dismissed.

8.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

9.

The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for the offence in question ?

10.

Victim, who is a minor only aged about 3 years and 8 months, was medically examined by Dr. Usharani (PW-6) and her medical report (Ex. P/6) has been found positive which has also been supported by the FSL report (page 68 of the paper book), as such, considering the MLC report (Ex. P/6) and the FSL report (page 68 of the paper book) and also considering the statements of victim’s mother (PW-1), her aunt Yambai (PW-2) and Dr. Usharani (PW-6), we are of the opinion that the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 4 of the Act of 2012.

11.

Now the next question for consideration is whether, as claimed by learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is entitled for reduction in the sentence of life imprisonment as awarded by the trial Court for offence punishable under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 4 of the Act of 2012 ?

12.

In the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court finding the accused therein to be guilty of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault punishable under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 proceeded to convict him for the said offence and upon further finding that the minimum punishment prescribed for offence punishable under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 at the time when offence was committed i.e. prior to 16.08.2019, was 10 years’ RI, awarded him sentence for 10 years’ RI with fine of Rs.5,000/- and held in Para-11, 12 & 13 as under:

“11. Section 6, as applicable before its substitution on 16-08-2019, read thus:

"6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine."

On the date of the commission of the offence, rigorous imprisonment for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. From 16th August 2019, the minimum sentence has been enhanced to twenty years. However, the amended provision will not apply to this case as the incident has taken place prior to 16th August 2019.

12.

Surprisingly, the High Court has observed that Section 5 was not applicable, and the offence committed by the respondent falls under the category of a lesser offence of penetrative sexual assault, which is punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. Thus, the High Court committed an obvious error by holding that the act committed by the respondent was not an aggravated penetrative sexual assault. In fact, the Special Court was right in punishing the respondent under Section 6 and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs.5,000/.

13.

The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6, on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology "shall not be less than.", the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act.

14.

Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim-child will be life-long. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court.

15.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 18th November 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.5415 of 2018 is quashed and set aside and the judgment and order dated 24th August 2018 passed by the learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge POCSO Act, Jhansi in Special Session Trial No.134 of 2016 is restored. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.5415 of 2018 filed before the High Court stands dismissed. The respondent shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and shall pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-.”

13.

In that view of the matter and considering the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra), while affirming the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 376 of IPC read with Section 4 of the Act of 2012, we award him sentence for a period of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment by reducing it from imprisonment for life as awarded by the trial Court as in the present case also date of offence is 31/10/2014 i.e. prior to 16/08/2019 when minimum sentence under Section 4 of the Act of 2012 was enhanced, as such, principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sonu Kushwaha (supra) would apply. However, the fine sentence and default sentence shall remain intact.

14.

This criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.

15.

Let a certified copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned trial Court along with the original records as well as to the jail for information and compliance.