Sukhdev Singh vs Union of India (UOI)

G.C. Garg, J.—Whether the landowner is entitled to pay additional court fee at any time after the disposal of his appeal and consequently claim enhanced compensation is the sole question that falls for consideration here.

Applicant''s Letters Patent Appeal was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court on January 30, 1989 along with a large number of appeals holding the applicant and other landowners entitled to a higher rate of compensation than the one allowed by the learned Single Judge. Through an application dated November 26, 1990 apparently filed in January, 1992, the applicant has prayed that he be allowed to pay additional court fee so a to entitle him to get the enhanced compensation as awarded by the Division Bench. The only ground alleged in the application is that at the time of hearing in the appeal, an oral request was made on behalf of the applicant that he be permitted to make good the deficiency in court fee during such time as may be fixed by the Court. From a reading of the order passed by the Division Bench dated January 30, 1989, it cannot be made out that such a request was made on behalf of the applicant. The order is quite silent in this behalf.

In order to seek the relief claimed in the application in hand, learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the orders of Division Bench in Civil Misc. 211 (LPA) of 1990 in LPA 1526 of 1987; and Civil Misc. 243 of 1990 in LPA 1055 of 1987, besides relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Nand Ram v. The State of Haryana 1988 PLJ 505. According to the learned counsel for the applicant the orders in the aforesaid two Civil Misc. applications were passed in the connected appeals and the landowners were allowed to pay additional court fee so as to enable them to take the benefit of the enhanced amount of compensation. Civil Misc. 211 (LPA) of 1990 was filed on April 22, 1989 after the disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal on January 30, 1989. Having regard to the observations of the apex Court in Nand Ram''s case the landowners were allowed two months time to make up the deficiency in court fee, by order dated September 6, 1990. In Civil Misc. 243 (LPA) of 1990, the landowners were allowed to make up the deficiency in court fee by order dated November 1, 1990, in view of the order passed in Civil Misc. 211 (LPA) of 1990. Civil Misc. 243 (LPA) of 1990 was apparently filed in the month of January 1990.

Still few other similar applications in similar circumstances were also filed in the connected appeals. These applications came up for final disposal before a Division Bench and were dismissed by order dated February 26, 1991 passed in Civil Misc. 85 (LPA) of 1991 in LPA 1187 of 1987, wherein the prayer for making up deficiency in the court fee was made after about two years of the decision of the Letters Patent Appeal and the only reason alleged in the application was that the certified copy of the judgment was supplied very late i.e. after about 13 months of the decision of the appeal. Besides, the decisions of the apex Court in Bhag Singh and Others Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh through the land acquisition collector, Chandigarh, . and in Nand Ram''s case (supra) were also relied upon by the landowners. On a consideration of the entire matter, the Division Bench, as noticed above, dismissed the application by observing as follows :

"After hearing the counsel for the applicant, we do not find any justification for allowing the applicant to make up the deficiency in court fee after about two years. The certified copy of the judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal, was not at all required for making up the deficiency. The judgments referred to above are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In Bhag Singh''s case (supra) the claimants had approached the Supreme Court against a judgment delivered in Letters Patent Appeal in which the Division Bench had restricted the benefit of the enhanced compensation only to those claimants who had made payment of proper court fee. Thus, that was not a case of making up deficiency in court fee alone. Similarly, in Nand Ram''s case (supra) the question of allowing to make up deficiency of court fee after such a long delay was not decided. The principle laid down therein could not be disputed. In the present case, the applicant himself is responsible for not approaching this Court for making up deficiency in court fee within the reasonable time. Consequently, all the Civil Misc. applications fail and are dismissed."

The vexed question with which we are dealing here once again came up for scrutiny before the apex Court in The Scheduled Caste Co-operative Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda Vs. Union of India and others, In that case, the Land Owning Society filed Regular First Appeal in the year 1981 which was allowed on November 10, 1981. After a lapse of almost six years, the petitioner-society preferred an application for allowing it to make good the deficiency in the court fee and for amending the order and decree of the learned Single Judge so as to grant to it additional compensation with enhanced solatium and interest, as per the amendment made in the Land Acquisition Act by Act 68 of 1984. This matter came up for hearing before a Division Bench. Before the Division Bench, the observations made in Bhag Singh''s case (supra) were pressed into service. Having regard to the importance of the question, the Division Bench referred the matter to a larger Beach and ultimately came to be heard by a Full Bench. The application of the petitioner society along with the applications of many other landowners was dismissed by the Full Bench on May 17, 1988. While dismissing the applications, the Full Bench took note of certain directions given by the apex Court. It would be worthwhile to notice the observations made by the Full Bench which reads thus:

"such relief, if granted, will encourage the practice of not paying the court fee in the hope that as and when the valuation is determined in appeal they will invoke the jurisdiction u/s 151 of the Code for paying court fee and receiving enhanced compensation "

Further, it was observed, that such an undesirable practice should not be encouraged but should be put to an end at the earliest. The Supreme Court in this backdrop, observed that the Full Bench of the High Court, therefore, rightly held that to permit payment of deficit court fee for recovering enhanced compensation after a lapse of almost six years under its inherent jurisdiction would encourage the practice of not paying the court fee in the hope that as and when the valuation is determined in appeal, the jurisdiction of the court can be invoked u/s 151 of the Code and the benefit of enhanced compensation can be reaped by making good the deficit court fee.

In the proceedings in hand, as noticed earlier, the application for allowing the applicant to pay additional court fee, though bearing the date of November 26, 1990, apparently had been filed in January 1992, ie., after a lapse of about three years and in any case after about two years, of the disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal which was decided on January 30, 1989. The only reason alleged in the application is that at the time of final hearing in the appeal an oral request was made for allowing the applicant to pay additional court fee. But this allegation of the applicant is not supported by any fact on record. If the applicant was aware that in order to claim the benefit of enhanced compensation, he was required to pay the deficit court fee, he should have applied for doing so immediately or at least on getting the copy of the judgment or in any shortly thereafter. The judgment relied upon by the applicant in Nand Ram''s case (supra) cannot be read to mean that a landowner is entitled to pay court fee after any amount of delay. The applicant could make request for payment of deficit court fee at the time of hearing of the appeal or at best at the time of pronouncement of the order Since nothing of the sort was done for at least three years, we feel that the applicant was remiss in approaching the Court for permission to pay the additional court fee within the reasonable time. There is, therefore, no justification whatsoever to allow the applicant to pay the additional court fee at this highly belated stage. The application is consequently dismissed.